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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
2SLS = Two-stage least squares regression 
AMEX = American Stock Exchange 
APT = Arbitrage pricing theory 
B/M = Book to market equity ratio 
BP = Breusch-Pagan test 
BSD = Broad spectrum diversification 
CAPM = Capital asset pricing model 
CD = Pesaran's CD statistic 
CEO = Chief executive officer 
Chisq = Chi-Quadrat-Test 
DCF = Discounted cash flow 
DE = Germany 
EEA = European Economic Area 
EFV = Excess firm value 
EMH = Efficient market hypothesis 
EPS = Earnings per share 
F-Stat. = F-statistic 
GOS = Growth on sales 
HML = High minus low book to market portfolio 
i.i.d. = independent identically distributed 
IBV = Institutional-based view 
ICB = Industrial classification benchmark 
JP = Japan 
MNSD = Mean narrow spectrum diversification 
NASDAQ = 
National Association of Securities Dealers Automated 
Quotations 
NP = Net profits 
NSD = Narrow spectrum diversification 
NYAM = New York or American stock exchange 
NYSE = The New York Stock Exchange 
OLS = Ordinary least squares 
PIN = Probability of informed trading 
q-ratio = Tobin’s Q 
REITs = Real estate investment trusts 
13 Acronyms and Abbreviations  
RMSEA = Root mean square error of approximation 
ROA = Return on assets 
ROCF = Return on cash flows 
ROE = Return on equity 
ROI = Return on investment 
ROS = Return on sales 
SDDS = Standard deviation of daily stock price changes 
SDROA = Standard deviation of a firm’s return on assets 
SDROCF = Standard deviation of a firm’s return on cash flows 
SDROS = Standard deviation of a firm’s return on sales 
SIC = 
Standard Industrial Classification system of the United 
States Census Bureau 
SMB = Small minus big portfolio 
SML = Security market line 
SS 
loadings 
= Sum of squared loadings 
SW test = Shapiro-Wilk normality test 
U.K. = United Kingdom 




a = Coefficient relating the independent and mediator variable 
AVit = Total capital of firm i at time t 
b = 
Coefficient relating the mediator and dependent variable 
adjusted for the effect of X 
BDIV[N] = Diversification dummy based on [N]-digit SIC codes 
c = Coefficient relating the independent and dependent variable 
c′ = 
Coefficient relating the independent and dependent variable 
adjusted for the effect of M 
cit = Relative illiquidity costs of stock i at time t 
cMt = Relative market illiquidity costs at time t 
CAPEXit = Capital expenditure of firm i at time t 
CF = Cash flow 
dt = Unobservable time effects 
DW = Extent of diversification based on weighted business count 
D&Ait = Depreciation and amortization expenses of firm i at time t 
DIVit = Proxy for corporate diversification of firm i at time t 
DIVit10 = Level of diversification of firm i at time t when below 10% 
DIVit1025 = 
Level of diversification of firm i at time t when between 10% 
and 25% 
DIVit25 = Level of diversification of firm i at time t when above 25% 
DPit = Firm i dividend paid out at time t 
E() = Expected value operator 
e−rt = Continuous compound rate at time t 
EFVit = 
Excess firm value of firm i at time t based on either the 
business count approach or market-implied approach 
EFVit
B = 




Excess firm value of firm i at time t based on the market-
implied approach 
ETDIV = Degree of diversification based on the Entropy measure 
FCEit = Flow to equity of firm i at time t 
ffi = Free float fraction of firm i 
15 Symbols  
f(Ri) = Marginal distribution of 𝑅𝑖. 
f(Ri|φi) = 
Distribution of 𝑅𝑖 conditional on the information signal 𝜑𝑖 
from the information structure η 
gt = 
Economic indicator variable with a value of one if the 
performance of the EURO STOXX 50 Total Return index is 
positive and zero otherwise 
H[N]DIV = 
Revenue-based Herfindahl index based on [N]-digit SIC 
codes 
HML = Expected risk premium on the value factor 
i1… i3 = Intercepts 
ILLIQt = Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio at time t 
INTit = Interest expenses of firm i at time t 
I(V)it = 
Imputed value of the sum of a firm’s segments as stand-
alone firms at time t 
I(V)it
m = 
Imputed value of the sum of a firm’s segments as stand-
alone firms based on market-implied approach at time t 
LR2t = Liquidity ratio 2 at time t 
M = Mediator 
Mijt = 
Multiple of total capital to sales for the median single-
segment firm in segment j’s industry at time t 
Mijt
m  = 
Multiple of total capital to sales for the median single-
segment firm in segment j’s industry based on market-
implied approach at time t 
MCOUNT = Degree of market diversification based on numerical count 
MDIV = Degree of market implied diversification 
MHDIV = 
Degree of market diversification based on Herfindahl 
weighting scheme 
Nδ = Number of significant regression coefficients 
Nδt = Number of significant regression coefficients at time t 
ni = Unobservable individual effects 
ni
s = Issued shares of firm i 
NP = Number of assets in the portfolio 
NSIC = 
Number of different SIC categories constituting the corporate 
portfolio 
NSIC2 = 
Number of different two-digit SIC categories constituting the 
corporate portfolio 
NSIC4 = 
Number of different four-digit SIC categories constituting the 
corporate portfolio 
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NSIC,t = 
Number of different SIC categories constituting the corporate 
portfolio at time t 
nT = Number of trades in a given time period T 
NDit = Net debt issuance of firm i at time t 
NOPATit = Net operating income after tax of firm i at time t 
NWCit = Net working capital of firm i at time t 
OPEXit = Operational expenditure of firm i at time t 
PV = Present value of an entitlement to uncertain cash flows 
pi = Transaction price of trade i 
pi
SIC = Share of the ith business relative to the firm as a whole 
pi
SIC2 = Share of the ith industry group relative to the firm as a whole 
pi
SIC4 = 
Share of the ith industry segment relative to the firm as a 
whole 
Pi,t  Price of security i at time t 
pt
A = Best asked price at time t 
pt
B = Best bid price at time t 
pt
M = Mid-price at time t 
pli = Probability of liquidation event for stock i 
qi = Number of shares of trade i 
r = Risk-adjusted rate of return 
R2 = Coefficient of determination 
rf = Return on the risk-free asset 
ri = Stock price return of asset i 
Ri = Return on security i in an event period of interest 
Ri,t+1 = One-period percentage change return of security i 
Rj
g
 = Equilibrium gross (market-observed) return 
rj,k
∗  = Equilibrium net (market-unobserved) return 
rt−1,t = Return from period t - 1 to t 
RSj = Relative bid-ask spread 
RTVt = Relative transaction volume at time t 
RVit = Measure of relative firm value of firm i at time t 
Sj = 
Multivariate return series of STOXX® EUROPE 600 sector 
indices 
SMB = Expected risk premium on the size factor 
Srel
Mt = Relative spread calculated with mid-prices 
STt = Stock turnover at time t 
17 Symbols  
SVit = Shareholder value of firm i at time t 
wi = Assigned weight summed over all of a firm’s businesses 
X = Independent variable 
xiP = Share of asset i in the portfolio 
Xit = 
Set of exogenous observable firm characteristics of firm i at 
time t 
xjit = Firm-specific control variables of firm i at time t 
Y = Dependent variable 
   
   
𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑛 = Constant regression coefficients 
𝛽𝑑𝑖𝑣 = Regression coefficient for diversification term 
𝛽𝑖 = 
Sensitivity of returns on the ith asset against movements in 
the return on the market portfolio 
𝛽𝑖𝑡 = 
Sensitivity of returns on the ith asset against movements in 
the return on the market portfolio 
𝛽𝑖𝑡
𝐿1…𝛽𝑖,𝑡
𝐿3 = Liquidity betas estimated for firm i at time t 
𝛽ℎ𝑖 = Sensitivity of returns on asset i against the value factor 
𝛽𝑠𝑖 = Sensitivity of returns on asset i against the size factor 
Δ𝐽 = Sum of the absolute regression coefficients 
𝛿𝑖𝑗𝑡
2 = Jth squared regression coefficients of firm i at time t 
𝛿𝑥 / 𝛿𝑖 = Vector of regression parameters 
𝜖𝑖𝑡 = Error term of firm i at time t 
λ = Risk premium 
𝜇𝑖 = Expected return on asset i 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 = Stochastic disturbance term of firm i at time t 
𝜇𝑀 = Expected return on the market portfolio 
𝜇𝑃 = Expected portfolio return 
𝜌𝑖𝑗 = Correlation coefficient based on the returns of assets i and j 
𝜌𝑖𝑀 = 
Correlation coefficient between the returns on asset i and the 
market portfolio 
𝜎𝑖/𝑗 = Standard deviation of the returns on asset i / j 
𝜎𝑖𝑀 = 
Covariance between the returns on the asset and the market 
portfolio 
𝜎𝑀
2  = Variance of the returns on the market portfolio 
𝜎𝑗 = Standard deviation of the returns of assets j 
Φ𝑡 = Set of available information at time t 
𝜑𝑖 = 
Signal from information structure η announced in the event 
period that potentially affects security i 
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 “OF all of the outstanding characteristics of business firms perhaps 
the most inadequately treated in economic analysis is the diversification of 
their activities, sometimes called “spreading of production” or 
“integration”, which seems to accompany their growth.”1 
I.1. RESEARCH MOTIVATION AND RELEVANCE 
Although decades have passed since Ansoff’s (1957) and Chandler’s (1962) 
observation that firms seek growth2, the nature of the relationship between 
corporate portfolio strategy and shareholder value remains a puzzle.3 Holistically, 
the corporate portfolio strategy makes statements about a firm’s commitment to 
diversify per se, defines the scope of a firm’s business activities, and is a critical 
engine for attaining competitive advantages through market power advantages or 
internal market efficiencies.4 The portfolio configuration directly influences the 
profitability, both systematic and unsystematic firm risk, as well as the internal 
culture of the multibusiness firm.5 Very (1993) concisely summarises the strategic 
importance of diversification when he states: “Portfolio diversification is sometimes the 
only way to achieve growth for a company, or the only way to survive when sales and 
profitability of the core business are declining […] and will be a strategic option largely 
used by managers to reach the long-term objectives planned to ensure the future of the 
firm.”56 
                                                          
1 Penrose, 2009, p. 79. 
2 Cp. Ansoff, 1957, p. 113ff.; Chandler, 1962, p. 1ff. 
3 Instead of many, see Bausch & Pils, 2009, p. 179; Benito‐Osorio et al., 2012, p. 
328ff.; Martin & Sayrak, 2003, p. 42ff.; Palich et al., 2000, p. 155. 
4 Cp. Palich et al., 2000, p. 156ff.; Piscitello, 2004, p. 762ff. 
5 Cp. Bettis & Mahajan, 1985, p. 785ff.; Datta et al., 1991, p. 534ff.; Erdorf et al., 
2013, p. 189ff.; Zhou, 2011, p. 624ff. 
6 Very, 1993, p. 80. 
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Though corporate diversification has a rich tradition as a topic of research for 
almost 50 years, recent meta-analytic reviews of the diversification literature by 
Benito‐Osorio et al. (2012), Erdorf et al. (2013), and Martin and Sayrak (2003) 
indicate much confusion about the net effects of diversification on shareholder 
value.7 The research findings oscillate between the two extremes “Diversification 
creates shareholder wealth” and “Diversification destroys shareholder wealth” as 
the prominent position. In the words of Scharfstein and Stein (2000): “In RECENT 
YEARS, it has become almost axiomatic among researchers in finance and strategy that a 
policy of corporate diversification is typically value reducing.” 8 Early research studies by 
Berger and Ofek (1995) and Lang and Stulz (1994) find that, on average, 
diversification is a value decreasing activity and that diversified firms sell at mean 
discounts of approximately 15% and 54% compared to non-diversified firms, 
respectively.89 Their seminal contributions have been replicated using various 
methodologies, periods, and firm samples showing that the diversification 
discount is a widespread phenomenon.910 
Previous studies predominately assess differences in future cash flows to 
explain the different valuations of diversified firms and focused firms. While 
agency cost arguments explain potential discounts in valuation11, the benefits of 
diversification are driven by debt coinsurance effects12 or operating synergies in the 
form of economies of scale and scope13. An alternative interpretation is that the 
findings of a diversification discount could be illusory and attributable to factors 
                                                          
7 Cp. Benito‐Osorio et al., 2012, p. 328f.; Erdorf et al., 2013, p. 192ff.; Martin & 
Sayrak, 2003, p. 42ff. 
8 Scharfstein & Stein, 2000, p. 2537. 
9 Cp. Berger & Ofek, 1995, p. 50; Lang & Stulz, 1994, p. 1268. 
10 For a detailed review of the diversification literature, see section II.4.2. 
11 Cp. Amihud & Lev, 1981, p. 605ff.; Denis et al., 1997, p. 135ff.; Jensen, 1986, p. 
323ff.; Ozbas & Scharfstein, 2010, p. 581ff.; Rajan et al., 2000, p. 35ff.; Shin & Stulz, 
1998, p. 531ff.; Stulz, 1990, p. 3ff. 
12 Cp. Hann et al., 2013, p. 1961ff.; Higgins & Schall, 1975, p. 93ff.; Lewellen, 1971, 
p. 521ff. 
13 Cp. Bailey & Friedlaender, 1982, p. 1026f.; Lubatkin & Chatterjee, 1994, p. 
114ff.; Palich et al., 2000, p. 159. 
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other than corporate diversification such as an endogeneity bias14, sample selection 
bias15, or construct validation bias16. Another reason for the inconclusive findings 
on the net benefits of diversification is a growing confusion on how to best measure 
corporate diversification.17 The different findings on the valuation effects of 
diversification might merely result from the fact that researchers have used various 
measurement concepts that tap different aspects of the diversification 
phenomenon. 
The disparity in research findings as outlined above not only highlights the 
complexity surrounding the diversification-performance linkage but also calls for 
a shift from the “average effect” of diversification to the identification of 
“moderating effects” that are likely to affect the influence of diversification on the 
market value of the firm.18 Among the most often cited factors that might control 
the influence of diversification on a firm’s value are industry affiliation19, home 
country environment20, differences in actual and expected returns21, and the time 
period22. 
The focus of this research study, instead, is on the effect of stock liquidity on 
the diversification-performance relationship. If investor care about stock liquidity 
and demand higher expected returns for illiquid assets than for otherwise similar 
                                                          
14 Cp. Campa & Kedia, 2002, p. 1731ff.; Dimitrov & Tice, 2006, p. 1465ff.; Graham 
et al., 2002, p. 695ff.; Santarelli & Tran, 2016, p. 31ff.; Villalonga, 2004b, p. 5ff. 
15 Cp. Erdorf et al., 2013, p. 197f.; Maksimovic & Phillips, 2008, p. 673ff.; Mitton 
& Vorkink, 2010, p. 1367ff. 
16 Cp. Chatterjee & Blocher, 1992, p. 874ff.; Davis & Duhaime, 1992, p. 511ff.; 
Hoskisson et al., 1993, p. 215ff.; Robins & Wiersema, 2003, p. 39ff. 
17 Cp. Bausch & Pils, 2009, p. 165; Zechser & Rojahn, 2017, p. 458. 
18 Cp. Datta et al., 1991, p. 533f.; de la Fuente & Velasco, 2015, p. 2. 
19 Cp. Grant & Jammine, 1988, p. 333ff.; Jones et al., 1977, p. 195ff.; Santalo & 
Becerra, 2008, p. 851ff. 
20 Cp. Khanna & Palepu, 1997, p. 41ff.; Kogut et al., 2002, p. 162ff.; Lee et al., 2008, 
p. 47ff.; Wan & Hoskisson, 2003, p. 27ff. 
21 Cp. Lamont & Polk, 2001, p. 1693ff.; Mitton & Vorkink, 2010, p. 1367ff. 
22 Cp. Basu, 2010, p. 87ff.; Fauver et al., 2003, p. 135ff.; Hubbard & Palia, 1999, p. 
1131ff. 
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liquid assets as predicted by, among others, Amihud and Mendelson (1986)23, then 
variations in stock liquidity should affect a firm’s stock market value.24  
To the extent that the potential for agency costs increases with the degree of 
corporate diversification, either due to an informational advantage of insiders over 
outside investors or higher costs for acquiring information25, greater diversification 
can lead to higher illiquidity premiums and an undervaluation of the issuer’s 
shares. However, there are also opposing studies arguing that corporate 
diversification might lessen the adverse-selection problem26 or reduce the 
inventory holding costs of the liquidity provider by reducing stock market 
volatility27. 
Despite the intuitive and theoretical appeal of stock illiquidity as a cause for 
the diversification discount, a great deal remains to be done in applying those ideas 
to empirical research. Empirical research on the mediating effects of stock liquidity 
has been proven difficult as liquidity does not lend itself to easy measurement. 
Consequently, the results of the few research studies available are contradictory 
showing both lower and higher liquidity scores for equity instruments of 
diversified firms.28 Besides, most studies are conducted using information from the 
real estate investment trust industry that can have very different risk-return 
profiles compared to corporate firms. 
  
                                                          
23 Cp. Amihud & Mendelson, 1986, p. 225ff. 
24 Cp. Amihud & Mendelson, 2015, p. 160. 
25 Cp. Best et al., 2004, p. 242ff.; Firth et al., 2013, p. 27ff.; Huson & MacKinnon, 
2003, p. 487ff.; Rojahn & Zechser, 2017, p. 20ff. 
26 Cp. Habib et al., 1997, p. 159ff.; Hadlock et al., 2001, p. 614f. 
27 Cp. Benston & Hagerman, 1974, p. 354f. 
28 Cp. Capozza & Seguin, 1999, p. 613; Clarke et al., 2004, p. 115ff.; Francis et al., 
2004, p. 24ff.; Lamont & Polk, 2001, p. 1705ff. 
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I.2. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE AND DIFFERENTIATION 
This research study contributes to the growing body of literature that 
analyses the valuation effects of corporate diversification in three aspects: First, to 
the best of the author’s knowledge, so far there has not been any study done on the 
mediating effects of stock liquidity on the diversification-performance linkage for 
a sample of European non-financial firms. Given that there is no clear empirical 
consensus about the impact of stock illiquidity on the diversification effect, the 
overall objective of this study is to answer the following research question: “Does 
stock liquidity mediate the relationship between corporate diversification and shareholder 
value?”  
Second, the study promotes a new estimator to assess the level of corporate 
diversification. The widely used business count measures require a somewhat 
arbitrary decision about the level of refinement that should be used, and the data 
about these measures is hard to obtain.29 The proposed market-implied 
diversification measures utilise stock market data to assign a firm’s business 
activities into homogenous groups instead of relying on an industry classification 
system. This way, the market-implied measures avoid the limitations inherent in 
the SIC system and, at the same time, take advantage of the benefits of quantitative 
measures.30 
Third, a comprehensive review of the diversification literature reveals that 
most empirical studies on the diversification-performance linkage are conducted 
in the U.S. context31, even though there are strong economic reasons to extend the 
research to other countries. The reason for the limited number of quantitative 
studies on the diversification-performance linkage in Europe might be due to 
differences in the capital market development, regulatory requirements, and legal 
systems across European countries which at least hamper a consolidated European 
view.32 However, it is generally acknowledged that the benefits and costs 
                                                          
29 For a detailed review of the approaches to measure corporate diversification, 
see section II.3. 
30 Cp. Zechser & Rojahn, 2017, p. 458. 
31 For an in-depth review of the diversification literature, see section II.4.2. 
32 Cp. Fauver et al., 2003, p. 140ff. 
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associated with diversification strategies depend upon the ability of the 
institutional environment of a firm’s home country to establish a stable structure 
that facilitates interactions among market participants.33 The more pronounced the 
market imperfections in the external capital markets, product markets, or factor 
markets, the more valuable is the internalisation of external services into the 
company's sphere.34 Benito‐Osorio et al. (2012) and Erdorf et al. (2013) present 
encouraging evidence that the diversification effect might be attributable to 
country-specific moderator variables including corporate governance systems, 
legal understandings (e.g. common law vs civil law), and the orientation of the 
financial system (e.g. bank-based vs market-based).35 Prior findings for the U.S., 
therefore, must not generalise to other countries. With its focus on European 
markets, this study provides further insights into the diversification phenomenon 
outside of the U.S.; thereby reducing the problem of data snooping36. Additionally, 
this study analyses data from 2007 to 2016, covering both economic up- and 
downturns. 
  
                                                          
33 Cp. Benito‐Osorio et al., 2012, p. 331f.; Hoskisson et al., 2000, p. 252ff. 
34 Cp. Fauver et al., 2003, p. 136; Khanna & Palepu, 1997, p. 41ff.; Lee et al., 2008, 
p. 49. 
35 Cp. Benito‐Osorio et al., 2012, p. 332; Erdorf et al., 2013, p. 193f. 
36 For furter reading on the problem of data snooping, instead of many, see Lo 
& MacKinlay, 1990, p. 431ff. 
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I.3. OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION 
The doctoral study is structured in five chapters. Chapter 1 summarises the 
research topic, its relevance to academic research and corporate management, and 
presents the overall objectives of the thesis. 
The second chapter focuses on the relationship between corporate portfolio 
strategy and shareholder value which is one of the core topics of this dissertation. 
By conducting comprehensive literature research, it aims (i) to develop a common 
understanding of the concept of diversification including a discussion of the 
advantages and disadvantages of traditional diversification measures based on SIC 
codes, (ii) to propose a new diversification metric based on stock market data, (iii) 
to explain the benefits and costs associated with diversification strategies, and (iv) 
to present the current state of the empirical research on the diversification-
performance linkage and its determinants.  
The third chapter discusses the effects of liquidity on the pricing process of 
financial assets. Followed by a thorough definition of stock market liquidity and 
detailed decoding of the components of trading costs, two alternative valuation 
models are introduced that are not subject to the neoclassical assumptions. In the 
first, liquidity is a priced stock characteristic, and in the second, liquidity is priced 
as a market level (systematic) risk factor. In each case, it should be verified, whether 
significant valuation effects can be derived using these liquidity-adjusted asset 
pricing models, which then might translate into a liquidity-induced diversification 
premium or discount. Finally, familiar liquidity measurement concepts are 
presented to choose an appropriate liquidity proxy for the empirical analysis. 
The fourth chapter presents the descriptive and quantitative findings 
concerning the core research hypothesis about the mediating impact of stock 
liquidity on the diversification’s effect. The chapter proceeds in three stages: 
Section IV.1 translates the research objective into two measurable hypotheses. 
Section IV.2 describes the data and introduces the diversification measures as well 
as the control variables. Finally, section IV.3 contains the empirical analysis of the 
valuation effects of corporate diversification both adjusted and un-adjusted for 
stock market liquidity. The analysis predominately uses stochastic models 
including two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, linear regression models, and 
multilevel mediation analysis.  
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The fifth and last chapter concludes the dissertation by summarising the main 
empirical findings and by suggesting avenues for further research.  
 
 
Figure 1: Structure of the thesis37 
 
 
                                                          
37 Source: own representation. 
 
 
II. INVESTORS’ VALUE IN DIVERSIFIED FIRMS 
II.1. FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITAL MARKETS 
II.1.1. EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS 
Since the work by Fama (1965, 1970)38, the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) 
has become one of the primary building blocks of the modern theory of financial 
economics and, among other features, is an essential element of perfect capital 
markets.39 The efficient market hypothesis is the nexus between the cash flows 
generated by the firm and the returns to shareholders without which the 
shareholder value concept populated by Rappaport (1981, 1986)40 would have no 
practical relevance. EMH can be described as a statement about the effectiveness 
(or speed) with which financial markets adjust the prices of securities such as stocks 
and bonds when new information comes to the market.41 Fama (1970) deems a 
market to be efficient if prices always fully reflect all available information.42 
Market efficiency can be described notationally as follows:43 
 𝐸(𝑃𝑖,𝑡+1|Φ𝑡) = [1 + 𝐸(𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1|Φ𝑡)] ∗ 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 (1) 
where: 
𝐸() = expected value operator 
𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = price of security i at time t, 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1 = 
one-period percentage change return of security i, 
and 
Φ𝑡 = set of available information at time t. 
                                                          
38 Cp. Fama, 1965, p. 34ff., 1970, p. 383ff. 
39 Cp. Findlay & Williams, 2000, p. 181ff.; Summers, 1986, p. 591ff. 
40 Cp. Rappaport, 1981, p. 139ff., 1986, p. 1ff. 
41 Cp. Hirschey, 2003, p. 30. 
42 Cp. Fama, 1970, p. 383. 
43 Cp. Fama, 1970, p. 384. 
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Here formula (1) says that the information in Φ𝑡 is fully utilized in deriving 
equilibrium expected returns and expected asset prices. Depending on the type of 
information conveyed in Φ𝑡, Fama (1970) further subdivides the EMH into weak, 
semi-strong, and strong form efficiency.44  
Weak-form efficiency requires that all historical information such as past prices 
and trading volumes be contained in current prices.45 This form of market efficiency 
is closely related to the random walk hypothesis used by researchers to characterise 
a price series in which all subsequent price changes represent random departures 
from previous prices.46 As there is no autocorrelation in returns, technical analysis 
of past return patterns to predict future returns is useless.47 Consequently, 
empirical tests of the weak-form of EMH are concerned with the forecasting power 
of past returns.48 They include various statistical tools such as runs tests, serial 
correlation tests, filter tests, augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, and multiple variance 
ratio tests.49  
Under semi-strong efficiency, all publicly available information (e.g. 
announcements of annual earnings, stock splits) are instantly capitalised into 
prices.184F50 Thus, fundamental analysis of publicly available information may be 
regarded as a futile exercise, too, because, as soon as news becomes publicly 
available, they are reflected in stock prices.51 Most studies on the semi-strong form 
efficiency fall into one of two types:52 The first type follows an event study approach 
analysing the speed at which stock prices adjust when an event occurs. The other 
type investigates whether combinations of stocks of particular fundamental 
characteristics (e.g. size, market to book equity ratio) beat the market over time.  
                                                          
44 Cp. Fama, 1991, p. 1576. 
45 Cp. Steiner et al., 2012, p. 39. 
46 Cp. Malkiel, 1989, p. 1313f.; Steiner et al., 2012, p. 40f. 
47 Cp. Malkiel, 1989, p. 1313; Shleifer, 2000, p. 6. 
48 Cp. Fama, 1991, p. 1576. 
49 As an example for a study applying multiple testing procedures, instead of 
many, see Worthington & Higgs, 2004, p. 59ff. 
50 Cp. Kasper, 1997, p. 15f. 
51 Cp. Steiner et al., 2012, p. 41. 
52 Cp. Findlay & Williams, 2000, p. 191. 
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Finally, the strong-form of EMH states that all public and private information 
are rapidly mirrored in security prices.53 In such a world, investors should not 
expect to consistently gain above the market returns while using technical analysis, 
fundamental analysis, or private information. The absence of information 
acquisition costs and trading costs is a necessary condition for a market to be 
strong-form efficient.54 For this reasoning, Fama (1991) claims the extreme version 
of the market efficiency hypothesis to be false.55 Clearly, a weaker form of EMH is 
always a subset of a stronger form. 
Beginning with the early studies by Fama (1965) and Levy (1971), extensive 
empirical research provides evidence consistent with the weak notion of efficient 
markets: Fama (1965) does not find any dependence in the stock-price series that 
would be regarded as essential for investment strategies.56 Relatedly, Levy (1971) 
documents that none of the 32 most used price patterns by chartists produces better 
than average trading results.57  
The notion of semi-strong form efficiency has proved far more controversial 
among finance researchers than weak-form tests. On the one hand, stock markets 
tend to quickly incorporate new information into security prices leaving little scope 
for information-driven trading rules.58 On the other hand, fundamental variables 
such as company size, the book to market equity, or the debt ratio have been 
detected to be a reliable estimator for future returns which, if the notion of semi-
strong form was true, could not be the case.59  
However, anomalies do not necessarily imply stock market inefficiencies: 
First, anomalies in stock prices could be random underreactions or overreactions 
to special news announcements without a persistent effect on prices. Second, 
                                                          
53 Cp. Hasan & Wadud, 2015, p. 237f. 
54 Cp. Grossman & Stiglitz, 1980, p. 405. 
55 Cp. Fama, 1991, p. 1575. 
56 Cp. Fama, 1965, p. 45ff. 
57 Cp. Levy, 1971, p. 316ff. 
58 Cp. Dann et al., 1977, p. 9ff.; Ederington & Lee, 1993, p. 1165ff., 1995, p. 119ff.; 
Fama et al., 1969, p. 7ff.; Patell & Wolfson, 1984, p. 231ff. 
59 Cp. Banz, 1981, p. 7ff.; Bhandari, 1988, p. 513ff.; Chan et al., 1991, p. 1746ff.; 
Reinganum, 1981, p. 23ff.; Rosenberg et al., 1985, p. 9ff. 
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market efficiency is always tested jointly with several auxiliary hypotheses about 
the conditions of capital markets such as the capital pricing model used to specify 
equilibrium returns.60 Anomalies may be treated as indications for misspecified 
asset pricing models rather than as evidence against the EMH.61 As Fama (1991) 
states: “The joint-hypothesis problem is more serious. Thus, market efficiency per se is not 
testable. It must be tested jointly with some model of equilibrium, an asset-pricing model. 
[…] As a result, when we find anomalous evidence on the behavior of returns, the way it 
should be split between market inefficiency or a bad model of market equilibrium is 
ambiguous.”162  




Table 1: Forms of market efficiency and empirical evidence63 
 
Following the literature reviews by Fama (1991) and Vollrath (2003)64, this 
study adopts efficiency at the semi-strong level. Additionally, it is assumed that 
investors are rational and value each security for their intrinsic value. When new 
                                                          
60 Cp. Malkiel, 1989, p. 1315f. 
61 Cp. Summers, 1986, p. 598. 
62 Cp. Fama, 1991, p. 1575f. 
63 Source: own representation. 




Weak form Semi-strong form Strong form
Information 
content
Historical Historical / public
Historical / public / 
private
Implications
Asset prices move as random
walks over time / technical 
trading will not lead to excess 
returns / no saisonal effects
Technical trading and 
fundamental analysis will 
not lead to excess returns




Largely validated Mixed results Empirically falsified
Efficient market hypothesis
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information comes to the market that indicates that the current price of an asset 
offers a profit opportunity (risk), investors will bid up (down) the price of this asset 
until the level that corresponds to their intrinsic value. They will incorporate new 
information into fair prices until the marginal costs from obtaining new 
information and trading the security exceed the marginal benefits.65 As a result, 
security returns provide an appropriate means to decide whether corporate policies 
such as diversification decisions are in the best interest of shareholders. 
II.1.2. ASSET PRICING MODELS 
There is a wide range of techniques that can be used to estimate future 
expected returns and that can be grouped into univariate and multivariate 
techniques by the number of explanatory variables.66 In this study, the focus is on 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model and the Fama-French three-factor model which 
represent popular univariate and multivariate models, respectively. These models 
constitute the fundamental basis for assessing differences in the performance of 
diversified and focused firms. This section also contains an introduction to the 
modern portfolio theory which not only serves as the basis for convenient asset 
pricing models but also provides a non-synergistic, financial justification for 
corporate diversification. 
II.1.2.1. Modern portfolio theory: Markowitz (1952) 
The modern portfolio theory dates back to the early studies by Markowitz 
(1952, 1959), who provides the first mathematical formalisation of the asset 
allocation decision as a choice of the mean and the variance of a portfolio.67 The 
core metaphor underlying Markowitz’s (1952) portfolio selection model is the 
desirability to diversification which refers to the possibility to eliminate 
unsystematic risks by holding a portfolio consisting of preferable securities with 
                                                          
65 Cp. Elton et al., 2010, p. 398. 
66 For a detailed discussion of univariate and multivariate asset pricing models, 
instead of many, see Bruns & Meyer-Bullerdiek, 2013, p. 85ff.; Mondello, 2015, p. 
197ff.; Steiner et al., 2012, p. 15ff. 
67 Cp. Elton & Gruber, 1997, p. 1744; Markowitz, 1952, p. 77ff., 1959, p. 1ff. 
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non-perfectly positively correlated returns.68 The mean-variance optimisation 
requires several simplifying assumptions about the investor’s portfolio selection 
behaviour and the characteristics of the underlying capital market: 
- Investor preferences and subjective beliefs. 
- All investors have a one-period investment horizon. They will select an 
optimal portfolio at the beginning of the planning horizon which will be held 
unchanged to the terminal date.69 
- In assessing the benefits of an investment, investors consider only the first 
two moments of the probability distribution of returns.70 
- Investors are risk averse and rational trying to maximise their end-of-period 
wealth.205F71 Given the mean portfolio return, they will choose the portfolio with 
the lowest return volatility and vice versa.72 
- Characterisation of capital markets. 
- The mean-variance approach either requires asset returns that follow a joint 
Gaussian distribution, or the investor’s utility function to be maximised is 
quadratic.73 
- Capital markets are perfect in several senses: financial assets are infinitely 
divisible74; there are no transaction costs, capital gains tax 209F75, short sales as well 
as liability holdings76. 
                                                          
68 Cp. Brealey et al., 2014, p. 171f.; Rubinstein, 2002, p. 1042; Spremann, 2008, p. 
178f. 
69 Cp. Fabozzi, 2009, p. 30; Lee, Finnerty, & Chen, 2010, p. 69; Spremann, 2008, p. 
173f. 
70 Cp. Constantinides & Malliaris, 1995, p. 14f.; Mondello, 2015, p. 104; 
Spremann, 2008, pp. 59, 176. 
71 Cp. Albrecht & Maurer, 2008, p. 258; Bruns & Meyer-Bullerdiek, 2013, p. 84. 
72 Cp. Mondello, 2015, p. 104; Perridon et al., 2016, p. 278f. 
73 Cp. Breuer et al., 2010, p. 142; Samuelson, 1970, p. 537. 
74 Cp. Bruns & Meyer-Bullerdiek, 2013, p. 84; Robison & Barry, 1980, p. 41; 
Steiner et al., 2012, p. 8. 
75 Cp. Albrecht & Maurer, 2008, p. 258; Steiner et al., 2012, p. 8. 
76 Cp. Markowitz, 1952, p. 78; Pogue, 1970, p. 1006. 
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Given the assumptions outlined above, much in the spirit of Markowitz’s 
(1952) formulation of the portfolio selection problem can be simplified to the 




















= 1;   𝑥𝑖𝑃 ≥ 0 (4) 
where: 
𝜇𝑃 = expected portfolio return, 
𝜇𝑖 = expected return on asset i, 
𝑥𝑖𝑃 = share of asset i in the portfolio, 
𝑁𝑃 = number of assets in the portfolio, 
𝜌𝑖𝑗 = 
correlation coefficient based on the returns of assets i 
and j,  
𝜎𝑖 = standard deviation of the returns of assets i, and 
𝜎𝑗 = standard deviation of the returns of assets j. 
The assumption of uncertain future returns is central to the understanding of 
the portfolio selection behaviour of risk-averse investors. Markowitz (1952) 
illustrates that given future returns are unknown investors select securities not only 
because of their ability to increase discounted expected returns but choose mean-
variance efficient portfolios that maximise the expected return for a given level of 
variance or exhibit the lowest variance for a given level of expected return.78 If 
corporate diversification affects unsystematic risks, it might also positively 
influence the investor’s willingness to trade the shares of diversified firms, 
especially if he or she holds an otherwise poorly diversified portfolio.79 
                                                          
77 Cp. Albrecht & Maurer, 2008, p. 272; Constantinides & Malliaris, 1995, p. 4; 
Perridon et al., 2016, p. 284. 
78 CP. Constantinides & Malliaris, 1995, p. 2f.; Steiner et al., 2012, p. 6f. 
79 Cp. Levy & Sarnat, 1970, p. 795ff. 
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The set of mean-variance efficient portfolios comprises an efficient frontier. 
Given any mean return 𝜇𝑃, the efficient frontier identifies the set of corresponding 
minimum variance portfolios.80 Its shape depends on the extent to which the assets 
contained in the portfolio fluctuate together.81 The correlation coefficient 𝜌𝑖𝑗 
measures the likelihood of co-movements between the assets in a portfolio and, 
thus, provides information about the extent to which asset risks are diversifiable.82 
Correlation coefficients range between -1.0 and 1.0, where the benefits of 
diversification increase the farther away the correlation is from 1.0.83  
Using the example of two stocks A and B, Figure 2 visualises the influence of 
the correlation coefficient on the diversification effect. Holding both the returns 
(e.g. 𝜇𝐴= 5%, 𝜇𝐵 = 3.5%) and the volatilities (e.g. 𝜎𝐴 = 15%, 𝜎𝐵 = 8%) constant, a 
lower correlation causes a greater curvature of the efficient frontier. In the rather 
unrealistic case where the returns are perfectly negatively correlated, a portfolio 
with zero risk could be constructed.84  
 
 
Figure 2: Correlation and shape of the efficient frontier85 
                                                          
80 Cp. Spremann, 2008, p. 179ff. 
81 Cp. Albrecht & Maurer, 2008, p. 259. 
82 Cp. Brealey et al., 2014, p. 175ff.; Volkart, 2008, p. 226. 
83 Cp. Perold, 2004, p. 7. 
84 Cp. Brealey et al., 2014, p. 177; Markowitz, 1952, p. 80ff. 
85 Source: own calculations. 
 
39 Investors’ value in diversified firms  
 
Regardless of its undoubted theoretical soundness, the portfolio selection 
model has considerable limitations, some of which Markowitz (1952) already 
mentions in his seminal contribution.86 Objections aim at the assumption of the 
quadratic utility function of the investors, the question of timing, and the high data 
requirements.87 Besides, well-optimised portfolios often have extreme allocations 
such that little changes in the input factors (e.g. return, variance, covariance) can 
cause the investment to be excluded from the portfolio, or vice versa, can be 
assigned a higher weight.88 
II.1.2.2. Capital Asset Pricing Model 
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) initially developed by Sharpe 
(1964)223F89, Lintner (1965)90, and Mossin (1966)91 constitutes a cornerstone of modern 
financial theory and is widely used to assess the cost of capital of firms, to measure 
abnormal returns, and to evaluate the performance of managed funds.92  
Markowitz’s (1952) portfolio selection model forms the foundation of the 
CAPM. Sharpe (1964) consciously picks up its central tenet: “Through diversification, 
some of the risk inherent in an asset can be avoided so that its total risk is obviously not the 
relevant influence on its price”.93 The CAPM posits a positive linear relationship 
between the expected excess return on an asset and the market risk premium with 
a constant proportionality given by its sensitivity to the market portfolio.228F94 In 
addition to the assumptions underlying the mean-variance optimisation by 
                                                          
86 Cp. Markowitz, 1952, p. 89. 
87 For further reading, see Albrecht & Maurer, 2008, p. 294; Bruns & Meyer-
Bullerdiek, 2013, p. 84f.; Fabozzi et al., 2002, p. 9ff.; Michaud, 1989, p. 33ff.; Perridon 
et al., 2016, p. 284f.; Steiner et al., 2012, p. 14. 
88 Cp. Chopra & Ziemba, 2013, p. 6f.; Spremann, 2008, p. 271f. 
89 Cp. Sharpe, 1964, p. 425ff. 
90 Cp. Lintner, 1965, p. 13ff. 
91 Cp. Mossin, 1966, p. 768ff. 
92 Cp. Bettis, 1983, p. 407; Dempsey, 2013, p. 10; Kim et al., 2012, p. 198; Levy, 
2010, p. 43. 
93 Sharpe, 1964, p. 426. 
94 Cp. Bollerslev et al., 1988, p. 117; Cuthbertson & Nitzsche, 2004, p. 117. 
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Markowitz (1952)95, the CAPM requires two other assumptions about the investors' 
behaviour and the security markets: 
- Investors agree on the joint distribution of asset returns such that they will 
end up with the same efficient frontier when constructing their portfolios.96 
This implies semi-strong form efficiency of the capital market.97 
- Investors can lend or borrow money at some risk-free rate of interest through 
buying or selling a risk-free asset.98  
Based on these premises, all securities will fall along the security market line 
(SML) which quantifies the relationship between risk and return in the CAPM:99 












𝜇𝑖 = expected return on asset i, 
𝑟𝑓 = return on the risk-free asset, 
𝜇𝑀 = expected return on the market portfolio, 
𝛽𝑖 = 
sensitivity of returns on the ith asset against 
movements in the return on the market portfolio, 
𝜎𝑖𝑀 = 
covariance between the returns on the asset and the 
market portfolio, 
𝜎𝑀
2  = variance of the returns on the market portfolio, 
𝜎𝑖 = standard deviation of the returns on asset i, and 
𝜌𝑖𝑀 = 
correlation coefficient between the returns on asset i 
and the market portfolio. 
The capital asset pricing model has several important implications: First, in 
equilibrium, the expected return on an asset is a linear function of the market price 
                                                          
95 For a list of the requirements, see section II.1.2.1. 
96 Cp. Fama & French, 2004, p. 26; Lee, Finnerty, & Wort, 2010, p. 95; Ross, 1978, 
p. 885. 
97 Cp. Mondello, 2015, p. 238; Steiner et al., 2012, p. 41. 
98 Cp. Mondello, 2015, p. 238; Perridon et al., 2016, p. 290. 
99 For the development of the CAPM, see, among others, Albrecht & Maurer, 
2008, p. 310f.; Fama & French, 2004, p. 26ff.; Schwartz, 1991, p. 237ff. 
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of risk (𝜇𝑀 − 𝑟𝑓) and the systematic risk of the individual asset as represented by 
its beta versus the market portfolio (𝛽𝑖).100 The beta coefficient measures the 
sensitivity of the asset’s returns to variations in the market returns and contains 
information about the securities’ contribution to the overall risk of the market 
portfolio.101 The market portfolio mimics the market environment perfectly such 
that its beta is 1.0.102 If an asset’s beta is above (below) 1.0, then the asset is exposed 
to greater (lower) market risks than the market portfolio. 
Second, the return on a risky asset does not depend on its standalone risk.103 
Since specific risks – also called unsystematic or residual risks – can be eliminated 
through diversification104, there will be no compensation for specific risks 
according to the CAPM.105 As beta is the only reason for asset returns above the 
risk-free rate, all securities fall along the security market line as visualised in Figure 
3. Arbitrage opportunities106 ensure that the prices of securities not falling on the 
SML will be adjusted to the point where the CAPM becomes valid again.107 
Consequently, from a neoclassical point of view, shareholders have little economic 
gains from (unrelated) diversification as they can quickly diversify their portfolio 
through mean-variance optimisation.108  
Third, the market portfolio is mean-variance efficient in the sense of 
Markowitz (1952).109 It represents a convex combination of all tradeable assets in 
the market, where each asset is assigned a weight in the same proportion as its 
                                                          
100 Cp. Cuthbertson & Nitzsche, 2004, p. 117; Perridon et al., 2016, p. 295; Steiner 
et al., 2012, p. 25f. 
101 Cp. Lee, Finnerty, & Wort, 2010, p. 95. 
102 Cp. Copeland & Weston, 1988, p. 198; Mondello, 2015, p. 240f. 
103 Cp. Albrecht & Maurer, 2008, p. 312f. 
104 Cp. Brealey et al., 2014, p. 174; Volkart, 2008, p. 229f. 
105 Cp. Bruns & Meyer-Bullerdiek, 2013, p. 89; Khan & Sun, 1997, p. 4229. 
106 Arbitrage refers to the simultaneous buying and selling of the same asset 
across different markets at different prices. 
107 Cp. Perold, 2004, p. 16. 
108 Cp. Levy & Sarnat, 1970, p. 795ff. 
109 Cp. Fama & French, 1992, p. 427; Ross, 1978, p. 885. 
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relative value in the market.110 As the market portfolio is unobservable by nature; 
it is commonly represented by broad market indices which renders any test of the 
CAPM meaningless. Observed deviations from the security market line might be 
simply due to a misspecification of the market portfolio and do not allow for 
conclusions to be drawn about the validity of the model.111 As long as the stock 
market index cannot be considered as a perfect substitute for the market portfolio, 
any validation of the SML will provide information only to the extent to which the 
index is mean-variance efficient in the sense of Markowitz (1952).112 As a 
consequence of the improper selection of the market portfolio, the estimates on 
both the asset’s beta and the slope of the SML might be distorted.113  
 
 
Figure 3: Security market line114 
 
Notwithstanding the limited testability of the CAPM, as discussed above, 
empirical evidence on the CAPM predictions provides mixed results.115 While 
                                                          
110 Cp. Copeland & Weston, 1988, p. 197; Fama, 1970, p. 402; Lee, Finnerty, & 
Wort, 2010, p. 95. 
111 Cp. Roll, 1977, p. 130. 
112 Cp. Steiner et al., 2012, p. 28. 
113 Cp. Reilly & Brown, 2012, p. 232f. 
114 Source: own representation based on Albrecht & Maurer, 2008, p. 311; 
Alexander, 2008, p. 253; Perridon et al., 2016, p. 296. 
115 Cp. Dempsey, 2013, p. 10f.; Fama & French, 2004, p. 30ff.; Ho et al., 2000, p. 
1629. 
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initial tests carried out during the mid-1960s and early 1970s provide encouraging 
support for the predictions of the CAPM116, more recent studies document a variety 
of CAPM anomalies which point to both recurring seasonal anomalies117 and other 
variables besides beta that are said to have a significant impact on the return of an 
asset.118 Popular idiosyncratic factors include company size119, book to market 
equity ratio120, financial leverage121, price earnings ratio122, and stock illiquidity123. 
II.1.2.3. Fama-French three-factor model 
The three-factor model populated by Fama and French (1993) constitutes an 
empirical approach for determining expected returns on capital assets addressing 
two of the most prominent anomalies of the CAPM: company size effect and value 
effect:124 
The company size effect dates back to Banz’ (1981) observation that the 
smallest 20% of NYSE firms have had risk-adjusted returns that, on average, are 
5% above the return on larger capitalisation stocks.125 The results have been 
expanded to a variety of sample periods and firm samples showing that the 
company size effect is a widespread phenomenon.126 The value effect describes the 
tendency of value stocks to outperform growth stocks.127 Value stocks are stocks 
that are cheap based on one or more fundamental characteristics including the book 
                                                          
116 Cp. Steiner et al., 2012, p. 28. 
117 For a detailed overview on seasonal anomalies, instead of many, see Vollmer, 
2008, p. 71ff. 
118 Cp. Levy, 2010, p. 43ff.; Subrahmanyam, 2010, p. 27ff. 
119 Cp. Banz, 1981, p. 3ff.; Reinganum, 1981, p. 19ff. 
120 Cp. Chan & Chen, 1991, p. 1467ff.; Rosenberg et al., 1985, p. 9ff. 
121 Cp. Bhandari, 1988, p. 507ff. 
122 Cp. Basu, 1983, p. 129ff. 
123 Cp. Amihud & Mendelson, 1986, p. 223ff.; Pástor & Stambaugh, 2003, p. 642ff. 
124 Cp. Fama & French, 1993, p. 3ff. 
125 Cp. Banz, 1981, p. 7ff. 
126 Cp. Blume & Stambaugh, 1983, p. 387ff.; Brown et al., 1983, p. 105ff.; Fama & 
French, 2008, p. 1653ff.; Horowitz et al., 2000, p. 83ff.; Reinganum, 1981, p. 19ff. 
127 Cp. Zaremba, 2016, p. 162. 
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to market equity ratio or the ratio of the market price to earnings or cash flows.128 
Among others, Asness et al. (2013), Chan et al. (1991), and Davis (1994) show that 
the value effect is a pervasive phenomenon, too.129 
Regarding the study at hand, the two anomalies can be relevant for two 
reasons: First, since diversified firms typically are large firms, they could have 
lower ex-post stock market returns compared to focused firms just because of the 
well-known size effect.130 Thus, controlling for firm size in the regression models 
appears compulsory. Second, a popular style of insider trading refers to the 
simultaneous buying of “value stocks” and selling of “growth stocks”.131 The 
advantageousness of these insider-based trading strategies depends, among other 
factors, on firm-specific attributes that determine the strength of the information 
gap between insiders (e.g. managers) and outsiders (e.g. investors). To the extent 
that corporate diversification amplifies or attenuates the imbalance of information 
between various economic agents, there is any possibility of a value premium 
according to Fama and French (1993). 
Fama and French (1993) extend the CAPM by the return of two zero-
investment portfolios as shown below:132 
 𝜇𝑖 − 𝑟𝑓 = (𝜇𝑀 − 𝑟𝑓) ∗ 𝛽𝑖 + 𝐸(𝑆𝑀𝐵) ∗ 𝛽𝑠𝑖 + 𝐸(𝐻𝑀𝐿) ∗ 𝛽ℎ𝑖 (7) 
where: 
𝜇𝑖 = expected return on asset i, 
𝑟𝑓 = return on the risk-free asset, 
𝜇𝑀 = expected return on the market portfolio, 
𝛽𝑖 = 
sensitivity of returns on the ith asset against 
movements in the return on the market portfolio, 
𝛽𝑠𝑖  = 
sensitivity of returns on asset i against the size 
factor, 
𝛽ℎ𝑖 = 
sensitivity of returns on asset i against the value 
factor, 
                                                          
128 Cp. Chen & Zhang, 1998, p. 501f. 
129 Cp. Asness et al., 2013, p. 939ff.; Chan et al., 1991, p. 1746ff.; Davis, 1994, p. 
1585ff. 
130 Cp. Lang & Stulz, 1994, p. 1253; Marinelli, 2010, p. 33. 
131 Cp. Khan et al., 2016, p. 101. 
132 Cp. Iatridis et al., 2006, p. 4076; Wallmeier, 2000, p. 33. 
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𝑆𝑀𝐵 = expected risk premium on the size factor, and 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 = expected risk premium on the value factor. 
In this equation, (𝜇𝑀 − 𝑟𝑓) is the difference between the return on a well-
diversified market portfolio and the risk-free asset, while 𝑆𝑀𝐵 (small minus big) 
and 𝐻𝑀𝐿 (high minus low) stand deputy for the returns of two zero-investment 
portfolios mimicking the risk factors associated with the company size effect and 
the value effect. The zero-investment portfolios are designed in such a way as to 
reflect higher returns on small firms and high book to market equity firms.133  
More specifically, the 𝑆𝑀𝐵 portfolio captures the company size risk and is 
formed by a portfolio of buying small stocks and selling big stocks. Likewise, the 
𝐻𝑀𝐿 portfolio is long in high B/M stocks and short in low B/M stocks. The betas 
correspond to the slopes in the multiple regression model of 𝜇𝑖 − 𝑟𝑓  on 𝜇𝑀 − 𝑟𝑓, 
𝑆𝑀𝐵, and 𝐻𝑀𝐿 quantifying the asset’s sensitivity against the respective factor. 
Objections as to the validity of the three-factor model aim at Fama and 
French’s (1993) assumptions about the investors' behaviour and the security 
markets. For example, value strategies might outperform growth strategies just 
because investors are overly optimistic about firms which have performed well in 
the past.134 An alternative interpretation is that the return on value stocks has 
nothing to do with the covariance structure of returns but is directly related to the 
specificity of the asset for reasons of a behavioural bias or liquidity through an 
information effect.135 Finally, the company size effect and the value effect might be 
caused by data-snooping136 and a survivorship bias in the COMPUSTAT 
database137, respectively. 
  
                                                          
133 Cp. Wallmeier, 2000, p. 33. 
134 Cp. Lakonishok et al., 1994, p. 1543. 
135 Cp. Daniel & Titman, 1997, p. 4. For further reading on information induced 
liquidity premiums or discounts, see section II.4.1.3. 
136 Cp. MacKinlay, 1995, p. 5. 
137 Cp. Kothari et al., 1995, p. 186. 
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II.1.3. SHAREHOLDER VALUE APPROACH AS A BASIS FOR CORPORATE 
PORTFOLIO STRATEGY 
This research study draws on the insights of the shareholder value approach 
while assessing the mediating effects of stock liquidity on the diversification-
performance linkage for a sample of European non-financial firms. Even though 
the proposition of value maximisation has its roots in 200 years of research in 
economics and finance138, it was not until the 1980s when Rappaport (1981) put the 
conventional accounting-oriented approaches for assessing the value of the 
corporate strategy into question139, that the shareholder value approach became 
more recognised.140  
The central tenet underlying the shareholder value approach is that business 
strategies should be judged by the economic returns they generate for their 
shareholders.141 Therefore, managers should make all decisions so as to increase the 
interests of its shareholders ahead of any other interested parties who might have 
claims against the firm.142 The economic returns to shareholders are the sum of 
dividend payments as well as capital gains from sales of their shares.  
According to Rappaport (1981), the shareholder value of a company is 
determined by the present value of its future cash flows.143 In his analysis, 
Rappaport (1981) follows the basic idea underlying most discounted cash flow 
(DCF) models: The value of a company does not equal the balance of its assets and 
liabilities but corresponds to the income stream generated by fully utilizing its 
stock of assets and liabilities, with particular regard to the economies of scale and 
scope that contribute to the competitive advantage of the firm.144 Building on the 
                                                          
138 Cp. Jensen, 2001, p. 299. 
139 Cp. Rappaport, 1981, p. 139ff. 
140 Cp. Schredelseker, 2003, p. 102. 
141 For a detailed introduction to the shareholder value approach, instead of 
many, see Vollmar, 2014, p. 51ff. 
142 Cp. Jensen, 2001, p. 299. 
143 Cp. Rappaport, 1981, p. 141. 
144 Cp. Ballwieser, 2011, p. 9. 
 
47 Investors’ value in diversified firms  
same theoretical basis as the neoclassical investment theory, much in the spirit of 









present value of an entitlement to uncertain cash 
flows,  
CF = cash flow, and 
𝑟 = risk-adjusted rate of return 
In the above formula, the present value of a risky project refers to the sum of 
the discounte d future cash flows or profits, where the capitalisation rate expresses 
the investment risk of the investor and can be obtained using the asset pricing 
models discussed in section II.1.2.  
The literature distinguishes between three DCF approaches to approximate 
the value of what a company is worth for its shareholders: the entity approach 
capitalizing the cash flow that is not required for operations or reinvestment (i.e. 
free cash flow) and subtracting bondholder value, the equity approach assuming 
pure equity financing and discounting free cash flows after interest expenses (i.e. 
flow to equity), and the adjusted present value approach that separates the effects 
of debt financing from the asset value of a firm.146 Drawing on the same 
assumptions about the firm’s financing strategy, the different approaches are 
expected to lead to the same shareholder value.147 By its technical nature, the so 
estimated shareholder value is also referred to as fundamental value or intrinsic value. 
One advantage of Rappaport’s (1986) shareholder value approach is that it 
illustrates how corporate management can apply decision making in operating, 
investing, and financing in order to improve up to seven value drivers that have a 
direct effect on capitalised operating cash flows as visualised in Figure 4. The value 
                                                          
145 For a detailed discussion of the methods of company valuation, instead of 
many, see Reilly, 2000, p. 1ff.; West & Jones, 1999, p. 1ff. 
146 For a detailed introduction to discounted cash flow analysis, instead of many, 
see Ballwieser, 2011, p. 132ff.; Herrmann, 2002, p. 18ff. 
147 Cp. Vollmar, 2014, p. 73. 
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network can be used to explore the superiority of alternative business strategies 
including diversification strategies.148 Following this logic, the effect of 
diversification strategies on shareholder value is the difference between the 
shareholder value before and after the implementation of the strategy.149 If the 
difference in shareholder value is positive (negative), corporate diversification 
creates (destroys) value.  
 
 
Figure 4: Shareholder value network150 
 
Regardless of its undoubted theoretical soundness, Rappaport’s (1986) 
approach has significant limitations. Like every valuation model, the shareholder 
value approach is criticised for being judgmental in relation to the estimation of 
future cash flows, capital costs, and value added from synergies.151 The subjective 
process cannot be systematically reproduced such that researchers valuing the 
same firm might end up with very different fundamental values.  
Only in perfect capital markets under the Fama (1965, 1970) assumptions 
about strong-form efficiency, there is an identity of a firm’s fundamental value and 
                                                          
148 Cp. Davis & Stout, 1992, p. 612. 
149 Cp. Ostrowski, 2007, p. 38; Vollmar, 2014, p. 84. 
150 Source: own representation based on Rappaport, 1986, p. 76. 
151 Cp. Ostrowski, 2007, p. 38ff.; Vollmar, 2014, p. 73ff. 
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its “Wall Street” value.152 To Rappaport (1986), the “Wall Street” value of a firm 
means the sum of the stock-market values of a firm’s traded equity.153 The market 
value counterbalances the results of firm valuations carried out daily by all 
investors, thereby objectifying the process of company valuation.154 For listed 
companies, the shareholder value can be determined by multiplying the number of 
shares outstanding by the stock price.155  
Figure 5 visualises the difference between the “Wall Street” value and the 
fundamental value of a firm as an oscillating movement of the “Wall Street” value 
around the fundamental value. A firm’s fundamental value can be different from 
its stock-market value for many reasons; the most often cited explanation is that 
capital markets are not strong-form efficient in the sense of Fama (1965, 1970).156 
Since the assumption of zero information acquisition costs and trading costs does 
not hold under real market conditions; outside investors regularly have access to 
less information and, therefore, they are less able to estimate the future cash flows 
and risks of a company as precise as inside managers. To the extent that the 
potential for an informational advantage of insiders over outside investors 
increases with the degree of corporate diversification, greater diversification might 
cause the fundamental value to move further away from its market value.157 It is 
this logic that underlies the empirical research of this thesis. 
  
                                                          
152 Cp. Herrmann, 2002, p. 12, and the literature cited therein. 
153 Cp. Rappaport, 1986, p. 32ff. 
154 Cp. Herrmann, 2002, p. 15. 
155 Cp. Ostrowski, 2007, p. 41. Throughout this thesis, the terms “Wall Street” 
value, shareholder value, stock-market value, and stock-market price are used 
interchangeably. 
156 Cp. Beckmann, 2006, p. 20. An alternative interpretation is that the findings 
of a valuation differential are attributable to fundamental characteristics (e.g. 
reduced growth expectations) or the behavior of investors being distorted by either 
a cognitive or an emotional bias. 
157 For a detailed discussion, see section II.4.1.1. 
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Figure 5: Differences between fundamental value and “Wall Street” value158 
II.2. DEFINITION AND TYPES OF DIVERSIFICATION 
Generally, corporate diversification is defined from two directions – one view 
based on the diversification move (process-view) and the other based on the 
resulting diversity (status-view) – each culminating in a wide field of academic 
research.159 Diversification as a process concentrates on the specific steps a firm 
undertakes to enter new product-market combinations as defined, among others, 
by Ansoff (1957) and Rumelt (1974).160 Researchers defining diversification as a 
process are interested in uncovering the motives why firms choose to diversify and, 
for this reason, focus on the path of diversification followed by companies over 
time.293F161 This view also covers the decision on the direction of diversification as well 
as the selection of the appropriate mode of diversification.162  
                                                          
158 Source: own representation based on Friedrich von den Eichen, 2002, p. 100; 
Vollmar, 2014, p. 82. 
159 Cp. Beckmann, 2006, p. 15f.; Klier, 2009, p. 10f.; Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 
1989, p. 524f. 
160 Cp. Klier, 2009, p. 10; Müller-Stewens & Lechner, 2016, p. 290; Wulf, 2007, p. 
7ff. 
161 Cp. Knecht, 2014, p. 52. 
162 Cp. Klier, 2009, p. 10. 
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Diversification as a status, instead, focuses on the spreading of a firm’s business 
activities at a certain point in time.163 Researchers propose three criteria to be used 
to identify distinct businesses: product difference, market discreteness, and 
resource independence.164 However, in the prevalent literature, one can find the 
most different definitions in which either all or only some of these dimensions are 
considered.165 To enumerate but some examples, Gort (1962) defines diversification 
through “an increase in the heterogeneity of output from the point of view of the number 
of markets served by that output”166, a definition closely related to the central tenet of 
industrial-organisational theory.167 To Berry (1971) diversification means an 
increase in the number of industries in which a firm is active.168 Finally, Pitts and 
Hopkins (1982) consider firms to pursue diversification strategies if they 
simultaneously operate several different businesses.169  
In his seminal contribution “Strategies for Diversification”, Ansoff (1957) 
provides one of the first conceptualisations of diversification as “a simultaneous 
departure from the present product line and the present market structure.”170 The product 
line defines the physical and functional characteristics of the end-user product, 
whereas the market dimension describes the intended use of the product.171 In 
sharp contrast to the other growth vectors depicted in Table 2, a diversification 
move “[…] invariably leads to physical and organizational changes in the structure of the 
business […]”172 and may require additional tangible and intangible resources. It is 
this logic that builds the bedrock for the traditional understanding of 
diversification as product-market diversification.173   
                                                          
163 Cp. Grant et al., 1988, p. 772. 
164 Cp. Greune, 1997, p. 12f.; Schüle, 1992, p. 7f.; Srivasta et al., 1994, p. 146. 
165 For a detailed overview of the various definitions, see also Fey, 2000, p. 7ff.; 
Greune, 1997, p. 13; Schüle, 1992, p. 8; Szeless, 2001, p. 26. 
166 Gort, 1962, p. 9. 
167 Cp. Bettis & Hall, 1982, p. 255. 
168 Cp. Berry, 1971, p. 380. 
169 Cp. Pitts & Hopkins, 1982, p. 620. 
170 Cp. Ansoff, 1957, p. 114. 
171 Cp. Ansoff, 1957, p. 113f. 
172 Ansoff, 1957, p. 114. 
173 Cp. Pils, 2009, p. 9. 
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Table 2: Matrix of growth vectors by Ansoff (1957)174 
 
In addition to the traditional view on diversification in terms of product-
markets, Penrose (1959) and Rumelt (1974) emphasise the importance of the 
resource endowments required to deliver a product or a service to the market. 
Penrose (1959) views a firm as diversified if it (i) enters into new markets with new 
products using the same production base, (ii) offers new products in the current 
markets that belong to a different area of technology, or (iii) penetrates new 
markets with new products that require the use of diverse technologies.175 Rumelt 
(1974) further refers to diversification as “its [the firm’s] commitment to diversify per 
se, together with the strengths, skills, or purposes that span this diversity, shown by the 
way in which business activities are related to one another.”176 As a consequence, a 
diversification move “requires or implies an appreciable increase in the available 
managerial competencies within the firm.”177 A major difference between the 
definitions by Ansoff (1957) and those of Penrose (1959) and Rumelt (1974) is the 
way the authors look at diversification. While the traditional view on 
diversification represents an “outside-in” perspective looking through the eyes of 
the customers on products and markets, the resource-based view follows an 
“inside-out” perspective with a particular interest on the unique resource 
endowments of a firm.178 
                                                          
174 Source: own representation based on Ansoff, 1957, p. 114. 
175 Cp. Penrose, 1959, p. 110. 
176 Rumelt, 1974, p. 29. 
177 Rumelt, 1974, p. 10. 
178 Cp. Gehrmann, 2014, p. 23. 
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This study follows the traditional understanding of product diversification 
by, among others, Pitts and Hopkins (1982) and Ramanujam and Varadarajan 
(1989) referring to product diversification as the extent to which firms are 
simultaneously active in many distinct businesses.179 Defining corporate 
diversification on the business unit level offers several features: First, simple 
product line extensions do not qualify as a step towards greater diversity, unless 
they lead to the creation of a new business with a separate structure, management, 
and operation.180 This condition is essential because some of the benefits of 
corporate diversification such as the co-insurance hypothesis by Lewellen (1971) 
necessitate the co-existence of multiple business units under a single corporate 
umbrella.181  
Second, with its emphasis on the extent of product diversification, the 
definition follows a continuous rather than a categorical (measurement) approach. 
Consequently, business count measures or the newly proposed market-implied 
diversification measures are the preferred choices for operationalising the 
diversification construct. Finally, the definition takes on a status perspective of 
diversification with a focus on the current number and variety of a firm’s 
businesses. Consequently, it is not concerned with the steps a firm undertakes to 
enter new product-market combinations. 
The conceptualisation of diversification given above incorporates the 
concepts of product difference, market discreteness, and resource independence182, 
allowing for distinctions between three general forms of diversification: (i) 
horizontal, vertical, and lateral diversification, (ii) related and unrelated 
diversification, and (iii) domestic and international diversification: 
  
                                                          
179 Cp. Pitts & Hopkins, 1982, p. 620f.; Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 1989, p. 524f. 
180 Cp. Knecht, 2014, p. 54; Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 1989, p. 525. 
181 Cp. Lewellen, 1971, p. 521ff. For a detailed discussion of the costs and benefits 
of diversification, see section II.4.1. 
182 Cp. Pitts & Hopkins, 1982, p. 621. 
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- Horizontal, vertical, and lateral diversification. Ansoff (1965) uses the technical 
affinity of the end-user products and the target customer groups to 
differentiate between three diversification strategies:183 Horizontal 
diversification can be viewed as a strategic approach directed at utilising a 
firm’s current resources and capabilities in technology, finance, or marketing 
to serve additional product missions of existing customers.184 As the new and 
old business units operate on the same level of the value chain185, the firm 
increases in size “without necessarily growing beyond its current business 
definition”186. Vertical diversification strategies, instead, reach different levels 
of the value chain.187 Their primary aim is to seek economic rents through 
leveraging and transferring core competencies across business units.188 
Finally, lateral diversification describes a firm’s move into other businesses 
that are likely to have little (concentric diversification) or no technological or 
commercial synergies (conglomerate diversification) in common with the 
actual product line of the company.189 
- Related and unrelated diversification. The terms related diversification and 
unrelated diversification refer to the breadth of diversification regarding the 
interconnectedness of the primary functions of the value chain.190 Related 
diversification occurs when a firm diversifies by adding new activities that 
“are tangibly related to the collective skills and strengths possessed originally by the 
firm”191. The nature of relatedness between the segments of a diversified firm 
can be very different and, among other factors, is determined by the 
relationships between markets served and distribution systems as well as 
commonalities in physical assets (e.g. productive factors, raw materials) and 
non-physical assets (e.g. tacit knowledge, organisational structures). By 
                                                          
183 Cp. Ansoff, 1957, p. 118; Hungenberg, 2014, p. 467ff.; Wulf, 2007, p. 16. 
184 Cp. Ansoff, 1957, p. 118; Liu & Hsu, 2011, p. 1517. 
185 Cp. Hungenberg, 2014, p. 468. 
186 Cp. Knecht, 2014, p. 50. 
187 Cp. Greune, 1997, p. 21; Jansen, 2006, p. 8. 
188 Cp. Liu & Hsu, 2011, p. 1516. 
189 Cp. Gehrmann, 2014, p. 25. 
190 Cp. Hill & Jones, 2012, p. 192; Johnson et al., 2005, p. 285ff. 
191 Rumelt, 1974, p. 11. 
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contrast, unrelated diversification refers to a strategy where the distinct 
business units do not tap a common pool of corporate resources.192 Potential 
benefits to unrelated diversification stem primarily from financial synergies 
such as co-insurance effects193 or increased efficiency of internal capital 
markets.194  
- Domestic and international diversification. Empirical studies further discern 
between domestic diversification and international diversification, thereby 
referring to a firm’s geographical orientation.195 Domestic diversification 
refers to an expansion within the borders of a firm’s home country, whereas 
international diversification refers to the spreading of a firm’s businesses 
across multiple global market areas.196  
Throughout this research study, the terms “business”, “business segment”, 
“business unit”, and “division” are synonymous for a distinct entity within a 
diversified firm’s corporate portfolio that can be operated independently.197 
Furthermore the words “corporate diversification”, “diversity”, and “product 
diversification” are applied in the same way to describe the extent to which firms are 
simultaneously active in various businesses. Likewise, the expressions “focused 
firm” (“diversified firm”), “single-segment firm” (multi-business firm), and “stand-alone 
firm” are used interchangeably for firms that are operating a single (multiple) 
business (es). 
  
                                                          
192 Cp. Hill & Jones, 2012, p. 192. 
193 For further reading on co-insurance effects from corporate diversification, see 
section II.4.1.2.2. 
194 Cp. Benito‐Osorio et al., 2012, p. 328; Palich et al., 2000, p. 160. 
195 Cp. Baldwin et al., 2000, p. 19; Schüle, 1992, p. 12. 
196 Cp. Capar & Kotabe, 2003, p. 345; Funke, 2006, p. 8; Kim et al., 1993, p. 276; 
Knecht, 2014, p. 51; Tihanyi et al., 2005, p. 272. 
197 Cp. Knecht, 2014, p. 191. 
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II.3. MEASURING CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION 
II.3.1. CLASSIFICATION OF MEASUREMENT APPROACHES 
“Valid measurement is the sine qua non of science”.198 If the measurement 
approach does not approximate the underlying theoretical concept, then theory 
testing becomes problematic, and the results cannot be generalised.199 From the 
viewpoint of corporate headquarters, without a reliable and valid measurement 
approach deciding about corporate diversification is not possible. 
Due to its multidimensional character, approaches employed to measure 
diversification are plenty.200 Over the last three decades, researchers have mainly 
followed two different approaches: a business count approach and a strategic 
approach.201 In the first, firms are positioned on a scale from “not diversified” to 
“highly diversified” while using objective, secondary data to allocate a firm’s 
reporting units to the Standard Industrial Classification system (SIC).202 A central 
tenet of the business count approach is that business units with similar industry 
classifications share a common pool of corporate resources and capabilities in 
technology, finance, or marketing. Commonly used measures include multi-
segment dummies based on SIC codes, the number of business segments as well as 
revenue- or asset-based Herfindahl indices.203 In the second, firms are grouped into 
discreet diversification categories according to the degree of commonality of 
strategic resources and capabilities among their businesses.204 Given their focus on 
the type of relatedness, they can provide rich insights into the breadth of 
diversification.205 
                                                          
198 Peter, 1979, p. 6. 
199 Cp. Lubatkin et al., 1993, p. 433. 
200 Cp. Fey, 2000, p. 181ff.; Pehrsson, 2006b, p. 352ff.; Schüle, 1992, p. 92ff. 
201 Cp. Hall & John, 1994, p. 153; Hoskisson et al., 1993, p. 216; Sambharya, 2000, 
p. 164. 
202 Cp. Hall & John, 1994, p. 154; Klier, 2009, p. 29ff. 
203 Section II.3.2 includes a detailed description of the various business count 
measures. 
204 Cp. Hall & John, 1994, p. 153f.; Palepu, 1985, p. 239f. 
205 Cp. Fey, 2000, p. 46f.; Pehrsson, 2006b, p. 355. 
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Apart from these traditional methods, in the recent past, input-based 
measures of diversification have been proposed in an attempt to capture 
relatedness in terms of either intangible technological characteristics or similarities 
in the human resource profiles between separate business units.206 However, only 
a few empirical studies are currently available which rely on input-based measures 
to investigate the diversification-performance relationship.207 One reason for the 
rare application in empirical research could be the requirement of survey data 
which renders comprehensive time series analysis impractical.208 Input-based 
measures cannot control for firm-specific heterogeneity and other forms of 
endogeneity in the diversification-performance linkage.209 Moreover, to the best 
knowledge of the author, there are no comprehensive studies about the (construct) 
validity of input-based measures available. Consequently, these measures are not 
taken into account in this thesis. 
As far as the construct validity of the business count and categorical approach 
is concerned, Appendix 3 indicates some degree of convergence between the 
approaches. Early research studies by Amit and Livnat (1988a) and Montgomery 
(1982) provide evidence for a high degree of convergent validity between Rumelt’s 
(1974) categorical measure and continuous SIC-based measures. Hoskisson et al. 
(1993) follow a structural equation modeling approach to test the validity of the 
entropy index of diversification on a sample of 160 firms that are actively traded 
on the NYSE or AMEX in 1988.210 The results of the structural equation model 
provide encouraging support for the entropy measure concerning convergent 
validity with Rumelt’s (1974) classification, discriminant validity on widely 
accepted control variables such as size, debt, and research and development 
expenditure, and predictive validity on firm performance using accounting 
measures and market measures.211 While the above-cited studies predominately 
conclude that business count measures offer a reliable and valid measurement 
                                                          
206 Cp. Knecht, 2014, p. 189; Nocker et al., 2016, p. 200f. 
207 Cp. Pils, 2009, p. 19. 
208 Cp. Nocker et al., 2016, p. 201. 
209 Cp. Nocker et al., 2016, p. 201. 
210 Cp. Hoskisson et al., 1993, p. 215ff. 
211 Cp. Hoskisson et al., 1993, p. 225ff. 
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concept, Hall and John (1994) argue that “entropy and Rumelt's categories do not assess 
differences between related and unrelated diversity in the same way”212. Likewise, 
Sambharya (2000) finds only little support for the construct validity of neither the 
business count approach nor the strategic approach regarding convergence 
validity, discriminant validity, and predictive validity.213 
Table 3 provides an overview of frequently used diversification measures 
separated into business count and strategic measures. To choose the most suitable 
liquidity measure for the investigation of the mediating effects of stock liquidity on 
the diversification’s effect, the author adopts five quality properties: 
- Reliability refers to the consistency or stability of a measurement approach.214 
It is the extent to which measures are free from random error and, thus, yield 
the same results on repeated trials given identical circumstances.215 
Approaches to testing the reliability of a measurement instrument build on 
correlation coefficients looking for similarities in the source of the random 
error variance.216 The greater the correlation between the measured values 
and the true values, the higher the reliability of the measure.217 Prominent 
methods of testing the reliability of an instrument include the test-retest 
approach and Cronbach’s alpha.218 
- Content validity deals with the appropriate degree to which empirical 
measurement reflects the full range of the underlying concept regarding 
contextual aspects.219 To prove the content validity of diversification 
measures, researchers follow a qualitative approach rather than an empirical 
                                                          
212 Hall & John, 1994, p. 165. 
213 Cp. Sambharya, 2000, p. 171. 
214 Cp. Bryman & Bell, 2015, p. 169; Carmines & Zeller, 1979, p. 12. 
215 Cp. John & Reve, 1982, p. 520; Schnell et al., 2013, p. 141. 
216 Cp. Maruyama & Ryan, 2014, p. 194; Schermelleh-Engel & Werner, 2012, p. 
120f. 
217 Cp. Maruyama & Ryan, 2014, p. 194; Peter, 1979, p. 8. 
218 Cp. Döring & Bortz, 2016, p. 443f.; Peter, 1979, p. 8. 
219 Cp. Hartig et al., 2012, p. 149; Maruyama & Ryan, 2014, p. 212. 
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approach and rely on a theoretical specification of the nature of the construct 
and its possible errors.220 
- Construct validity means the extent to which a measure connects with other 
measures that are deemed suitable for assessing the construct.221 It involves 
determining whether the measure has convergent validity and discriminant 
validity.222 To check whether a measure exhibits sufficient convergent and 
discriminant validity, researchers often investigate correlation coefficients 
and apply general structural equation models.223 
- Data availability enables to construct long time series of diversification 
measures that are necessary to control for the effects of liquidity on the 
diversification’s effect over time. 
- Comparability is the possibility to compare the level of corporate 
diversification across the various sample firms and over time. 
Table 3 shows that, to date, there is no silver bullet on how to obtain the 
“true” level of corporate diversification. Instead, researchers are confronted with a 
trade-off between objective but unprecise business count measures and strategic 
measures that might score from high content validity but are judgmental and not 
available for large data samples. Out of the eleven traditional measures, three 
business count measures will be considered for the empirical analysis of the 
mediating effects of stock liquidity on the diversification-performance relationship: 
Diversification dummy (included for compatibility reasons with prior studies), two 
mod. Berry-Herfindahl indices.  
  
                                                          
220 Cp. Hoskisson et al., 1993, p. 217; Robins & Wiersema, 2003, p. 44f. 
221 Cp. Hartig et al., 2012, p. 153; Wegener & Fabrigar, 2004, p. 161. 
222 Cp. Cohen et al., 2011, p. 187. 
223 Prominent examples include Hoskisson et al., 1993, p. 215ff.; Lubatkin et al., 
1993, p. 433ff.; and Sambharya, 2000, p. 163ff. 
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Table 3: Selective summary of diversification measures224 
The table presents eleven diversification metrics proposed over the last three decades of 
diversification research and that measure different aspects of corporate diversification. The analysis 
of the quality properties is based on Hall and John (1994), Lubatkin et al. (1993), Montgomery (1982), 
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II.3.2. EMPIRICAL BUSINESS COUNT MEASURES OF PRODUCT 
DIVERSIFICATION 
In industrial organisation225, the total diversity of a firm’s business units is 
commonly estimated using the business count approach.226 The most 
straightforward form of the business count measures is a binary variable that takes 
a value of one if the number of two-, three-, or four-digit SIC categories in which a 
firm participates at a given point in time exceeds one and is zero otherwise:227  
 BDIV[N] = {
1, N𝑆𝐼𝐶 > 1




Diversification dummy based on [N]-digit SIC codes, 
and 
N𝑆𝐼𝐶 = 
number of different SIC categories constituting the 
corporate portfolio. 
The multi-segment dummy has the advantage of being the easiest to calculate 
among all measures of diversity, but it is criticised for its failure to take into 
consideration differences in the size distribution and the relative importance of 
various businesses that constitute a firm’s scope of activities.228 Therefore, using the 
diversification dummy is appropriate only when the goal is to study the effects of 
being diversified but is almost useless for analysing changes in the degree of 
diversification. This disadvantage is, however, offset to some degree by Lang and 
Stulz’ (1994) observation that there is only a weak drop in Tobin’s Q when 
increasing the number of segments beyond two.229 While the multi-segment 
                                                          
225 The Industrial Organization Theory focuses on the interaction between 
market and company and dates back to the early works by Bain (1956, 1968) and 
Mason (1939). 
226 Cp. Datta et al., 1991, p. 531f.; Perry, 1998, p. 55. 
227 Cp. Rojahn & Zechser, 2017, p. 7. 
228 Cp. Gort, 1962, p. 10; Scherer, 1980, p. 90ff. 
229 Cp. Lang & Stulz, 1994, p. 1261. 
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dummy enjoys limited popularity in strategic management research230, it is still 
frequently applied in the finance literature.231 
Since the beginning of the 1960s, more comprehensive business count 
measures have been proposed that reflect the degree to which sales, assets, 
employees, or income are concentrated among different business segments.232 Most 
of these weighted business count measures represent variants of the following 
general equation:233  











share of the ith business relative to the firm as a 
whole, 
𝑤𝑖 = 
assigned weight summed over all of a firm’s 
businesses, and 
N𝑆𝐼𝐶  = 
the number of different SIC categories constituting 
the firm’s portfolio. 
Weighted business count measures have been proposed or employed, among 
others, by Berry (1971) and Jacquemin and Berry (1979) and include the Berry-
Herfindahl index and the Entropy index of diversification.234 Berry (1971) suggests 
to measure the extent of diversity as the inverse of the sum of the squared output 
in the ith business unit as a percentage of the firm’s squared total output across all 
business units:235 
                                                          
230 Cp. Palepu, 1985, p. 250f. 
231 Popular studies include Berger and Ofek (1995), Campa and Kedia (2002), 
Glaser and Mueller (2010), Lamont and Polk (2001), Mansi and Reeb (2002), and 
Servaes (1996). 
232 Cp. Pils, 2009, p. 11; Varadarajan, 1986, p. 44. 
233 Cp. Amit et al., 1989, p. 91; Chatterjee & Blocher, 1992, p. 878. 
234 Cp. Berry, 1971, p. 371ff.; Jacquemin & Berry, 1979, p. 359ff.; Martin & Sayrak, 
2003, p. 49f.; Nocker et al., 2016, p. 200. 
235 Cp. Berry, 1971, p. 373. 
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share of the ith business relative to the firm as a 
whole, and  
𝑁𝑆𝐼𝐶  = 
number of different SIC categories constituting the 
corporate portfolio. 
When a firm occupies only one business, the index attains a value of 𝐷𝐵 = 0 
The value approaches monotonically towards 𝐷𝐵 = 1 as the number of a firm’s SIC 
involvements with equal shares 𝑝𝑖 = 1 𝑁⁄  increases.236 The Berry-Herfindahl index 
is sensitive to changes in the number and distribution of business units, which gives 
it great popularity in empirical research.237 However, by squaring the output 
figures, the index weights more heavily the values for larger business units bearing 
the risk of underestimating a firm’s total diversity.238  
The Entropy measure, on the other hand, weights each industry involvement 
to the firm by the natural logarithm of its reciprocal value 1 𝑝𝑖⁄ , thereby giving less 
weight to large business units compared to the Berry-Herfindahl index.239 The 
index takes the following functional form:240 
  
                                                          
236 Cp. Amit et al., 1989, p. 91; Bühner, 1993, p. 111. 
237 Cp. Fey, 2000, p. 128ff.; Wulf, 2007, p. 49ff. 
238 Cp. Fey, 2000, p. 42; Hungenberg, 2014, p. 465. 
239 Cp. Fey, 2000, p. 42f.; Jacquemin & Berry, 1979, p. 36f.; Pitts & Hopkins, 1982, 
p. 622. 
240 Cp. Jacquemin & Berry, 1979, p. 361; Palepu, 1985, p. 252. 















share of the ith industry segment relative to the firm 
as a whole, and  
𝑁𝑆𝐼𝐶4 = 
number of different four-digit SIC categories 
constituting the corporate portfolio. 
The Entropy index attains a value of DET = 0 for single-segment firms and 
approaches DET = ln (𝑁) for highly diversified firms with equal shares 𝑝𝑖 = 1 𝑁⁄ .241 
Going forward, the entropy measure of diversification is not considered because of 
the missing upper limit which renders comparisons across firms more difficult 
compared to the Berry-Herfindahl index. 
Given their ease of computation and the consideration of objective, secondary 
data to allocate a firm’s reporting units to standardised industry taxonomies like 
the SIC system242, business count measures benefit from a high level of objectivity 
and reliability.243 The use of well-accepted and standardised industry taxonomies 
not only helps to make research replicable and cumulative but also allows for the 
investigation of a broad range of statistical methods applied to large data 
samples.244  
However, the use of segment data can reduce the explanatory power 
significantly and thus may lead to imprecise conclusions about the actual effects of 
diversification on firm value:245 Business count measures, such as the number of 
industries in which a firm operates, require a somewhat arbitrary decision about 
the level of refinement (i.e., two-digit vs four-digit SIC codes). Furthermore, these 
                                                          
241 Cp. Raghunathan, 1995, p. 1001. 
242 Cp. Klier, 2009, p. 29ff.; Szeless, 2001, p. 62. 
243 Cp. Montgomery, 1982, p. 300; Weiss, 2009, p. 58. 
244 Cp. Knecht, 2014, p. 197; Robins & Wiersema, 1995, p. 280. 
245 For a detailed discussion of the downside from using SIC codes and segment 
data, see section IV.3.1.1. 
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measures do not accurately account for the dissimilarities of products because they 
assume equal distances between SIC codes.246 Also, using segment data may cause 
distorted results due to strategic accounting: To avoid detailed information 
disclosures on separate segments in the presence of competitors, a firm may group 
multiple former independent business segments so that they appear to perform 
more poorly than single segment firms in the same industry.247 Alternatively, large 
reporting units may be created after an acquisition to reduce the danger of future 
goodwill write-offs.248  
II.3.3. CONSTRUCTION OF MARKET-IMPLIED MEASURES OF 
DIVERSIFICATION 
It is not the use of a business count measure per se that may lead to decreasing 
levels of construct validity, but rather the hierarchical logic implied by the SIC 
classification system. To mitigate the biases resulting from both the SIC system and 
segment reporting, this thesis applies a series of market-implied diversification 
measures recently introduced by Zechser and Rojahn (2017). These measures are 
similar to the business count approach but do use information from stock markets 
instead of industry classification schemes to identify the business activities that a 
firm is engaged in. To ensure that the market-implied diversification measure 
meets the highest academic standards, one section of chapter 4 is devoted to the 
empirical assessment of the construct validity regarding uniqueness, convergent 
and predictive validity.249 
The market-implied diversification measures date back to Barnea and 
Logue’s (1973) contribution “Stock-Market Based Measures of Corporate Diversification, 
in which they consider the degree of diversification to be a direct function of the 
amount of residual unsystematic variation that remains in a combination of risky 
assets.250 In refining Barnea and Logue’s (1973) measurement approach, the market 
                                                          
246 Cp. Gollop & Monahan, 1991, p. 321. 
247 Cp. Villalonga, 2004a, p. 482. 
248 A more detailed analysis of the validity of the business count approach is 
included in section IV.3.1. 
249 For a detailed discussion of the construct validity, refer to section IV.3.1. 
250 Cp. Barnea & Logue, 1973, p. 51ff. 
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implied diversification measures employ a set of ten STOXX® EUROPE 600 sector 
indices to obtain information on the extent to which equity risks are diversifiable. 
Barnea and Logue (1973), instead, use a broad market portfolio.  
The starting point for constructing the market-implied diversification 
measures is a multivariate regression model: Let 𝑟𝑖 denote the equity return of firm 
i in year t and let 𝑟𝑖 be a linear function of the multivariate return series of ten 
STOXX® EUROPE 600 sector indices during the period commencing 250 days 
before and ending on the last trading day prior to the individual firm’s fiscal year 
end: 
 𝑟𝑖 = 𝛿𝑖𝑆𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖 (13) 
where: 
r𝑖 = stock price return of asset i, 
𝑆𝑗 = 
multivariate return series of STOXX® EUROPE 600 
sector indices, 
𝛿𝑖  = vector of regression parameters, and 
𝜖𝑖 = error term. 
The first and most straightforward form of the market-implied diversification 
measures then involves numerically counting the number of significant regression 
coefficients in 𝛿𝑖. MCOUNT takes a value of one if the number of significant 
coefficients exceeds one and is zero otherwise:  
 MCOUNT = {
1, N𝛿 > 1
0, N𝛿 ≤ 1
 (14) 
where: 
MCOUNT = degree of market diversification based on 
numerical count, and 
N𝛿 = number of significant regression coefficients. 
To avoid distortions induced by insignificant regression coefficients, 
equation (13) is estimated using a forward stepwise regression procedure. The 
boundaries for the removal and the addition of a sector index are p ≥ .1 and p ≤
.05, respectively. Whenever R² is used, statistical inferences are based on Huber-
White standard errors to correct for heteroscedastic residuals.251  
                                                          
251 Cp. Huber, 1967, p. 221ff.; White, 1980, p. 817ff.  
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The index is the easiest to calculate among all market-implied diversification 
measures but falls short in taking into consideration differences in the size 
distribution and the relative importance of the various industry involvements. In 
order not to exaggerate the overall significance of diversification by merely 
counting the significant sector indices, this thesis proposes two more 
comprehensive diversification measures, MHDIV and MDIV, that reflect the 
relative strength of each STOXX® EUROPE 600 sector index.  
The second measure is an application of the Berry-Herfindahl index and 
measures the extent of diversity as the inverse of the sum of the squares of each 
standardised regression coefficient divided by the squared sum of the absolute 
regression coefficients  










degree of market diversification based on Herfindahl 
weighting scheme, 
N𝛿 = number of significant regression coefficients,  
Δ𝐽 = sum of the absolute regression coefficients, and  
𝛿𝑗 = vector of regression parameters. 
MHDIV assumes a value of zero for single-business firms and approaches 
towards one as the number of significant regression coefficients increases. Relying 
on the market’s view about the interrelationships between various industry sectors, 
MHDIV is robust against distortions resulting from the inherent hierarchy of 
industry classification systems such as the SIC system.252 A major disadvantage of 
MHDIV is that it does not take account of the extent to which equity risks are 
diversifiable in external capital markets, thereby likely overestimating the level of 
corporate diversification. For instance, consider the case of three significant indices 
with homogenous beta-coefficients which according to equation (15) would mean 
a mid-degree of diversification (66%). Nevertheless, R2 could be relatively small 
indicating that the portfolio uses the diversification benefits offered by equity 
capital markets only to a limited extent.  
                                                          
252 For a discussion of the limitations of the SIC system as an information source, 
instead of many, see Robins & Wiersema, 1995, p. 281f. 
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The third measure integrates the number of significant industry sectors, their 
relative importance, and the proportion of explained variance into a single 
diversification measure. More specifically, MDIV is the minimum of the proportion 
of explained variance (R²) and the inverse of a Herfindahl index based on 
standardised regression coefficients resulting from yearly forward stepwise 
regressions of equation (13): 










𝑀𝐷𝐼𝑉 = degree of market implied diversification 
𝑅2 = coefficient of determination, 
N𝛿 = number of significant regression coefficients, 
Δ𝐽 = sum of the absolute regression coefficients, and  
𝛿𝑗  = vector of regression parameters. 
In this equation, the left-hand side of the minimum function refers to the level 
of explained variance in the regression model. R² determines the extent to which 
the corporate portfolio makes use of diversification effects offered by external 
capital markets. The second element of the minimum function equals MHDIV. 
Analogous to MHDIV, MDIV converges towards one as the firm becomes less 
focused. 
The following example of BASF SE illustrates how the various market-
implied measures can be used to obtain the level of corporate diversification. BASF 
SE is a German multi-national chemical organisation and, is amongst the most 
abundant chemical producer in the world. The corporate umbrella comprises 
subsidiaries and joint ventures around the world offering a broad range of products 
across the business sectors chemicals, plastics, performance products, crop 
protection products, and oil and gas. According to the market-implied 
diversification measures, BASF SE is diversified across the industries “Basic 
Materials” and “Industrials”; thereby making less use of diversification benefits 
offered by the capital market as indicated by low values of MHDIV and MDIV.  
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Table 4: Regression results for BASF and fiscal year 2017253 
 Linear, stepwise regression 
VARIABLES Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 
 
STOXX® EUROPE 600 INDUSTRIALS 
0.334 0.072 4.650 0.000 
STOXX® EUROPE 600 BASIC MATERIALS 0.454 0.073 6.240 0.000 
 
OBSERVATIONS 
256    
R-SQUARED. 0.546    
F TEST 116.76***    
 
MCOUNT = 2 
    
𝑀𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑉 = 1 −
0.3342 + 0.4542
(0.334 + 0.454)2
= 0.489     
𝑀𝐷𝐼𝑉 = min(0.546; 0.489) = 0.489     
 
The estimates of the degree of diversification based on the traditional 
business count measures show that BASF SE is diversified across industry 
segments, but, except for one business segment, remains within the industry group 
chemicals (SIC codes beginning with 28XX). The two approaches therefore lead to 
different assessments of the portfolio configuration of BASF SE (e.g. MHDIV: 49% 
<< H4DIV: 74%). This can have far-reaching implications for the analysis of the 
value contribution of diversification as contained in chapter IV. 
 
Table 5: BASF SE reported sales per business unit and fiscal year 2017254 
Segment description SIC Sales Sales^2 
Functional Solutions 2851 20,745,000 430,355,025,000,000 
Chemicals 2891 16,331,000 266,701,561,000,000 
Performance Products 2865 16,217,000 262,991,089,000,000 
Agricultural Products 2879 5,696,000 32,444,416,000,000 
Oil & Gas 6221 3,244,000 10,523,536,000,000 
Total n/a 62,233,000 1,003,015,627,000,000 
𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑉4 = 5    
BDIV2 = 2    
𝐻4𝐷𝐼𝑉 = 1 −
1,003,015,627,000,000
62,233,0002
= 0.741    
𝐻2𝐷𝐼𝑉 = 1 −
58,989,0002 + 3,244,0002
62,233,0002
= 0.100    
  
                                                          
253 Source: Own representation. 
254 Source: Worldscope database by Thomson Reuters. 
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II.4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND EXPLANATORY APPROACHES ON THE 
DIVERSIFICATION-PERFORMANCE LINKAGE 
II.4.1. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE ON PRODUCT DIVERSIFICATION 
II.4.1.1. An economic model of corporate diversification 
There is ample theoretical literature discussing the benefits and costs of 
diversification strategies.255 In perfect capital markets under the Modigliani and 
Miller (1958)256 assumptions, one would not expect a firm’s diversification decision 
to affect firm value: Shareholders have little economic gains from corporate 
diversification because they can diversify away unsystematic risks more cheaply 
by holding a portfolio of investments that have a low correlation among one 
another and, thus, may not want firms to diversify.257 Not surprisingly, many of the 
arguments made about why firms diversify focus on market imperfections. 
Following prior research by Capozza and Seguin (1999) and Lamont and Polk 
(2001)258, this study refers to the fundamental dividend-discount relationship to 
uncover the sources of the valuation differences between diversified firms and 
focused firms. The dividend-discount model posits that a firm is worth the sum of 
its discounted future dividends:259  






𝑆𝑉𝑖𝑡 = shareholder value of firm i at time t, 
𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 = firm i dividend paid out at time t, and 
𝑒−𝑟𝑡 = continuous compound rate at time t. 
Defining, further, the excess firm value on a diversified firm as the log ratio 
of the value of a diversified firm and the value of an industry-matched portfolio of 
focused firms and substituting the Gordon-Growth model in the excess value 
                                                          
255 Instead of many, see Erdorf et al., 2013, p. 189ff.; Martin & Sayrak, 2003, p. 
39ff. 
256 Cp. Modigliani & Miller, 1958, p. 261ff. 
257 Cp. Levy & Sarnat, 1970, p. 795ff.; Myers, 1984, p. 129. 
258 Cp. Capozza & Seguin, 1999, p. 591ff.; Lamont & Polk, 2001, p. 1695. 
259 Cp. Gordon, 1959, p. 102f. 
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measure, it follows that, if corporate diversification affects equity value, it can do 
so through future cash flows (𝐷𝑖𝑡) or through future returns (𝑒
−𝑟𝑡): 
 𝑅𝑉𝑖𝑡 = ln
𝑆𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝑆𝑉𝑖𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅










𝑅𝑉𝑖𝑡 = measure of relative firm value of firm i at time t, 
𝑆𝑉𝑖𝑡 = shareholder value of firm i at time t, 
𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 = firm i dividend paid out at time t,  
𝑒−𝑟𝑡 = continuous compound rate at time t, and 
the bar indicating focused firms. 
Under the assumption of paying out the income in full, the cash flow which 
can be distributed among the shareholders 𝐷𝑖𝑡 equals:260 
 
𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 − 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 − 𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 +𝐷&𝐴𝑖𝑡
− ∆𝑁𝑊𝐶𝑖𝑡 + ∆𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 
(19) 
where: 
𝐹𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 = flow to equity of firm i at time t, 
𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 = net operating income after tax of firm i at time t, 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡 = interest expenses of firm i at time t, 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 = capital expenditure of firm i at time t,  
𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡 = operational expenditure of firm i at time t, 
𝐷&𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 
depreciation and amortization expenses of firm i at 
time t, 
∆𝑁𝑊𝐶𝑖𝑡 = delta net working capital of firm i at time t, and 
∆𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 = delta net debt issuance of firm i at time t. 
Figure 6 graphically summarises the different channels through which 
corporate diversification can affect value. With a view to corporate level cash flows, 
a considerable amount of literature argues that diversified firms may reap benefits 
in the form of operating synergies261 and financial synergies such as debt co-
insurance effects262 and an increased allocation efficiency of capital in multi-
                                                          
260 Cp. Viebig et al., 2008, p. 29. 
261 Cp. Beckmann, 2006, p. 40ff.; Purkayastha et al., 2012, p. 71; Tanriverdi & 
Venkatraman, 2005, p. 99ff. 
262 Cp. Hann et al., 2013, p. 1961ff.; Higgins & Schall, 1975, p. 93ff.; Lewellen, 
1971, p. 521ff. 
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business firms263. Aside from operating and financial diseconomies264, the value-
destroying effects of corporate diversification are primarily led back to amplifying 
agency problems causing inefficiencies in the internal capital allocation process due 
to increasing costs of decision management and control.265  
Further to the cash flow related arguments, differences in the appropriate 
discount rates of equity might contribute to the diversification’s effect. If the cash 
flows are held constant at the same time as the discount rate for equity is increased, 
then diversified firms will have a lower stock market valuation as predicted by 
equation (18). Lamont and Polk (2001) claim: “Different securities can have different 
expected returns for many reasons; explanations include risk, mispricing, taxes, and 
liquidity.”266  
Among such factors, this research study stresses the mediating role of 
liquidity of equity on the diversification-performance linkage; a channel that has 
received only little attention, albeit its theoretical implications are ambiguous: On 
the one hand, diversified firms might be exposed to higher information 
imbalances267, lowering the liquidity of a firm’s traded equity, and leading to 
substantial reductions in shareholder value. On the other hand, the corporate 
umbrella might provide an information benefit by diversifying away the adverse 
impacts of insiders’ informational advantage over outsiders that possibly makes 
large stocks relatively more attractive. Additionally, diversified firms are often 
large stocks268 that are less affected by expected and unexpected market-wide 
liquidity shocks resulting in a “flight to liquidity” effect.269  
                                                          
263 Cp. Gertner et al., 1994, p. 1211ff.; Hubbard & Palia, 1999, p. 1131ff.; Rajan et 
al., 2000, p. 35ff.; Stein, 1997, p. 111ff. 
264 For a detailed discussion of diseconomies within the context of corporate 
diversification, see Vollmar, 2014, p. 113ff. 
265 Cp. Amihud & Lev, 1981, p. 605ff.; Denis et al., 1997, p. 135ff.; Jensen, 1986, p. 
323ff.; Ozbas & Scharfstein, 2010, p. 581ff.; Rajan et al., 2000, p. 35ff.; Shin & Stulz, 
1998, p. 531ff.; Stulz, 1990, p. 3ff. 
266 Lamont & Polk, 2001, p. 1694. 
267 Cp. Hadlock et al., 2001, p. 613ff.; Harris et al., 1982, p. 604ff. 
268 Cp. Pomfret & Shapiro, 1980, p. 140ff. 
269 Cp. Amihud, 2002, p. 53. 
73 Investors’ value in diversified firms  
While reviewing the theoretical literature in sections II.4.1.2.1 to II.4.1.3.2, the 
study adopts the point of view of the shareholders of the diversified firm. 
Therefore, any judgment on the costs and benefits of corporate diversification is 




Figure 6: Benefits and costs of diversification270 
II.4.1.2. Channel I: Corporate level cash flow 
From a fundamental perspective, the benefits and costs of corporate 
diversification can be derived from i) operating synergies in the form of economies 
of scale and scope (or dissynergies), ii) financial synergies arising from a reduction 
in corporate risk, a higher debt capacity, and an increased efficiency of internal 
capital markets (or financial dissynergies), and iii) agency problems causing 
inefficiencies in the internal capital allocation process. 
II.4.1.2.1. Operating synergies 
One of the strongest motives for diversification suggests that diversified 
firms can generate value from transferring, sharing, and leveraging valuable 
                                                          
270 Source: Own representation based on Capozza & Seguin, 1999, p. 593. 
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resources among business units that are mutually reinforcing.271 Provided that the 
relatedness among the business units is appropriately managed272, scope 
economies should result in sub-additive cost synergies that make the combined 
businesses worth more than they would be on a stand-alone basis.273 By their 
nature, such economies are available to related diversified firms more so than to 
unrelated diversified firms.274  
On the positive side, the additional value arising from the utilisation of these 
synergies is derived from economies of scope and economies of scale.275 Economies 
of scope refer to the sub-additivity of production costs276 and exist when “(…) it is 
less costly to combine two or more product lines in one firm than to produce them 
separately.”277 They arise from inputs that can be shared or utilised to service two or 
more product lines without complete congestion.278 Economies of scope have value 
when they contribute to sources of cost or differentiation advantages over an 
undiversified rival.279 Contrarily, economies of scale refer to the cost advantages 
that firms can gain by using more efficient processes, which lead to an increased 
speed of operation.280 A firm is said to exhibit economies of scale if the unit costs of 
a product (or operation or function that goes into producing a product) decline as 
the absolute volume per period increases.281 By using its existing stock of resources 
                                                          
271 Cp. Bailey & Friedlaender, 1982, p. 1026; Lubatkin & Chatterjee, 1994, p. 114ff.; 
Palich et al., 2000, p. 156ff. 
272 Cp. Nayyar, 1992, p. 220ff. 
273 Cp. Goold & Kathleen, 1993, p. 16; John & Harrison, 1999, p. 130; Weston, 
1970, p. 70. 
274 Cp. Perry, 1998, p. 11; Robins & Wiersema, 1995, p. 279. 
275 Cp. Ostrowski, 2007, p. 76; Singh & Montgomery, 1987, p. 379; Vollmar, 2014, 
p. 107. 
276 Cp. Bausch & Pils, 2009, p. 160; Purkayastha et al., 2012, p. 21. 
277 Panzar & Willig, 1981, p. 268. 
278 Cp. Panzar & Willig, 1981, p. 268. 
279 Cp. Hill et al., 1992, p. 502; Markides & Williamson, 1996, p. 342. 
280 Cp. Lubatkin, 1983, p. 219; Singh & Montgomery, 1987, p. 379. 
281 Cp. Porter, 2004, p. 7. 
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more efficiently, the diversified firm might be able to lower its average cost curve 
and thus enjoy an advantage over competing firms.282  
On the negative side, increasing the number and diversity of the business 
units under one management may narrow the efficient allocation of resources.283 
According to transaction economics, expanding the scope of a firm’s business 
activities would lead to increased costs of both decision management and decision 
control, which may offset any economies implicit in the production function.284 
Management teams commonly operate under a single dominant logic that can be 
defined as “the way in which managers conceptualize the business and make critical 
resource allocation decisions”.285 There is every possibility of X-inefficiencies when 
corporate managers continue to apply their existing dominant logic to newly 
integrated strategically different businesses.286 Likewise, diseconomies of decision 
control may result from increasing agency costs.287 Last but not least, there can be a 
strategic misfit between the individual business units which might lead to 
diseconomies of scope.288 
Although operating synergies in the form of scale and scope economies 
provide significant insights into the diversification-performance linkage, a great 
deal remains to be done in verifying them as the economic rationale for multi-
business firms to exist. There is only a little empirical evidence on the net effects of 
operating synergies on the diversification-performance linkage in the literature as 
it is extraordinarily difficult to capture tacit resources such as capabilities and 
know-how and to retrieve all information necessary such as average cost data.289 
Recently, several authors have made significant steps in this direction by 
                                                          
282 Cp. Perry, 1998, p. 11; Singh & Montgomery, 1987, p. 379. 
283 Cp. Lamont, 1997, p. 83ff.; Rajan et al., 2000, p. 35ff.; Scharfstein, 1998, p. 1ff. 
284 Cp. Schipper & Smith, 1983, p. 458. 
285 Cp. Prahalad & Bettis, 1986, p. 490. 
286 Cp. Markides, 1995, p. 26. 
287 For a detailed discussion of agency costs in the context of corporate 
diversification, refer to section II.4.1.2.3. 
288 Cp. Vollmar, 2014, p. 114f. 
289 Cp. Purkayastha et al., 2012, p. 21; Robins & Wiersema, 1995, p. 279ff.; 
Shepherd & Shepherd, 2004, p. 161f.; Szeless et al., 2003, p. 150. 
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developing indirect indicators of business relatedness based on technology flows 
between the businesses of a firm290, skill291 and managerial competencies292, and the 
strategic importance of imperfectly tradable assets in different business lines293.  
For instance, Robins and Wiersema (1995) investigate the flows of technology 
between the business units of 120 U.S. manufacturing firms and find that 
technological relatedness is positively associated with accounting-based 
profitability.294 Farjoun (1998) concludes that synergies resulting from skill-based 
relatedness can only be realised when the resulting products share similar physical 
attributes (e.g. raw materials, production processes).295 Szeless et al. (2003) 
investigate a European sample of 33 large firms from Germany, Switzerland, and 
Austria and report a significant positive relationship between technological 
relatedness and several accounting-based and market-based performance 
indicators.296 Tanriverdi and Venkatraman (2005) provide evidence for firms to be 
more profitable when they can exploit cross-business knowledge synergies across 
products, customers, and management.297 
II.4.1.2.2. Financial synergies 
Lewellen (1971) provides a pure financial justification for diversification in 
cases where there exists a positive probability of bankruptcy and risk-adjusted 
pricing behaviour of lending institutions.298  
According to the fundamental principles of modern portfolio theory299, the 
combination of different business units in a firm’s portfolio will reduce the variance 
of total earnings for the company, whenever the earnings of the individual units 
                                                          
290 Cp. Robins & Wiersema, 1995, p. 282ff. 
291 Cp. Farjoun, 1994, p. 189ff., 1998, p. 611ff. 
292 Cp. Ilinitch & Zeithaml, 1995, p. 401ff. 
293 Cp. Markides & Williamson, 1994, p. 149ff., 1996, p. 340ff.; Tanriverdi & 
Venkatraman, 2005, p. 79ff. 
294 Cp. Robins & Wiersema, 1995, p. 290. 
295 Cp. Farjoun, 1998, p. 620ff. 
296 Cp. Szeless et al., 2003, p. 154ff. 
297 Cp. Tanriverdi & Venkatraman, 2005, p. 108ff. 
298 Cp. Lewellen, 1971, p. 521ff. 
299 For an introduction to modern portfolio theory, see section II.1.2.1. 
 
77 Investors’ value in diversified firms  
are not perfectly correlated.300 This co-insurance effect, by facilitating a greater debt 
capacity, enhances firm value through an increasing level of optimal leverage and 
higher tax savings.301 If in a world of taxes, debt funds are “cheaper” than equity 
funds due to the tax deductibility of interest expenses, borrowing will increase the 
value of equity.302 
Besides the opportunity to utilise interest tax shields arising from debt co-
insurance effects as described above, diversified firms may benefit from the 
asymmetric treatment of gains and losses by tax authorities.303 As they can 
contemporaneously offset the losses of some of its businesses against the gains of 
others, more diversified firms pay less in taxes than their business units would if 
operated separately.304 This proposition might even hold under the assumption of 
tax loss carrybacks or carryforwards.305 Diversified firms may also lower their tax 
burdens by conducting tax-efficient intra-firm transactions, where earnings are 
shifted between foreign subsidiaries to make the most of the differences in tax 
structures across countries.306  
Several empirical studies support the co-insurance hypothesis:307 Kim and 
McConnell (1977) show that merging firms make greater use of financial leverage 
after the merger compared to the combined level of financial leverage volume of 
the individual firms before the merger, which negates windfalls losses for the 
bondholders of the merging firms.308 Berger and Ofek (1995) report that diversified 
firms have a 1% point higher ratio of debt to total assets than their business units 
would have as separate firms, two-thirds of which is attributable to the debt co-
insurance effect.309 Mansi and Reeb (2002) demonstrate that the diversification 
                                                          
300 Cp. Amit & Livnat, 1988b, p. 100f.; Higgins & Schall, 1975, p. 99ff. 
301 Cp. Berger & Ofek, 1995, p. 41; John, 1993, p. 141; Singh et al., 2004, p. 491. 
302 Cp. Lubatkin, 1983, p. 219. 
303 Cp. Berger & Ofek, 1995, p. 41. 
304 Cp. Beckmann, 2006, p. 45. 
305 Cp. Majd & Myers, 1987, p. 345ff. 
306 Cp. Manzon et al., 1994, p. 1903. 
307 Cp. Singhal & Zhu, 2013, p. 1476. 
308 Cp. Kim & McConnell, 1977, p. 362. 
309 Cp. Berger & Ofek, 1995, p. 59. 
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discount vanishes when correcting for the book value bias of debt.310 However, the 
co-insurance hypothesis is not without controversy. Despite its undoubtful 
theoretical rationale that business segments with a negative correlation of cash 
flows will stabilise a firm’s total earning streams, it can be hard for managers to 
identify countercyclical businesses and if identified, there is no guarantee that the 
negative correlation is stable over time. Leland (2007) states that because of 
decreasing liability protection which, in times of financial distress, shields strongly 
performing business segments from loss-generating units, the financial synergies 
generated from combining various businesses units may be negative.311 Furfine and 
Rosen (2011) find that after a merger the default risk of the combined firm can be 
higher because of managerial actions by self-interested managers that outweigh the 
benefits of product diversification (e. g. option-based compensation plans).312  
Another financial justification for diversification is the ability to create 
internal financial markets to steady earnings and to fund deserving business 
units.313 Under the assumption of inefficient external capital markets, having an 
internal source of financing offers several benefits to the firm’s owner: Any 
informational disadvantage of outside investors can lead to credit rationing and 
underinvestment when individual business units attempt to raise monetary funds 
on their own in the arm’s length external capital market.314 In efficient internal 
capital markets, business units might be able to invest in profitable projects that, 
because of differences in information, incentives, asset specificity, control rights, or 
transaction costs, would be hard to finance externally.315 Besides this “more-
money” effect offering access to additional financing sources, there is an added 
advantage of internal capital markets from a “smarter-money” effect. To the extent 
that corporate managers have information advantages over outside investors in 
                                                          
310 Cp. Mansi & Reeb, 2002, p. 2177ff. 
311 Cp. Leland, 2007, p. 765ff. 
312 Cp. Furfine & Rosen, 2011, p. 832ff. 
313 Cp. Erdorf et al., 2013, p. 190; Markides, 1995, p. 24. 
314 Cp. Stein, 1997, p. 114ff. 
315 Cp. Arikan & Stulz, 2016, p. 145; Lamont, 1997, p. 85f.; Liebeskind, 2000, p. 
59ff. 
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evaluating and disciplining operating units316, they may do a better job of shifting 
a given amount of funding from business units with limited growth opportunities 
to deserving businesses that are more promising to create value for shareholders.317  
Thus, internal capital markets seem to be value enhancing318, in particular, 
with regard to emerging markets where firms may opt for greater diversification 
to overcome the market imperfections in the external capital, labour, and product 
markets.319 Khanna and Palepu (2000) analyse the performance of divisions of 
Indian business groups and conclude that group affiliation enhances firm 
performance by replicating the functions of institutions that are missing in 
emerging markets.320 Fauver et al. (2003) study a sample of 35 developed and 
emerging market countries and suggest that corporate diversification is a value-
enhancing strategy in weak institutional environments.321 Shackman (2007) 
estimates a negative association between corporate diversification and capital 
market development for a sample of 1,560 firms from 39 countries, 20 of which 
belong to the richest countries of the world and the remainder belonging to the 
poorest countries.322 
II.4.1.2.3. Agency costs 
Agency theory initially developed by Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Ross 
(1973), and Stiglitz (1974)323 constitutes a cornerstone of financial economics theory 
and is widely used to explain why firms pursue diversification strategies that lead 
                                                          
316 Cp. Bolton & Scharfstein, 1998, p. 107. 
317 Cp. Markides, 1995, p. 24; Martin & Sayrak, 2003, p. 41; Rajan et al., 2000, p. 
38; Stein, 2003, p. 140f. 
318 A discussion of the dark side of internal capital markets follows in section 
II.4.1.2.3. 
319 Cp. Benito‐Osorio et al., 2012, p. 331. 
320 Cp. Khanna & Palepu, 2000, p. 875ff. 
321 Cp. Fauver et al., 2003, p. 137f. 
322 Cp. Shackman, 2007, p. 493ff. 
323 Cp. Alchian & Demsetz, 1972, p. 777ff.; Ross, 1973, p. 134ff.; Stiglitz, 1974, p. 
219ff.  
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to substantial reductions in shareholder value.324 Ross (1973) defines a relationship 
of agency as a situation between two (or more) parties where “one, designated as the 
agent, acts for, on behalf of, or as representative for the other, designated the principal, in a 
particular domain of decision problems.”325 The central feature of this agency 
relationship is the contractual arrangement between the parties used to specify the 
rules of the game regarding the agent’s rights in the firm, the methods to evaluate 
the agent’s performance, and the resulting compensation to the agent.326  
Agency theory is predicated on the belief that market imperfections induced 
by conditions of uncertainty, lack of contracting ability, and information 
asymmetry lead to second-best outcomes327 in which the separation of ownership 
and control and the ensuing conflicts result in agency costs that reduce the value of 
the firm.328  
As a result of informational disadvantages, principals cannot control their 
agents efficiently, thereby giving them the necessary leeway to act 
opportunistically and increase their own benefits.329 Depending on the extent and 
temporal structure of the information asymmetry between the principal and the 
agent, the management literature differentiates between three forms in which 
agency problems may take shape:330 (i) hidden characteristics referring to the risks 
of selecting an unfavourable agent and bearing the risk of adverse selection331, (ii) 
hidden actions that arise when the managerial effort is unobservable after the 
contractual agreement has been established and/or has a differential value for the 
principal (leading to moral hazard)332, and (iii) hidden intention describing a hold 
                                                          
324 Cp. Erdorf et al., 2013, p. 189; Martin & Sayrak, 2003, p. 42; Montgomery, 1994, 
p. 165ff. 
325 Ross, 1973, p. 134. 
326 Cp. Alparslan, 2006, p. 14; Fama & Jensen, 1983, p. 302. 
327 Cp. Darrough & Stoughton, 1986, p. 501. 
328 Cp. Amihud & Lev, 1999, p. 1063ff.; Denis et al., 1999, p. 1072. 
329 Cp. Müller-Stewens & Lechner, 2016, p. 583; Spremann, 1987, p. 6. 
330 Cp. Beckmann, 2006, p. 50; Picot & Wolff, 1994, p. 220. 
331 Cp. Akerlof, 1970, p. 488ff. 
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up333 situation where the principal depends on a continuation of the agency 
relationship, even so, the agent is likely to behave in an opportunistic manner.  
Holistically, there are two approaches to resolving the principal’s 
informational disadvantage and to reducing the resulting agency costs: either 
through a reduction of information asymmetry or by co-aligning the interests of 
the principal and the agent.334 The former approach involves the establishment of 
control systems that allow for conclusions about the quality of the agent including 
techniques for signalling, screening or self-selection.335 The latter approach, instead, 
aims to co-align the interest between the principal and the agent through 
compensation schemes that imitate equity ownership.336 The following table 
summarises the different forms of information asymmetry: 
 
 
Table 6: Agency theory and classification of asymmetric information337 
 
                                                          
333 Cp. Goldberg, 1976, p. 426ff. 
334 Cp. Denis et al., 1999, p. 1072; Picot & Wolff, 1994, p. 222. For detailed 
explanations on the possibilities of reducing agency problems, see Alparslan, 2006, 
p. 28ff.; Arnold et al., 2015, p. 95ff.; Kieser & Walgenbach, 2010, p. 47f. 
335 Cp. Perridon et al., 2016, p. 626f.; Wenzel, 2006, p. 36 
336 Cp. Denis et al., 1997, p. 1072. 
337 Own representation based on Arnold et al., 2015, p. 95; Knecht, 2014, p. 60; 
Picot & Wolff, 1994, p. 221. 
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Because all kinds of contractual arrangements (as between employer and 
employee) contain essential elements of agency338, agency problems might be 
present in nearly all corporations. However, they increasingly appear in diversified 
firms, where there are many complex delegation situations, and information 
asymmetries are strongly pronounced.339  
Two types of agency problems are especially relevant for this research 
study:340 The owner-manager conflict that is concerned with a divergence of 
interests between the shareholders and corporate management, and the 
headquarter-division manager conflict assumes that the corporate headquarter 
itself is a principal of divisional managers. 
Owner-manager conflict. The central tenet underlying the owner-manager 
conflict is a divergence of interests between the owners and the management of the 
(diversified) firm.341 As managers are not full residual claimants, they might engage 
in top management featherbedding342 and overinvest in diversification to maximise 
their utility without the best interest of their shareholders in mind.343 In general, 
two benefits accrue to senior managers, but that are not available to the 
shareholders:344 First, managers may wish to derive additional private benefits 
from managing a more diversified firm.345 Shleifer and Vishny (1989) show that 
                                                          
338 Cp. Ross, 1973, p. 134. 
339 Cp. Beckmann, 2006, p. 50; Martin & Sayrak, 2003, p. 42. 
340 Other types of conflicts less relevant for the present study concern (i) the 
relationship between stockholders and bondholders and suggest reductions in firm 
value through the problem of risk shifting (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 305ff.) and 
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managers have an incentive to select a diversification strategy that has the highest 
value under them than under the best alternative manager.346 Being aware of the 
firm’s dependence on their particular skills347, diversification provides an 
opportunity for higher managerial compensation due to the increased complexity 
of the organisation.348 Besides the pure pleasure of entrenching themselves, in his 
contribution “Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers” 
Jensen (1986) describes another specific incentive problem arising from free cash 
flows and bearing the risk of over-investment.349 According to this free cash flow 
hypothesis, managers of firms with greater borrowing power or large free cash 
flows will not return these funds to the shareholders but invest them as to pursue 
increasingly far-flung opportunities that increase their power, compensation, and 
perquisites.350 As diversified firms may have more available resources as discussed 
in section II.4.1.2.2, the free cash flow problem might be more severe in multi-
business firms than in single-business firms.351  
Second, diversification provides a means for reducing managerial 
employment risk which is closely related to the unsystematic risk of the firm.352 
Hoskisson and Turk (1990) define employment risk as “the risk of job loss, loss of 
compensation, or loss of managerial reputation.”353 Lacking the opportunity to diversify 
their employment risk in other ways (e.g. working as a manager for various firms 
at the same time), managers are tied to the success of their firms and will wish to 
invest resources in (unrelated) diversification as to decrease the risk associated with 
their human capital.354 As shareholders can efficiently eliminate unsystematic risks 
                                                          
346 Cp. Shleifer & Vishny, 1989, p. 123f. 
347 Cp. Barkema & Pennings, 1998, p. 995; Rose & Shepard, 1997, p. 498ff. 
348 Cp. Perry, 1998, p. 20f. 
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by holding a portfolio of investments that have a low correlation among one 
another, they have little economic gains from (unrelated) diversification.355  
Headquarter-division manager conflict. The conflict of interest between a firm’s 
corporate headquarter and its divisions can be traced back to Coase (1937) 
observation that conscious power and influence activities within a hierarchy may 
adversely lever internal policies of capital allocation.356 In the bargaining-power 
models by Meyer et al. (1992), Scharfstein and Stein (2000), and Rajan et al. (2000) 
unprofitable divisions with better-connected managers may get allocations larger 
than what is justified by the investment opportunities they provide.357 Influence 
activities are costly because the corporate headquarter might try to induce 
divisional managers not to rent-seek by directing to them an inefficiently large 
share of the resources over which they have the allocative authority and because 
the resulting investments may be inefficient.358 Corporate managers, therefore, 
might allocate investment funds to business units irrespective of whether the 
receiving unit offers the best investment opportunities within the diversified 
firm.359 
Moreover, winner-picking in a diversified firm amplifies the moral-hazard 
problem between the corporate headquarter and divisional managers. Since 
divisional managers have no control over the rents they earn, they are vulnerable 
to opportunistic behaviour by corporate managers and, thus, have only little ex-
ante incentives to keep their division profitable.360 Managers of divisions with 
strong future investment opportunities have even lower incentives as they may be 
able to free-ride on the resources from losing divisions should they fail to produce 
enough resources themselves.361 
                                                          
355 Cp. Levy & Sarnat, 1970, p. 795ff. 
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Several empirical studies suggest that internal capital markets function less 
efficiently than their external counterparts: Berger and Ofek (1995) observe that 
inefficient cross-subsidisation might account for at least part of the excess value 
loss of unrelated diversification.362 Lamont (1997) observes that oil firms 
significantly reduce their investments in non-oil segments as a result of the oil-price 
shock in 1986 which the author deems as an indication for inefficient cross-
subsidisation and overinvestment in poorly-performing segments.363 Ozbas and 
Scharfstein (2010) document that unrelated segments of diversified firms tend to 
invest more in low-q industries than they would as stand-alone firms.364 Rajan et 
al. (2000) find that diversity in investment opportunities across divisions of a 
diversified firm can result in greater distortions of investment allocations due to 
internal power struggles between the divisions.365  
Table 7 summarises the effects of corporate diversification on corporate level 
cash flow. 
 
Table 7: Corporate level cash flow and corporate diversification366 
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II.4.1.3. Channel II: Future returns 
From a return-based perspective, the benefits and costs of corporate 
diversification can be derived from the informativeness of stock prices. On the one 
hand, diversified firms might benefit from a “flight to liquidity’’ that makes large 
stocks relatively more attractive.368 On the other hand, increasing agency costs 
prevent investors from assessing correctly the value of corporate diversification 
amplifying their potential unwillingness to trade the equity of diversified firms. To 
                                                          
367 The dark-side of internal capital markets are subsumed under agency costs. 
368 Cp. Amihud, 2002, p. 53. This effect will be discussed in greater detail 
throughout chapter 0 of this study. 
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the extent that the potential for agency costs in the form of the owner-manager 
conflict or an informational advantage of insiders over outside investors increases 
with the degree of diversification, greater diversification can lead to higher 
liquidity premiums because dealers price protect against potential losses from 
trading with better-informed investors by demanding higher bid-ask spreads.369  
II.4.1.3.1. Informational disparity 
Hadlock et al. (2001) develop two competing hypotheses to explaining how 
corporate diversification affects the exchange of information between the corporate 
headquarter and external capital markets: an information transparency hypothesis 
and an information diversification hypothesis.370  
On the negative side, the transparency hypothesis suggests that diversified 
firms face more difficulty in raising funds from external capital markets than 
focused firms due to valuation problems in the presence of asymmetrically 
distributed information between the corporate headquarter and outside 
investors.371 Managers have an incentive to avoid disclosing information on poorly 
performing segments in order not to expose themselves to higher external scrutiny, 
and on above-average performing segments to reduce the danger of rival firms 
entering the market.372 Thus, the diversified firm’s accounting numbers and the 
quality of the figures reported for each business segment might be less informative 
compared to the figures issued by focused firms. 
Habib et al. (1997) present an information-based model in which breaking up 
the diversified firm into several focused firms increases the informativeness of the 
price system.373 Through a reduction in the investors’ uncertainty about the value 
of the individual divisions, the portfolio of the separately traded focused firms is 
worse more than the combined firm.374 Nanda and Narayanan (1999) define an 
                                                          
369 Cp. Damodaran, 2005, p. 5; Welker, 1995, p. 802.  
370 Cp. Hadlock et al., 2001, p. 613ff. 
371 Cp. Hadlock et al., 2001, p. 615. 
372 Cp. Bens et al., 2011, p. 420; Berger & Hann, 2007, p. 873f. 
373 Cp. Habib et al., 1997, p. 153ff. 
374 Cp. Habib et al., 1997, p. 159ff. 
 
 Florian Zechser, M.A. 88 
asymmetric information model where the unobservability of disaggregated 
information about the cash flows of the individual segments of the diversified firm 
results in a misevaluation of the firm’s securities.375 In their model, managers trade 
off the benefits of internal capital markets against diversification-related 
information costs and are likely to resort to divestitures in order to raise external 
financing at a fair price. 
On the positive side, the information diversification hypothesis argues that 
corporate diversification might lessen the adverse-selection problem facing equity 
issuers, also known as Myers and Majluf (1984) problem.376 Myers and Majluf 
(1984) develop an equilibrium model of corporate investment according to which 
managers issue stocks to raise cash to undertake a valuable investment opportunity 
in the presence of information asymmetries between corporate headquarter and 
external capital markets.377  
The information diversification hypothesis assumes that the errors the 
market makes in forecasting the cash flows of the multiple segments in a diversified 
firm are imperfectly correlated. The corporate umbrella provides an information 
benefit by diversifying away the adverse impacts of insiders’ informational 
advantage over outsiders. As a result, the forecast for a diversified firm can be more 
accurate than the forecast for a focused firm.378  
A related argument for diversified firms to suffer from less severe 
information problems than separately traded focused firms can be found in the 
security design literature. Gorton and Pennacchi (1993) and Subrahmanyam (1991) 
present models where trading in basket securities (e.g. index future, exchange-
traded funds) is subject to less asymmetric information compared to trading 
individual securities.379 Informed traders often possess private information about 
the value of a particular claim but do not have superior knowledge about the entire 
capital market. In effect, the informational advantages about the value of individual 
                                                          
375 Cp. Nanda & Narayanan, 1999, p. 178ff. 
376 Cp. Hadlock et al., 2001, p. 614f. 
377 Cp. Myers & Majluf, 1984, p. 187ff. 
378 Cp. Thomas, 2002, p. 377. 
379 Cp. Gorton & Pennacchi, 1993, p. 8ff.; Subrahmanyam, 1991, p. 20ff. 
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securities are diversified away across the securities that constitute the basket, so 
that information asymmetry problems are less severe for the basket than for the 
individual securities in the basket.380 To the extent that corporate diversification 
bundles the claims on individual assets into composite claims, any informational 
advantage is likely to be offset by changes in the diversified firm’s other claims that 
the informed trader knows less about.381  
It remains an empirical question which of the views more accurately reflects 
the informational environment of the diversified firm: In support of the 
transparency hypothesis, Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) find that firms 
that engage in spin-offs have higher levels of information asymmetry about their 
value than non-diversified firms, resulting in information-based capital 
constraints.382 Firth et al. (2013) demonstrate that, on average, more-diversified 
firms have higher probabilities of informed trading which, in turn, lead to 
reductions in firm value.383 Rojahn and Zechser (2017) study the effects of corporate 
diversification on the market price for credit risk.384 Using a sample of STOXX® 
EUROPE 600 index members, the authors show that the information disadvantage 
of outside investors is more severe in diversified firms which in turn provides for 
an increase in CDS spreads of these firms.385 Again, there are opposing studies 
reporting that greater diversification must, on average, not lead to increasing 
information asymmetries.386 
II.4.1.3.2. Analyst coverage 
The main function of security analysts is to reduce information asymmetries 
in the relationship between corporate headquarters and investors by providing 
research reports, earnings forecasts, price targets, and buy-sell recommendations. 
                                                          
380 Cp. Thomas, 2002, p. 377. 
381 Cp. Huson & MacKinnon, 2003, p. 484. 
382 Cp. Krishnaswami & Subramaniam, 1999, p. 110. 
383 Cp. Firth et al., 2013, p. 27ff. 
384 Cp. Rojahn & Zechser, 2017, p. 1ff. 
385 Cp. Rojahn & Zechser, 2017, p. 20ff. 
386 Cp. Clarke et al., 2004, p. 107; Thomas, 2002, p. 384ff. 
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Analysts initiate or increase coverage in a firm while considering a variety of factors 
such as firm size, ownership structure, stock performance, and the availability as 
well as the accuracy of financial information.387  
Among such factors, one stream of research argues that analysts might prefer 
focused companies to reduce their economic costs of generating information.388 
Security analysts often confine her or his attention to one industrial sector or 
market, whereas diversified firms tend to spread their activities across multiple 
industries or markets.389 Following a diversified firm by nature takes an analyst out 
of her or his area of expertise, thereby increasing the analyst’s career penalties 
associated with the production of inaccurate forecasts (e.g. lower reputation, risk 
of job loss).390 Besides, corporate diversification leads to analysts' propensity to herd 
together in forecasting and, because analyst herding is synonymous with 
ineffective analyst coverage, herding can be considered an additional source of 
undervaluation of diversified firms.391 Among others, Bhushan (1989), Cai and 
Zeng (2011), Gilson et al. (2001) report a negative association between a firm’s level 
of diversification and analyst coverage.392  
Other researchers focus on the forecast accuracy and conclude that the 
analyst’s earnings forecast errors and the dispersions in analysts’ forecasts are 
significantly higher for diversified firms than those for pure plays. Gilson et al. 
(2001) examine changes in the composition and forecast accuracy of financial 
analysts for a sample of 103 conglomerate stock breakups undertaken during the 
period 1990 to 1995 and report a 30% to 50% improvement in analyst forecast 
accuracy after a breakup event.393 The authors relate the improvements to the 
availability of deconsolidated financial statements that contain more value-relevant 
                                                          
387 Cp. Beyer et al., 2010, p. 326; Cai & Zeng, 2011, p. 67f.; Zuckerman, 2000, p. 
595. 
388 Cp. Brennan & Tamarowski, 2000, p. 27; Cai & Zeng, 2011, p. 76. 
389 Cp. Wen, 2017, p. 2. 
390 Cp. Duru & Reeb, 2002, p. 417f.; Zuckerman, 2000, p. 595. 
391 Cp. Kim & Pantzalis, 2003, p. 69f. 
392 Cp. Bhushan, 1989, p. 268; Cai & Zeng, 2011, p. 74f.; Gilson et al., 2001, p. 567. 
393 Cp. Gilson et al., 2001, p. 567f. 
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information and the improved ability of industry specialists to utilise their 
expertise in forecasting the performance of pure plays.394 Feldman (2016) finds that 
legacy spinoffs that involve a firm’s core business are more likely to induce analysts 
to revisit and change their earlier coverage decisions than their non-legacy 
counterparts, leading to considerable improvements in the composition and 
quality of their analyst coverage.395  
Research from the security design literature provides two rationales for why 
a termination of analyst coverage could have a negative impact on the excess value 
of diversified firms:396 First, security analysts by monitoring the senior management 
of a firm can alleviate the adverse effects of agency conflicts between the firm 's 
ownership and management as described in section II.4.1.2.3. Doukas et al. (2000) 
show that security analysts serve an important monitoring function like other 
information intermediaries (e.g. board of directors, rating agencies).397 Due to 
specialised knowledge within a particular industry, security analysts possess 
comparative advantages in analysing and monitoring firms. A termination of 
analysts’ coverage can lead to increased adverse selection costs; thereby making 
trading diversified firms’ equity more costly.398  
Second, security analysts can reduce the extent of informational asymmetries 
between corporate headquarters and the external capital market.399 There is every 
possibility of misvaluation of equity if there are information asymmetry problems 
between managers and investors that cannot fully be resolved.400 A termination of 
analyst following, therefore, amplifies informational problems, increasing the 
equity investors’ perceived level of risk, and leading to considerable surcharges in 
the discount rate for equity of diversified firms.401 
  
                                                          
394 Cp. Gilson et al., 2001, p. 568. 
395 Cp. Feldman, 2016, p. 1197. 
396 Cp. Beckmann, 2006, p. 57f. 
397 Cp. Doukas et al., 2000, p. 57ff. 
398 Cp. Lipson & Mortal, 2007, p. 344. 
399 Cp. Ferris & Sarin, 2000, p. 110f. 
400 Cp. Healy & Palepu, 2001, p. 407ff. 
401 Cp. Beckmann, 2006, p. 58. Bhushan, 1989, p. 268. 
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II.4.1.3.3. Stock market liquidity 
Generally, the diversification literature, including the explanations in the 
preceding sections, computes the average valuation effects of corporate 
diversification under the implicit assumption that the shares of diversified firms 
are equally liquid compared to the shares of a portfolio of comparable focused 
firms. Various studies such as Capozza and Seguin (1999), Francis et al. (2004), and 
Huson and MacKinnon (2003) note that the transaction costs incurred by investors 
when trading stocks of diversified and focused companies must not be identical.402  
The theoretical literature on corporate diversification offers conflicting 
predictions about how diversification affects stock market liquidity.403 On the 
positive side, the information diversification hypothesis – in line with the studies 
on security baskets’ liquidity by Gorton and Pennacchi (1993) and Subrahmanyam 
(1991) – suggests that diversified firms suffer from less severe information 
problems making the estimates of the conglomerate’s value more precise than the 
separate estimates of the individual segments’ values. The reduced adverse 
selection costs are the starting point for an increase in shareholder value. 
As inventory holding costs of the market maker are a positive function of the 
riskiness of the underlying, corporate diversification might also reduce spreads 
through an inventory holding cost effect resulting from a lower price risk of 
diversified firm’s stocks.404 As claimed by Lewellen (1971), the combination of 
different business units in a firm’s portfolio will reduce volatility if their cash flows 
are not perfectly positively correlated. Likewise, Amihud (2002) finds that the 
effects of market illiquidity are stronger for small firm stocks than they are for 
larger firms.405 Assuming that diversifying firms are larger406, the “flight to 
                                                          
402 Cp. Capozza & Seguin, 1999, p. 587ff.; Francis et al., 2004, p. 1ff.; Huson & 
MacKinnon, 2003, p. 481ff. 
403 Cp. Lipson & Mortal, 2007, p. 346. 
404 Cp. Benston & Hagerman, 1974, p. 354f.; Guéant et al., 2013, p. 490; Mansi & 
Reeb, 2002, p. 2170. 
405 Cp. Amihud, 2002, p. 47. 
406 In terms of firm size, Table 18 shows that diversified firms are 1.64 times 
larger than focused firms. 
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liquidity” hypothesis provides a rationale for why diversifying firms might be 
more attractive than focused firms and thus face higher liquidity.  
On the negative side, there are also compelling reasons to suspect that 
diversified firms trade at significant liquidity premiums due to valuation problems 
in the presence of asymmetrically distributed information or restrictions in the 
investor base. To the extent that the potential for agency costs increases with the 
degree of corporate diversification, either due to an informational advantage of 
insiders over outside investors407 or higher costs for acquiring information408, then 
greater diversification would lead to higher illiquidity premiums and an 
undervaluation of the issuers’ shares because market makers would need to price 
protect against potential losses from trading with better-informed investors by 
demanding higher bid-ask spreads. Furthermore, an unwillingness to trade the 
equity of diversified firms might also stem from characteristics unique to the 
diversified firm that restricts the investor base of the diversifying firm:409  
- Investor Cognizance. Investors tend to invest in stocks that they “know 
about”.410 It might, thus, be advantageous for firms to be followed by financial 
analysts (or brokers) acting as independent information producers. If 
investors care about their economic costs of generating information and to 
the extent that fewer analysts follow diversified firms, they might be less 
attractive for a variety of investors which reduces the level of liquidity 
prevailing in the (secondary) market. 
- Scope of investment. Investors often want to invest in a specific industrial sector 
or market and might be scared off by the plethora of a diversified firm’s 
business activities.411 A spinoff of the distinct business units might increase 
the investor base. 
- Ease of diversification. According to modern finance theory and the predictions 
of the CAPM, investors are not compensated for bearing unsystematic risks 
                                                          
407 Cp. Hadlock et al., 2001, p. 613ff.; Harris et al., 1982, p. 604ff. 
408 Cp. Grossman, 1976, p. 573ff.; Ippolito, 1989, p. 1ff. 
409 Cp. Beckmann, 2006, p. 60; Herrmann, 2002, p. 42f. 
410 Cp. Brennan & Hughes, 1991, p. 1666. 
411 Cp. Vijh, 1994, p. 593. 
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as they can be eliminated by holding a portfolio of investments that have a 
low correlation among one another.412 As risk pooling will not reduce 
systematic risks, managers should not be concerned with managing 
unsystematic, and, therefore, total risk. Investors will not reward such 
behavior.413 Also, there is any possibility that managers might introduce new 
sources of variance through deficits in implementing and controlling the 
diversification strategy. In effect, corporate diversification might not fulfil the 
assumptions of the Markowitz (1952) portfolio selection model. 
To summarise, from a conceptual point of view, diversified firms have many 
characteristics that make them worth more or less than a portfolio of comparable 
focused firms. These characteristics can affect both the fundamental value (i. e. cash 
flow related arguments, section II.4.1.2) and the Wall Street value of the diversified 
firm (i. e. future return related arguments, section II.4.1.3). Table 8 reviews the effect 
of corporate diversification on future returns. 
  
                                                          
412 For further reading on the CAPM, refer to section II.1.2.2. 
413 Cp. Lubatkin & O'Neill, 1987, p. 666ff.; Perry, 1998, p. 13ff. 
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Table 8: Future returns and corporate diversification414 
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II.4.2. VALUATION CONSEQUENCES OF CORPORATE 
DIVERSIFICATION 
II.4.2.1. Measures of financial performance 
Organisational performance plays a dominant role in strategy research and 
often is the ultimate dependent variable in diversification research. In a nutshell, 
organisational performance means “the fulfilment of the economic goals of the firm”.415 
Because different fields of study might require different measures of organisational 
performance, a demarcation of the term is necessary.416 Throughout this study, the 
terms “organisational performance”, “financial performance”, and “performance” are 
deemed to refer to the same construct and will be used interchangeably. 
Regarding the measurement of firm performance, Appendix 4 and Appendix 
5 - in line with previous meta-analytic reviews by Klier (2009), Perry (1998), and 
Schüle (1992)417 - indicate that no consensus exists among strategic management 
researchers on how to best measure the performance effects of corporate 
diversification. Instead, approaches range from one-dimensional accounting-based 
measures (e.g. return on asset, equity, or sales) to two-dimensional financial 
market-based measures of risk and return (e.g. Jensen’s alpha, Sharpe ratio, 
Treynor ratio,) with two prominent value-based measures, excess firm value (EFV) 
and Tobin’s Q (q-ratio), in between. Table 9 provides a summary of the leading 
performance indicators. 
  
                                                          
415 Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986, p. 803. 
416 Cp. Dalton et al., 1998, p. 274. 
417 Cp. Klier, 2009, p. 35ff.; Perry, 1998, p. 77ff.; Schüle, 1992, p. 102ff. 
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Table 9: Approaches to measuring firm performance418 
The table provides a short description of eight well-appreciated performance measures used in 
previous diversification studies. 
Variable Description 
Accounting measure:  
 
Return on asset 
(ROA) 
ROA is among the most popular accounting measures of 
performance and is defined as earnings before interest and tax 
divided by the firm’s total assets. The ratio is an indicator of how 
effectively a firm generates profits from its assets, before the effects 
of financing.  
 
Return on equity 
(ROE) 
ROE is the net operating profit after interest and tax expressed as a 
percentage of total shareholder’s equity. The ratio reflects how 
successful a firm’s management is in increasing the capital 
entrusted by its owners. Unlike ROA, ROE is sensitive to capital 
structure differences. 
 
Return on sales 
(ROS) 
ROS, sometimes called profit margin, is the ratio of net profit after 
taxes (excluding extraordinary items) to net sales. The measure 
provides information on how effectively a firm converts sales into 
profits. 




Jensen’s alpha is the difference between a firm’s actual stock market 
return and the expected return according to the CAPM. That is, the 
alpha coefficient indicates how much on average a firm's stock price 




The Sharpe ratio, also called return‐to‐variability‐ratio, 
corresponds to the slope of the capital market line. It equals the 




The Treynor ratio refers to the fundamental risk‐return 
relationship of the CAPM. It determines a firm’s excess return over 
the risk‐free asset in relation to the market risk associated with the 
firm. 
Value measure:  
 
Excess firm value 
(EFV) 
Excess firm value is the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s 
actual value to its imputed value. The imputed value corresponds to 
the reported accounting value (e.g. assets, sales, or earnings) 
multiplied by its industry median ratio of capital to that accounting 





This measure is defined as the ratio of market value to the 
replacement cost of the firm. In contrast to accounting figures, 
Tobin’s Q is considered a superior means of determining firm rents 
as it implicitly assumes the correct risk‐adjusted discount rate and 
minimises distortions induced by accounting conventions or 
strategic accounting. 
                                                          
418 Source: Own representation based on Fey, 2000, p. 207; Richard et al., 2009, p. 
729ff.; Wulf, 2007, p. 116. 
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Accounting figures provide a readily available means of measuring firm 
performance and are the primary focus of much of the strategic management 
research on diversification.419 Derived from audited financial statements, 
accounting measures are oriented towards the historical performance of a firm.420 
They reflect the efficacy of diversification efforts from the viewpoint of firm 
managers who are used to making decisions based on financial statements rather 
than value-orientated indicators.421 The most commonly used performance 
measures in diversification research include return on assets (ROA), on equity 
(ROE), and on sales (ROS).422 
Given their ease of computation and the consideration of objective 
accounting data to determine the profitability of a firm, accounting-based ratios 
benefit from a high level of objectivity and comparability across firms. At least for 
publicly traded firms, all data necessary for the calculation of accounting-based 
ratios is publicly available because of the extensive disclosure requirements set out 
by stock exchanges and national commercial codes. Despite their popularity and 
widespread use in strategic management research423, objections to the accounting-
based approach aim primarily at its vulnerability against strategic accounting and 
its failure to capture the expected future cash flows of a firm's stock of assets.424 
Four issues arise in the use of accounting-based ratios:  
- First, to the extent that net operating profit is distorted, so will all therefrom 
derived profitability ratios be distorted.425 Profit can be distorted for various 
reasons; explanations include accounting policies (e.g. undervaluation of 
assets, systematic differences in accounting rules across national borders), 
                                                          
419 Cp. Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 1989, p. 540. 
420 Cp. Chakravarthy, 1986, p. 444; Richard et al., 2009, p. 728. 
421 Cp. Hoskisson et al., 1993, p. 221; Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 1989, p. 540. 
422 Cp. Klier, 2009, p. 35; Wulf, 2007, p. 117. 
423 Cp. Fey, 2000, p. 208. 
424 Cp. Dalton et al., 1998, p. 274. 
425 Cp. Perry, 1998, p. 88. 
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human error, strategic accounting, and deception.426 Besides, differences in 
the capital structure across firms can impede the comparability of 
accounting-based ratios, an issue that applies especially to ROE.427 This 
misrepresentation is closely related to the financial leverage effect used by 
researchers to characterise a situation in which increasing financial leverage 
enhances the return for the equity shareholders. Given that the return on 
investment exceeds a firm’s borrowing costs, the financial leverage effect 
predicts a positive linear relationship between ROE and the leverage ratio.428  
- Second, accounting rates of return are criticised for emphasising historic 
activity over future performance.429 Since accounting-based ratios reflect 
what has happened in the past, they are quite limited in anticipating 
expectations about future cash flows a firm’s stock of assets might generate.430 
In this context, numerous authors point out that the period-based 
determination of net operating profits can lead to doubtful estimates of a 
firm’s profitability when the firm is invested to a large extent in long-term 
projects such as diversification.431 These investments are characterised by 
high initial costs, which are offset by corresponding returns only in later 
periods, resulting in an underestimation of the firm’s profitability in the early 
stages of the project and an overvaluation at later stages.  
- Third, using accounting-based measures requires controlling for differences 
in shareholder’s risk.432 That is, diversified firms and focused firms might 
perform differently merely because the former or the latter have higher risk 
which, according to traditional asset pricing models, is associated with higher 
                                                          
426 Cp. Chakravarthy, 1986, p. 443f.; Fey, 2000, p. 208ff.; Richard et al., 2009, p. 
728; Wulf, 2007, p. 118ff. 
427 Cp. Fey, 2000, p. 215f. 
428 Cp. Perridon et al., 2016, p. 562ff. 
429 Cp. Keats, 1988, p. 153ff. 
430 Cp. Richard et al., 2009, p. 728. 
431 Cp. Wulf, 2007, p. 118. 
432 Cp. Fey, 2000, p. 212. 
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expected returns.433 Studies by Bettis and Mahajan (1985), Chatterjee and 
Wernerfelt (1991), Dubofsky and Varadarajan (1987), McDougall and Round 
(1984), and Nayyar (1993) integrate a firm’s business risk and industry sector 
to obtain a more complete picture of the economic performance of the firm 
and to make comparisons across firms more reliable.434  
- Fourth, Glaser and Mueller (2010) and Mansi and Reeb (2002) provide 
evidence that unadjusted book values of debt may be a downward-biased 
proxy for the market values of debt, as they ignore the risk effects of 
diversification435 and, thus, may lead to a systematic underestimation of the 
overall firm value of diversified firms relative to focused firms.436 
Financial market measures based on a firm’s stock price performance are the 
second means to determine the performance effects of corporate diversification. 
They are the preferred instrument for characterising organisational performance 
within the economics and finance literature.437 Researchers relying on financial 
market measures are concerned with the extent of shareholder wealth creation and 
portfolio risk reduction achieved by diversification from an investor’s, as opposed 
to a managerial, point of view.438 The central tenet underlying most of the financial 
market measures is the efficient market hypothesis used by researchers to 
characterise a situation where today’s stock price fully reflects the market's best 
estimate of the value of all future profits. Consequently, these kinds of measures 
can be best described as long-run indicators of the financial performance of a 
firm.439 Prominent measures include Jensen’s alpha, Sharpe ratio, Treynor ratio.440 
                                                          
433 Cp. Lang & Stulz, 1994, p. 1252. 
434 Cp. Bettis & Mahajan, 1985, p. 785ff.; Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991, p. 33ff.; 
Dubofsky & Varadarajan, 1987, p. 597ff.; McDougall & Round, 1984, p. 384ff.; 
Nayyar, 1993, p. 28ff. 
435 For further reading on the co-insurance effect, see section II.4.1.2.2. 
436 Cp. Glaser & Mueller, 2010, p. 2307ff.; Mansi & Reeb, 2002, p. 2167ff. 
437 Cp. Richard et al., 2009, p. 728. 
438 Cp. Perry, 1998, p. 84; Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 1989, p. 540. 
439 Cp. Datta et al., 1991, p. 533; Richard et al., 2009, p. 728. 
440 Cp. Klier, 2009, p. 37; Wulf, 2007, p. 121. 
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The greatest strength of financial market measures is that they are forward-
looking, representing the value of all future profits and growth that will accrue to 
that company.441 The figures are robust against strategic accounting and include 
intangible assets more effectively than accounting measures.442 Financial market 
measures offer a holistic view on firm performance that is not limited to specific 
information aspects of performance such as sales growth or profits.443  
There are also considerable limitations to measuring firm performance in this 
manner. Financial market measures require that capital markets are informational 
efficient in the sense of Fama (1965, 1970).444 Therefore, one cannot assess whether 
diversified firms ceteris paribus earn lower rents because share prices already fully 
reflect all available information regarding a firm’s diversification decision.445 
Moreover, the only stakeholder that, from the viewpoint of financial market 
measures, matters is the fully diversified investor which runs counter to the notions 
of strategic management recognising the need for business organisations to be 
accountable to many stakeholder groups.446 Finally, they are limited to listed 
companies and analyse profitability at the divisional level but not on the corporate 
level.447  
Value measures are the third means to measure firm performance. As hybrid 
measures, they combine accounting and stock market data into a single 
performance indicator. Among the most popular hybrid measures are Tobin’s Q 
(q-ratio) and Berger and Ofek’s (1995) excess firm value measure.448  
Tobin’s Q is defined as the ratio of the market value of the sum of a firm's 
capitalised income streams to the replacement value of its assets.449 It is a 
                                                          
441 Cp. Perry, 1998, p. 89; Richard et al., 2009, p. 728. 
442 Cp. Richard et al., 2009, p. 728. 
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449 Cp. Jansen, 2006, p. 99; Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 1988, p. 627. 
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theoretically based measure of the premium (or discount) that the market is willing 
to pay above (or below) the replacement costs of a firm’s assets.450 Tobin’s Q can be 
used as an indicator for growth opportunities where a value above (below) 1.0 
indicates that the firm is underinvested (overinvested).451  
Berger and Ofek (1995) treat the relative value of diversified firms compared 
to focused firms as the natural logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s actual value to its 
imputed value. The imputed value corresponds to the reported accounting value 
(e.g. assets, sales, or earnings) multiplied by its industry median ratio of capital to 
that accounting item.452 Negative (positive) excess firm values indicate a 
diversification discount (premium).  
Value measures combine capital market data with accounting data; thereby 
providing the advantage of balancing differences in systematic risk and costs of 
capital, primarily ignored by accounting measures, against operational 
performance issues associated with market measures that capture only changes in 
firm value, not levels of value.453 However, the value measures also share some of 
the downsides with the other approaches such as the assumption of strong-form 
efficiency and the neglect of the positive effect of corporate diversification on 
bondholder value.  
A common yardstick in adopting Tobin’s Q is the estimation of the 
replacement costs of assets. Researchers often measure the replacement value 
through the book value of assets454 which not only introduces the potential for 
several accounting distortions455 but also requires assumptions about rates of 
depreciation and inflation456. In its original version, Tobin’s Q furthermore fails to 
adjust for differences in the profitability levels across industries. Diversified firms 
                                                          
450 Cp. Perry, 1998, p. 88. 
451 Cp. Lindenberg & Ross, 1981, p. 2; Wulf, 2007, p. 123. 
452 Cp. Berger & Ofek, 1995, p. 60f. 
453 Cp. Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 1988, p. 626f.; Richard et al., 2009, p. 732. 
454 Cp. Funke, 2006, p. 94. 
455 Cp. Richard et al., 2009, p. 732. 
456 Cp. Berger & Ofek, 1995, p. 47; Fey, 2000, p. 205. 
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might perform worse simply because their corporate portfolio consists of low q 
businesses.457  
EFV is vulnerable to strategic reporting when total sales or earnings are used 
as a multiplier.458 Moreover, excess value is criticised for assuming that the business 
units can be separated from another which contradicts with the economic rationale 
of the multibusiness firm to transfer, share, and leverage valuable resources 
between formerly distinct businesses.459 
II.4.2.2. Event studies 
Event studies are concerned with the relationship between security prices 
and economic events.460 Within the diversification literature, most event studies 
focus on the behaviour of share prices in order to test whether their behaviour is 
affected by changes in the corporate portfolio strategy (“diversification event”).461 
Based on the premise that stock markets are informationally efficient at 
assimilating new information about firms into share prices, the general form of the 
null and alternative hypothesis are as follows:462 
 𝐻𝑁: 𝑓(𝑅𝑖|𝜑𝑖) − 𝑓(𝑅𝑖) = 0  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝜑𝑖  
(20) 
 𝐻𝐴: 𝑓(𝑅𝑖|𝜑𝑖) − 𝑓(𝑅𝑖) ≠ 0  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑡 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝜑𝑖 
where: 
𝑅𝑖 = return on security i in an event period of interest, 
𝜑𝑖 = 
signal from information structure η announced in 
the event period that potentially affects security i, 
𝑓(𝑅𝑖|𝜑𝑖) = 
distribution of 𝑅𝑖 conditional on the information 
signal 𝜑𝑖 from the information structure η, and 
𝑓(𝑅𝑖) = marginal distribution of 𝑅𝑖. 
                                                          
457 Cp. Lang & Stulz, 1994, p. 1263. 
458 Cp. Rajan et al., 2000, p. 53f. 
459 Cp. Fey, 2000, p. 229; Wulf, 2007, p. 124. 
460 Cp. Strong, 1992, p. 533. 
461 For a detailed description and application of the approach to diversification 
research, instead of many, see Ostrowski, 2007, p. 119ff.; Vollmar, 2014, p. 185ff. 
462 Cp. Strong, 1992, p. 533. 
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In an efficient capital market, abnormal returns (𝑓(𝑅𝑖|𝜑𝑖) − 𝑓(𝑅𝑖)) reflect the 
believes of investors on how the refocusing event might change the firm’s future 
profitability: If abnormal returns are positive, then investors consider corporate 
diversification a value-increasing strategy, whereas negative abnormal returns are 
indicative of a value-destroying strategy. Appendix 5 summarises the results of 18 
event studies that are concerned with the effect of corporate diversification on the 
financial market-based performance of firms. Most of the selected studies provide 
evidence of adding value by refocusing spinoffs, which is especially true for 
spinoffs where the continuing firm’s business units and the spinoff unit belong to 
different two-digit SIC.463 The losses to shareholders from non-focus decreasing 
spinoffs or even diversifying acquisitions comes to a maximum of 5.4% in the short 
run (-1d to +1d) and up to 11.8% in the long run (>12m). The results are not country-
specific. As it is often the case within the diversification literature, there are also 
some studies documenting no performance differences between diversifying and 
non-diversifying mergers or even higher net benefits for diversifiers.464  
The variability in the diversification’s effect on firm value based on the event 
study approach might be attributed to methodological issues as well as differences 
in sample selection:465 First, event studies require semi-strong form efficiency to 
ensure that  𝜑𝑖 is fully utilized by investors in deriving equilibrium expected 
returns and expected asset prices. As discussed in section II.1.1, the notion of 
informational efficiency proves a controversial discussion among finance 
researchers. Relatedly, the market’s reaction to firms that are involved in 
diversifying or re-focusing mergers is always tested jointly with several auxiliary 
hypotheses about the equilibrium pricing models used to specify the benchmark 
return and the event window (i.e. joint hypothesis problem).  
                                                          
463 Cp. Berger & Ofek, 1999, p. 335; Daley et al., 1997, p. 265; Desai & Jain, 1999, 
p. 77f.; Morck et al., 1990, p. 42; Morgan et al., 2000, p. 15. 
464 Cp. Akbulut & Matsusaka, 2010, p. 259; Hadlock et al., 2001, p. 627; Hubbard 
& Palia, 1999, p. 1141. 
465 For a detailed description of the shortcomings of the event study approach to 
measure the value of diversification strategies, instead of many, see Erdorf et al., 
2013, p. 195; Fey, 2000, p. 225ff. 
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Second, event studies are vulnerable against confounding events introducing 
a spurious association between the refocusing event and the stock market 
performance. Since it cannot be ruled out that investors have already become aware 
of the transaction before the official announcement by the company, it is 
established practice to determine the stock market performance over several days 
or month. In this case, however, it is no longer possible to isolate the price 
movements due to new information from price movements triggered by events 
other than a diversification decision.466  
Third, the event study approach is limited both in terms of firms and types 
of diversification. By way of construction, the event study approach is restricted to 
publicly listed companies as well as external diversification events. The approach 
cannot capture the valuation effects of internal diversification due to the missing 
signal send out to capital investors. For this reasoning, it does not apply to this 
study. 
II.4.2.3. Panel studies 
Panel studies do not build on abnormal returns but directly determine the 
value of diversified firms relative to a portfolio of comparable single-segment 
firms.467 By combining longitudinal data and cross-sectional data, panel studies 
allow for both investigations of the value of corporate diversification over time 
(within variance) and the value of diversified firms relative to focused firms 
(between variance). The effect of diversification on firm value is modelled as a 
linear function of various firm characteristics as shown below:468 
 RV𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽𝑑𝑖𝑣𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑥𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 (21) 
where: 
RV𝑖𝑡 = measure of relative firm value of firm i at time t, 
𝑋𝑖𝑡 = 
set of controlling observable firm characteristics for 
firm i at time t, 
                                                          
466 Agrawal et al., 1992, p. 1620. 
467 Cp. Beckmann, 2006, p. 25. 
468 Cp. Campa & Kedia, 2002, p. 1746f.; Gopalan & Xie, 2011, p. 3648; Maksimovic 
& Phillips, 2007, p. 433f.; Rojahn & Zechser, 2017, p. 12. 
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𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 = proxy for corporate diversification of firm i at time t, 
𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑛 = constant regression coefficients, 
𝛽𝑑𝑖𝑣 = regression coefficient for diversification term, 
𝛿𝑥  = vector of parameters to be estimated, and 
𝜖𝑖𝑡 = error term of firm i at time t. 
Given the combination of longitudinal data and cross-sectional data, panel 
studies benefit from a more accurate estimation of the diversification effect through 
an increase of the degrees of freedom. Panel regressions are also less negatively 
affected by multicollinearity biases or an incomplete specification of the regression 
model.  
Major disadvantages of the panel study approach include the sample 
selection bias and its high data requirements. In contrast to an ordinary 
specification bias that arises because of missing data, the sample selection bias 
results from using nonrandomly selected samples to estimate behavioural 
relationships.469 For instance, if maturing firms are replaced by new firms that are 
less likely to be diversified than those firms already in the sample, there will be a 
bias towards reductions in average diversification even if the individual firms are 
not altering their diversification status.470 To avoid sample selection biases, 
researchers commonly adopt the “same firm approach” (i.e. time series analysis 
based on the same firms).471  
For more than half a century, corporate diversification has offered a lively 
field of research centring around the diversification-performance linkage as the 
great “enigma” to be solved. The guiding question is whether diversified firms 
trade at a discount or premium relative to focused firms. Yet, this area of inquiry 
falls short in establishing causality in the relationship between diversification and 
value as concisely summarized by Datta et al. (1991) when they state: Studies which 
examine the hypothesis that the degree of diversity and profitability are cross-sectionally 
related […] unfortunately fail to provide generalizable conclusions […].472 Their 
                                                          
469 Cp. Heckman, 1979, p. 153. 
470 Cp. Comment & Jarrell, 1995, p. 68f.; Denis et al., 2002, p. 1962. 
471 Cp. Comment & Jarrell, 1995, p. 68; Funke, 2006, p. 89. 
472 Datta et al., 1991, p. 534. 
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conclusion is shared, among others, by Benito‐Osorio et al. (2012), Erdorf et al. 
(2013), and Martin and Sayrak (2003) and it is still valid today.473 
In summarising the diversification discount literature, this study focuses on 
five popular themes and linkages:474 the degree of diversification and performance, 
breadth of diversification and performance, the influence of home country and 
period, information asymmetries and diversification discounts, biases in the 
valuation methodology, and the role of liquidity. 
II.4.2.3.1. Degree of diversification and performance 
The studies by Lang and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995) have been 
the template for much of the work on the association between the degree of 
diversification and performance.475 Lang and Stulz (1994) conduct a cross-sectional 
analysis on a sample of 1,468 U.S. firms over the period 1978 to 1990 and find that 
diversified firms tend to have 27% to 54% lower q-ratios than their single-segment 
peers.476 The diversification discount remains significant even after controlling for 
firm-specific variables such as firm-size and the research and development 
expenditure. For a sample of 3,659 U.S. firms during the period 1986 to 1991, Berger 
and Ofek (1995) compute a valuation discount of -15% to -13%.477  
Appendix 4 - in line with previous literature reviews by Martin and Sayrak 
(2003) and Erdorf et al. (2013)478- is consistent with the early findings by Lang and 
Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995). On average, the sum of a diversified firm’s 
distinct business units is worth 2,8% to 60% of the value of a comparable portfolio 
of single segment firms. It appears that the market is not going to pay extra for 
                                                          
473 Cp. Benito‐Osorio et al., 2012, p. 335; Erdorf et al., 2013, p. 210; Martin & 
Sayrak, 2003, p. 54. 
474 Vollmar (2014) divides the diversification literature in a similar fashion. Cp. 
Vollmar, 2014, p. 127ff. 
475 Cp. Berger & Ofek, 1995, p. 39ff.; Lang & Stulz, 1994, p. 1248ff. 
476 Cp. Lang & Stulz, 1994, p. 1268. 
477 Cp. Berger & Ofek, 1995, p. 50. 
478 Cp. Erdorf et al., 2013, p. 192ff.; Martin & Sayrak, 2003, p. 42ff. 
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corporate diversification.479 It is worth to mention that a few studies are showing 
no performance differences between diversifying and non-diversifying firms480 or 
even higher net benefits for diversifiers481. 
II.4.2.3.2. Breadth of diversification and performance 
Influential findings by, among others, Rumelt (1974), Bettis (1981), and 
Markides and Williamson (1996) suggest that related diversified firms overcome 
unrelated diversified firms in terms of both accounting-based and market-based 
returns.482  
Most of the research in this field has been inspired by the early work of 
Rumelt (1974) on a sample of 246 Fortune 500 firms between the years 1949 and 
1969 in which he observes that firms using constrained strategies are higher 
performers in terms of the price-earnings ratio, return on equity, and return on 
capital compared to firms that follow single business strategies or unrelated-
passive strategies.483 Bettis (1981) shows that related-diversifiers are more 
profitable compared to unrelated diversified firms because of high barriers to entry 
resulting from tacit resources such as advertising and R&D expenditures.484  
In contrast to many other studies, Markides and Williamson (1996) do not 
rely on the classification proposed by Rumelt (1974)485 but develop their own 
strategic measure of relatedness based on various indicators that are said to capture 
the extent to which markets share similar non-tradable, non-substitutable, and 
hard-to-accumulate assets.486 Based on their measure, Markides and Williamson 
                                                          
479 Cp. Myers, 1984, p. 129. 
480 Cp. Klein, 2001, p. 756; Villalonga, 2004a, p. 492. 
481 Cp. Campa & Kedia, 2002, p. 1754; Dimitrov & Tice, 2006, p. 1482; Hann et al., 
2013, p. 1963. 
482 Cp. Bettis, 1981, p. 389; Markides & Williamson, 1996, p. 357ff.; Rumelt, 1974, 
p. 91f. 
483 Cp. Rumelt, 1974, p. 91f. 
484 Cp. Bettis, 1981, p. 386ff. 
485 Cp. Rumelt, 1974, p. 29ff. 
486 Cp. Markides & Williamson, 1996, p. 348ff. 
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(1996) notice that related diversification unfolds its entire potential only “when it 
allows a business to obtain preferential access to strategic assets – those that are valuable, 
rare, imperfectly tradable, and costly to imitate.”487  
Bausch and Pils (2009) meta-analytically employ empirical data from 104 
diversification studies published between 1970 and 2005 and find that strategies of 
related diversification entail positive effects on both accounting- and market-based 
performance.488 
II.4.2.3.3. Influence of home country and time period  
A central aspect of the institutional-based view (IBV) is that the benefits and 
costs of corporate diversification depend upon the ability of the institutional 
environment of a firm’s home country to establish a stable structure that facilitates 
interactions among market participants.489 Corporates follow a strategy of 
diversification to deal with the challenges induced by a weak or non-stable home 
country environment and which relate to arm’s length transactions on external 
capital markets, product markets, or factor markets.490  
Lins and Servaes (1999) study a sample of firms from Germany, Japan, and 
the United Kingdom for the years 1992 and 1994.491 While there is no diversification 
discount for German multi-business firms, conglomerates from Japan and the 
United Kingdom trade at significant discounts of 10% and 15%, respectively.492 In 
Lins and Servaes (2002), they use a large data sample covering more than 1,000 
firms across seven emerging markets including Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand for the fiscal year end closest to 
December 1995.493 Lins and Servaes (2002) report that diversified firms in emerging 
markets trade at significant valuation discounts of approximately 7% compared to 
                                                          
487 Cp. Markides & Williamson, 1996, p. 363. 
488 Cp. Bausch & Pils, 2009, p. 170ff. 
489 Cp. Benito‐Osorio et al., 2012, p. 331f.; Hoskisson et al., 2000, p. 252ff. 
490 Cp. Nachum, 2004, p. 276. 
491 Cp. Lins & Servaes, 1999, p. 2215ff. 
492 Cp. Lins & Servaes, 1999, p. 2222ff. 
493 Cp. Lins & Servaes, 2002, p. 8ff. 
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industry-matched focused firms.494 The lower valuation of diversified firms is 
found to be driven by two effects:495 First, the discount is related to membership in 
industrial groups. Second, firms with management ownership concentration 
between 10% and 30% are less valued through an entrenchment effect. 
Fauver et al. (2003) draw on a sample of 8,000 firms from 35 countries during 
the first half of the 20th century and document that the valuation effects of corporate 
diversification depend on the level of capital market development, internal 
integration, and legal systems.496 Using a slightly different firm sample, Shackman 
(2007) supports the findings by Fauver et al. (2003) regarding the negative 
relationship between corporate diversification and capital market development.497 
In terms of time periods, there is ample literature including Dimitrov and 
Tice (2006), Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2016), Yan (2006), and Yan et al. (2010) 
acknowledging that the state of the economy in the business cycle influences the 
value added from diversification.498 The increase in the relative value of diversified 
firms during economic downturns might be through the “more-money” effect and 
the “smarter-money” effect which allow diversified firms to maintain their optimal 
level of financing even if access to external financing becomes more costly. 
Though most studies direct at significant premiums during distressed 
financial periods, there are prominent exceptions such as de la Fuente and Velasco 
(2015) and Serafeim et al. (2014).499 For a panel of Spanish listed firms over the years 
1997 to 2012, de la Fuente and Velasco (2015) find that for distressed periods the 
value of diversification is even lower due to increasing agency costs.500 Serafeim et 
al. (2014) study the influence of institutional voids on the value of corporate 
diversification for a sample of 35,886 firms across 38 countries and report strong 
                                                          
494 Cp. Lins & Servaes, 2002, p. 15. 
495 Cp. Lins & Servaes, 2002, p. 5f. 
496 Cp. Fauver et al., 2003, p. 144f. 
497 Cp. Shackman, 2007, p. 493f. 
498 Cp. Dimitrov & Tice, 2006, p. 1465ff.; Kuppuswamy & Villalonga, 2016, p. 
905ff.; Yan, 2006, p. 5ff.; Yan et al., 2010, p. 103ff. 
499 Cp. de la Fuente & Velasco, 2015, p. 1ff.; Serafeim et al., 2014, p. 37ff. 
500 Cp. de la Fuente & Velasco, 2015, p. 11. 
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evidence for a negative association between the excess value measure proposed by 
Berger and Ofek (1995) and the efficiency of both capital and labour markets.501 
II.4.2.3.4. Information asymmetries and diversification discounts 
Although information asymmetries can be a major determinant in the 
diversification-performance linkage, empirical work that directly relates 
information asymmetries to the value of corporate diversification is sparse except 
for Bardong et al. (2010), Best et al. (2003), Borah et al. (2018), and Thomas and Fee 
(2000).502 Bardong et al. (2010) provide evidence for positive stock-market reactions 
to break-up announcements of U.S. corporate stocks in the period 1995 to 2005 due 
to reductions in insider-related information asymmetry.503 Best et al. (2003) study a 
sample of 27,683 U.S. firm-year observations over the period 1989 to 1998 and find 
that the diversification discount is reduced by half after controlling for the impact 
of information asymmetries.504 In their model, the authors use financial analyst 
coverage as a measure of information asymmetry. Finally, Thomas and Fee (2000) 
find that the market value of a diversified firm is at least partly determined by the 
severity of asymmetric information problems relative to a similarly constructed 
portfolio of focused firms.505 Specifically, they document evidence that diversified 
firms with high levels of information asymmetry trade at a significant discount 
compared to diversified firms with low levels of information asymmetry. However, 
only 26% of all conglomerate firm-years are exposed to higher adverse selection 
costs than they would as stand-alone firms calling into question the net relative 
information benefits of stock-breakups.506 
  
                                                          
501 Cp. Serafeim et al., 2014, p. 49ff. 
502 Cp. Bardong et al., 2010, p. 1ff.; Best et al., 2003, p. 29ff.; Borah et al., 2018, p. 
683ff.; Thomas & Fee, 2000, p. 1ff. 
503 Cp. Bardong et al., 2010, p. 18ff. 
504 Cp. Best et al., 2003, p. 31ff. 
505 Cp. Thomas & Fee, 2000, p. 4. 
506 Cp. Thomas & Fee, 2000, p. 25. 
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II.4.2.3.5. Biases in the valuation methodology 
Though diversified firms are systematically different from the typically 
focused firm as advised by, among others, Campa and Kedia (2002), Hyland and 
Diltz (2002), and Maksimovic and Phillips (2008)507, a large part of the standard 
literature on the diversification discount assumes that firms become conglomerates 
randomly.508 If this assumption does not hold, two biases can arise that might 
explain why researchers observe lower valuations for diversified firms: First, 
systematic differences in unchangeable attributes of diversified firms and focused 
firms imply that focused firms might be a noisy benchmark to value conglomerates’ 
business units (i.e. sample selection bias).509 Hann et al. (2013) report that 
diversified firms have, on average, lower cost of capital than comparable portfolios 
of single-segment firms as they are less vulnerable to countercyclical deadweight 
costs.510 Lamont and Polk (2001) show that approximately half of the cross-sectional 
variance of excess values can be explained by the differences in future returns and 
by the covariance of returns with cash flows.511 The differences in expected returns 
will lead to a diversification discount even if all other firm characteristics are equal. 
Mitton and Vorkink (2010) find that diversified firms, on average, have a positive 
but lower skewness coefficient than their focused counterparts.512 Since investors 
prefer positive skewness in return distributions513, diversified firms might have to 
offer higher returns to compensate investors for lack of upwards potential.  
Second, any failure of controlling for the endogeneity of the diversification 
decision by using more advanced econometric techniques than ordinary least 
squares (OLS) can lead to incorrect inferences about the diversification’s effect.514 
                                                          
507 Cp. Campa & Kedia, 2002, p. 1736ff.; Hyland & Diltz, 2002, p. 65ff.; 
Maksimovic & Phillips, 2008, p. 688ff. 
508 Cp. Erdorf et al., 2013, p. 198f.; Maksimovic & Phillips, 2007, p. 433f. 
509 Cp. Erdorf et al., 2013, p. 198. 
510 Cp. Hann et al., 2013, p. 1972ff. 
511 Cp. Lamont & Polk, 2001, p. 1709ff. 
512 Cp. Mitton & Vorkink, 2010, p. 1371ff. 
513 Cp. Arditti, 1967, p. 19ff. 
514 Cp. Martin & Sayrak, 2003, p. 45. 
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Campa and Kedia (2002) and Villalonga (2004b) agree that the same characteristics 
that cause a firm to choose to diversify may also cause it to be discounted.515 
Graham et al. (2002) claim that the reduction in excess value is an artefact from 
diversified firms to acquire already discounted firms but not because 
diversification destroys value.516 Chevalier (2004), studying a sample of 
diversifying mergers between 1980 and 1995, demonstrates that observed 
inefficiencies in the capital allocation of diversified firms are already apparent 
before these firms undertake diversification moves.517  
Stand-alone firms, thus, may be a poor benchmark for conglomerate 
divisions. 
II.4.3. CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION AND THE ROLE OF LIQUIDITY: 
SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
To date, there is no consensus among researchers as to whether diversified 
firms trade with a liquidity premium or a liquidity discount as summarised in 
Table 10. The main results of the nine research studies controlling for the value of 
liquidity in the diversification-performance linkage are as follows: 
- Liquidity induced discount. Most of the selected studies suggest that diversified 
firms face higher financing costs from external capital markets than 
comparable focused firms. At least for firms rooted in the real estate 
investment trust (REIT) industry, corporate diversification can, on average, 
be considered a value-destroying strategy. In the words of Capozza and 
Seguin (1999): “[…] focus affects value indirectly through liquidity. After 
controlling for this direction of causation, there is no evidence that focus has any 
additional effect on firm value.”518 However, there are opposing studies from 
other industries showing no differences in the liquidity of traded stocks of 
diversified and non-diversified firms or even higher stock market liquidity 
for diversifiers (e.g. Lamont and Polk (2001), Thomas and Fee (2000)).519 
                                                          
515 Cp. Campa & Kedia, 2002, p. 1746ff.; Villalonga, 2004b, p. 6ff. 
516 Cp. Graham et al., 2002, p. 701ff. 
517 Cp. Chevalier, 2004, p. 6ff. 
518 Cp. Capozza & Seguin, 1999, p. 613. 
519 Cp. Lamont & Polk, 2001, p. 1709; Thomas & Fee, 2000, p. 23ff. 
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- Methodological issues. The variability in the contribution of liquidity to the 
diversification-performance linkage might be attributed to methodological 
issues as well as differences in sample selection: First, many research studies 
are rooted in the real estate investment trust industry. As there are unique 
regulatory rules for REITs, which fluctuate across countries, a generalisation 
of research findings can be problematic. Likewise, the risk-return profile of 
REITs can be very different from that of a corporate firm. Second, only three 
out of the nine research studies (e.g. Thomas and Fee (2000), Danielsen and 
Harrison (2007), and Boulton et al. (2013)) employ the same estimator for 
stock liquidity, and even their results are contradictory. Again, a 
generalisation of the research findings is not possible as the various measures 
might tap different dimensions of liquidity. Third, the most recent sample 
period ends in 2006 meaning that there is no research covering the latest stock 
market crash starting in 2007. The more pronounced the market 
imperfections in the external capital markets, the more valuable might be the 
internalisation of external services into the company's sphere (e.g. costs for 
seasoned equity offerings vs internal capital markets).  
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Table 10: Effect of illiquidity on the diversification-performance relationship520 
The table summarises the results of nine research studies that control for the value of illiquidity in the 
diversification-performance linkage. Definition of diversification measures: 4D means four-digit SIC 
code and so forth. “L-Discount” and “L-Premium” indicate whether diversified firms are traded with 
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smaller in magnitude than the 
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Free float 
L-Discount: A firm's focus on 
property types is significant and 
negative associated with its 
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discount in net asset value. 
Danielsen and 
Harrison (2007) 
151 U.S. REITs 
1993-1995 
Herfindahl index 




L-Discount: REITs that diversify 
along various property type 
sectors are exposed to reduced 
stock market liquidity and are 
more complicated to value. 







L-Premium: Diversified firms are 
less underpriced. The average 
quoted spread is a monotonically 
decreasing function of the number 
of reported segments. 
Jiao et al. (2013) 





L-Discount: Diversified firms 
have a lower share trading 
turnover. 
                                                          
520 Source: Own representation. 
 
 




III. LIQUIDITY IN AN ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK 
III.1. OPERATIONALIZATION OF LIQUIDITY BY TRANSACTION COSTS 
III.1.1. DEFINITION OF STOCK MARKET LIQUIDITY 
From a neoclassical point of view, any investor can buy or sell significant 
quantities of a security without moving the price against him or her. 3521 In assessing 
the benefits of an investment, investors consider only the systematic risk and the 
return of the financial asset. However, the introduction of various market 
imperfections such as real frictions affecting all market participants alike (e.g. 
deficits in the market organisation) or informational frictions that shift wealth 
between market participants522, might lead to conclusions otherwise and might 
motivate investors to estimate and incorporate the impact of trading costs 
accurately.523  
Stock market liquidity determines the markets ability to absorb the flow of 
buying and selling orders smoothly.524 In liquid capital markets, investors can place 
large security orders without moving the price against them. If a lack of liquidity 
reflects a non-diversifiable risk, it may be considered a significant determinant in 
valuing illiquid securities.525 
While there is a great deal of variation in the way stock liquidity is defined in 
the finance literature526, traditional understandings of the term have a common 
denominator. To enumerate but some examples, to Keynes (1930) an asset is liquid 
if “it is more certainly realizable at short notice without a loss.”527 Bernstein (1987), 
                                                          
521 Cp. Kempf, 1999, p. 14. 
522 Cp. Stoll, 2000, p. 1481ff. 
523 Cp. Bessembinder & Venkataraman, 2010, p. 184. 
524 Cp. Shen & Starr, 2002, p. 53. 
525 Cp. Sauerbier, 2006, p. 7; Schwartz & Peng, 2006, p. 630. 
526 Cp. Kindermann, 2005, p. 9ff.; Wyss, 2004, p. 5f. 
527 Keynes, 1930, p. 67. 
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Kempf (1998), and Schmidt and Iversen (1991) declare securities as liquid if they 
can be bought and sold promptly with minimal impact on the securities’ price.528 
And, Campbell et al. (1997) define liquidity as “the ability to buy or sell significant 
quantities of a security quickly, anonymously, and with relatively little price impact.”529 To 
summarise, the core point of the concept of liquidity is the possibility to exchange 
a given asset in an arm’s length transaction with minimal impact on the prevailing 
market price, even if the transaction volume is high. 
These and the majority of other definitions draw on a concept of liquidity that 
has somewhat been inspired by the early work of Garbade (1982) in which he 
describes the multi-dimensional character of liquidity along three dimensions: 
depth, breadth, and resiliency.530 Market depth is a measure for the amount of an 
asset or lot size that can be bought or sold without influencing the quoted price.531 
In a low depth market, trading large quantities can cause slippage and drive down 
(up) the executable price of a sell order (buy order). Various methods can 
approximate the value of market depth; common measures include the order ratio, 
the trading volume, the flow ratio, and the bid-ask spread.532 In depth markets, bid-
ask spreads are tighter. Market breadth means that sufficient interest exists on both 
the sell side and the buy side for traders to buy and to sell large positions of an 
asset in the close neighbourhood of the best-quoted price.533 Measures for market 
breadth often include various spread measures.534 Market resiliency means that 
temporary price changes due to order imbalances are quickly abated by 
countervailing order flows that restore the market equilibrium.535 The concept takes 
into account the elasticity of liquidity supply and demand, i.e. the speed of 
adjusting the share price to its true value.536 Common measures of resiliency are 
                                                          
528 Cp. Bernstein, 1987, p. 54; Kempf, 1998, p. 299; Schmidt & Iversen, 1991, p. 
2010. 
529 Campbell et al., 1997, p. 99f. 
530 Cp. Garbade, 1982, p. 420ff. 
531 Cp. Kindermann, 2005, p. 15. 
532 Cp. Wyss, 2004, p. 5. 
533 Cp. Schwartz, 1991, p. 127. 
534 Cp. Harris, 1991, p. 3. 
535 Cp. Bernstein, 1987, p. 55; Sauerbier, 2006, p. 8. 
536 Cp. Wyss, 2004, p. 6. 
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intraday returns, variance ratios, or liquidity ratios. Market depth, breadth, and 
resiliency jointly form the price dimension of liquidity. 
Above and beyond the price dimension, some authors consider “immediacy” 
as an additional dimension of liquidity.537 Immediacy refers to the ability to execute 
a transaction immediately at the prevailing price, thereby introducing a time 
dimension to the concept of liquidity. Technically, immediacy measures the time 
until an asset is exchanged for money.538 Figure 7 visualises both the time 
dimension and the price dimension of liquidity. 
 
 
Figure 7: Dimensions of stock market liquidity539 
 
This study follows the traditional understanding of liquidity by Bernstein 
(1987), Garbade (1982), and Keynes (1930) referring to liquidity as the ability to 
liquidate securities infinitely fast without causing adverse price effects.540 Focusing 
on the price dimension of liquidity simplifies the operationalisation of the liquidity 
concept: First, there are strong reasons to suggest a negative relationship between 
both dimensions as investors might be able to increase the willingness of market 
makers to trade by placing orders in the market that are far away from the actual 
price. Second, measuring immediacy requires information about the time until the 
                                                          
537 Cp. Sauerbier, 2006, p. 8. 
538 Cp. Lippman & McCall, 1986, p. 43. 
539 Source: own representation based on Kerry, 2008, p. 182. 
540 To keep the concept of liquidity focused, this study acknowledges but does 
not explicitly distinguish between persistent and transitory price impacts. Cp. 
Kindermann, 2005, p. 31ff. 
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next trading opportunity which is hard to obtain as market systems usually record 
transactions only.541  
III.1.2. COMPONENTS OF TRADING COSTS 
The concept of liquidity does not lend itself to easy conceptualisation and 
measurement as liquidity, in contrast to stock prices, is inherently unobservable. 
Because the level of liquidity prevailing in the secondary market is closely related 
to the costs of executing a transaction542, liquidity is commonly approximated by 
transaction costs.543 While the brokerage commission might be the only cost 
investors explicitly pay; Figure 8 concisely shows that there are other costs that they 
incur in the course of trading including a bid-ask spread and a price concession. 
 
 
Figure 8: Components of transaction costs544 
 
First, there is the basic bid-ask spread which is considered an implicit cost 
component reflecting the difference between the ask (dealer’s selling /traders’ 
buying) quote and the bid (dealers’ buying/traders’ selling) quote.545 Bagehot (1971) 
distinguishes between three groups of agents who confront the market maker: 
Informed traders possessing pertinent information that are not currently reflected 
in a stock’s price, liquidity traders who face cash needs and merely reallocate 
                                                          
541 Cp. Kempf, 1998, p. 300. 
542 Cp. Amihud & Mendelson, 1991, p. 56. 
543 Cp. Jang et al., 2007, p. 2329ff.; Lesmond et al., 1999, p. 1113ff.; Loeb, 1983, p. 
39ff. 
544 Source: own representation based on Kumar, 2004, p. 87; Loeb, 1983, p. 41. 
545 Cp. Kumar, 2004, p. 87. 
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wealth or implement an investment strategy using the stock of information 
inherent in the stock price, and traders acting on some residual piece of information 
that they believe has not yet been fully reflected in the market price.546 Dealers and 
liquidity-motivated traders are equally well-informed vis-à-vis each other but less 
informed compared to information-driven traders. As the dealer cannot discern the 
trader’s motivation, he will set the spreads in such a way that the gains from 
liquidity traders offset the losses from trades with informed traders.547 The dealer 
always gains by trades with liquidity-motivated traders. 
Second is the price concession. The dealer may extract price concessions from 
an investor by either reducing the bid quote or by increasing the ask quote when 
the dealer is asked to buy or sell beyond the best bid and ask prices.548 The larger 
the order, the greater the price impact that the trader faces for immediate 
implementation of her buy or sell decision which is often the case for information 
motivated trades. For instance, Stephen and Thomas (1990) use quoted bid-ask 
spreads to show that costs associated with a conventional liquidity-seeking 
program trade are up to twice the costs of a patient trading strategy.549 
The third is the brokerage commission which is charged explicitly to the 
negotiated transaction and is assessed by the dealer for handling the sale 
transaction.550 The brokerage commission is much smaller than the basis bid-ask 
spread including the price concession and often is ignored when measuring trading 
costs.551 This assumption can be justified by the background of an on-going 
institutionalisation of the capital markets as well as the progressive automation of 
securities trading.552 
Above and beyond the cost components outlined above, Collins and Fabozzi 
(1991) consider opportunity costs in the form of search and delay costs as an 
                                                          
546 Cp. Bagehot, 1971, p. 13. 
547 Cp. Kumar, 2004, p. 87f. 
548 Cp. Amihud & Mendelson, 1991, p. 57; Loeb, 1983, p. 40. 
549 Cp. Stephen & Thomas, 1990, p. 38f. 
550 Cp. Loeb, 1983, p. 40. 
551 Cp. Collins & Fabozzi, 1991, p. 27f.; Loeb, 1983, p. 40. 
552 Cp. Keim & Madhavan, 1998, p. 51. 
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additional cost of transacting securities.553 Opportunity costs represent hidden costs 
of trading that arise when a trader delays the execution of a transaction opting for 
better trading terms such as a smaller price impact or lower bid-ask spread.554 
Hence, investors face a trade-off between immediacy and the uncertainty of a more 
favourable future price.555  
The following section addresses the vital role of the bid-ask spread in 
assessing the performance of a securities market. The bid-ask spread is of particular 
interest because it represents a large proportion of transaction costs and serves as 
the leading measure for assessing the level of stock market liquidity in the 
empirical analysis contained in chapter IV. 
III.1.3. CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE BID-ASK SPREAD 
As first noticed by Demsetz (1968), a fundamental issue in trading is related 
to the predictable immediacy of exchange in organised markets.556 The 
asynchronous arrival of buy and sell orders creates uncertainty as to both the 
amount of time that will be required to find a counterparty and the prevailing price 
at the time when the counterparty is located.557 To reduce these opportunity costs, 
organised exchanges appoint liquidity suppliers558 that maintain an appropriate 
level of liquidity, and that stand ready to trade with the incoming orders of those 
who demand immediate servicing of their orders. This delegation of liquidity 
services is necessary because individual market participants cannot continuously 
analyse market conditions and provide supply and demand curves for each 
                                                          
553 Cp. Collins & Fabozzi, 1991, p. 29. 
554 Cp. Amihud & Mendelson, 1991, p. 57. 
555 Cp. Kumar, 2004, p. 88. 
556 Cp. Demsetz, 1968, p. 35f. 
557 Cp. Bessembinder & Venkataraman, 2010, p. 184. 
558 Throughout this thesis, the terms “liquidity provider“, “dealer“, and “market 
maker“ are used interchangeably to characterize an exchange specialist in the case 
of listed securities standing ready to transact with anyone who comes to the 
market. 
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financial asset.559 Dealers need to be compensated for their endogenous costs of 
operating liquidity services which, besides order-processing costs, include 
inventory holding costs and adverse selection costs.560 Dealers recover these costs 
by quoting different prices for purchases from the dealer (dealer’s ask price) and 
selling assets to the dealer (dealer’s bid price). The difference between the two is 
the basic bid-ask spread. 
Order-processing cost models assume that there are fixed costs in providing 
“predictable immediacy” for the exchange of ownership titles.561 Order-processing 
costs represent a fee for matching buying and selling orders and may include 
administration expenses, royalty fees in respect to the subscription of electronic 
trading systems and information systems, as well as the cost of acquiring qualified 
personnel and a name in the market. As a high proportion of these costs are fixed, 
dealers might be able to derive additional value from economies of scale by 
lowering its average cost curve and enjoy an advantage over competing dealers.562 
As a result, spreads should decrease when stocks are frequently traded.563  
Inventory holding cost models argue that the bid-ask spread reimburses dealers 
for accumulating undesired inventory.564 While hoarding an inventory of stocks 
increases the price risk and might run against diversification benefits; less 
inventory holdings increase the probability of costly short sells.565 The inventory 
holdings costs of the dealer are driven by the risk aversion of the liquidity 
provider83F566 and the uncertainty about when future transactions will occur567. As 
                                                          
559 Cp. Biais et al., 2005, p. 218. 
560 Cp. Gregoriou et al., 2005, p. 1802; Hartmann, 1999, p. 803ff.; Stoll, 1978, p. 
1144. 
561 CP. Stoll, 2000, p. 1481f. 
562 Cp. Hartmann, 1999, p. 804. 
563 Cp. Lipson & Mortal, 2007, p. 345. 
564 Cp. Hartmann, 1999, p. 804; Kumar, 2004, p. 88ff.; Madhavan, 2000, p. 213ff. 
565 Cp. Damodaran, 2005, p. 4f. 
566 Cp. Stoll, 1978, p. 1135f. 
567 Cp. Ho & Stoll, 1981, p. 47. 
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part of their optimal pricing policy, dealers can, to a certain extent, influence the 
probabilities of buying and selling by offering a better bid or ask price.568  
Information cost models emphasize the distribution of information amongst 
market participants. Under this view, the spread compensates liquidity suppliers 
for the risk of trading against more timely or better-informed investors regarding 
the security value.569 As dealers, in an anonymous market, on average lose money 
on transactions with informed traders; they need to price protect against such 
losses by raising bid-ask spreads.570 Due to the negative elasticity of demand for 
immediacy, an expansion of the spread is only possible to a certain extent to keep 
liquidity traders motivated to trade with the dealer.571  
Researchers expend much effort in investigating how spreads are set by 
market makers arriving at an estimator of the individual components of the bid-
ask spread. There are two general classes of spread decomposition models:572 (i) 
covariance models that rely on the serial correlation of observed transaction prices 
caused by the bid-ask bounce effect 90F573, and (ii) trade indicator regression models574 
which express the spread components through a linear function of signed order 
flow.575  
Table 11 - by no means exhaustive - reveals considerable variability in their 
estimates on the different spread components. Some part of the variability in the 
spread estimates might be explained by differences in methodology, periods, and 
firm samples. There are some doubts about whether adverse selection estimates 
from spread decomposition models measure information asymmetry. Van Ness et 
al. (2001) benchmark the performance of the adverse selection component of five 
                                                          
568 Cp. Amihud & Mendelson, 1982, p. 52. 
569 Cp. Stoll, 2000, p. 1482. 
570 Cp. Bagehot, 1971, p. 13; Glosten & Harris, 1988, p. 124; Stoll, 2003, p. 566. 
571 Cp. Wolff, 2003, p. 83. 
572 Cp. Frijns et al., 2008, p. 228; Wolff, 2003, p. 55. 
573 Cp. George et al., 1991, p. 623ff.; Roll, 1984, p. 1127ff.; Stoll, 1989, p. 115ff. 
574 Cp. Glosten & Harris, 1988, p. 123ff.; Huang & Stoll, 1997, p. 995ff. 
575 Cp. Hachmeister, 2007, p. 40f.; Kumar, 2004, p. 91f.; Rudy De & Christophe, 
2003, p. 96. 
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different spread decomposition models against other well-appreciated information 
asymmetry metrics including stock volatility, volume, leverage, analyst earnings 
forecast error, and market-to-book equity ratio. Using a sample of stocks listed on 
the NYSE from April 1999 to June 1999, the authors conclude that “the adverse 
selection models we study might not be capturing other costs of trading.”576 Rudy De and 
Christophe (2003) underpin the results by Ness et al. (2001) using other information 
asymmetry metrics and a more recent period.577  
 
Table 11: Selected studies on the components of the bid-ask spread578 
The table compares the components of the bid-ask spread in eight well-known research papers. In 
this table, GH (1988), GKN (1991), and HS (1997) mean the empirical spread decomposition models 
developed by Glosten and Harris (1988), George et al. (1991), and Huang and Stoll (1997). N/A 
indicates that the information is not available in the respective framework. 
Study 
Market and time 
period 
Method 








Glosten and Harris 
(1988) 
NYSE (daily); 
Dec. 1981-Jan. 1983  
GH (1988) n/a 64.0% 36.0% 
Stoll (1989) 
NASDAQ (daily); 
Oct. 1984-Dec. 1984 
Stoll (1989) 47.0% 10.0% 43.0% 
George et al. (1991) 
NASDAQ (daily); 
Jan. 1983-Dec. 1987 
GKN (1991) 
96.4% n/a 3.6% 
NASDAQ (weekly); 
Jan. 1983-Dec. 1987 




Jan. 1988-Dec. 1988 
Foster and Viswanathan 
(1993) 
88% n/a 12% 
Affleck-Graves et al. 
(1994) 
NASDAQ / NMS; 
Mar 1985-Apr. 1985 
Stoll (1989) 
47.0% 17.0% 36.0% 
NYSE / AMEX; 
Mar 1985-Apr. 1985 
1.0% 48.0% 50.0% 
NASDAQ / NMS; 
Mar 1985-Apr. 1985 
GKN (1991) 
90.3% n/a 9.7% 
NYSE / AMEX; 
Mar 1985-Apr. 1985 
70.6% n/a 29.4% 
Jones and Lipson 
(1995) 
NASDAQ to NYSE 
(before switch) 
1990-1992 
GKN (1991) 94% n/a 6% 
NASDAQ to NYSE 
(after switch) 
1990-1992 
GKN (1991) 57% n/a 43% 
Huang and Stoll 
(1997) 
NYSE; 
Jan. 1992-Dec. 1992 
HS (1997) two-way 
decomposition of the 
spread. 
88.6% 11.4% 
HS (1997) three-way 
decomposition of the 
61.7% 28.7% 9.6% 
                                                          
576 Van Ness et al., 2001, p. 96. 
577 Cp. Rudy De & Christophe, 2003, p. 127ff. 
578 Source: Own representation. 
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Study 
Market and time 
period 
Method 








spread (induced serial 
correlation) 
HS (1997) three-way with 
portfolio approach to 
inventory holding 
68.9% 9.6% 21.5% 
III.2. VALUE OF STOCK LIQUIDITY 
Over the last three decades, researchers have examined the liquidity effect on 
stock returns using two different approaches:579 In the first, liquidity is a priced 
stock characteristic, and the premium for this characteristic compensates investors 
in efficient markets for bearing the transaction costs of trading in the security.580 
Here, the expected premium added on to the discount rates exclusively depends 
on the stock’s liquidity level. Prominent research in this field includes Amihud 
(2002), Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Brennan et al. (1998), Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam (1996), and Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993).581  
In the second, liquidity is priced as a market level (systematic) risk factor, 
associated with the sensitivity of the stock returns to shocks in market liquidity.582 
The pricing of liquidity-related systematic risk is based on the idea that, because 
liquidity varies over time and because there is a commonality in liquidity, liquidity 
exposures may not be diversifiable for which investors will command a 
premium.583 Important representatives of this mindset are Acharya and Pedersen 
(2005), Korajczyk and Sadka (2008), Pástor and Stambaugh (2003), and Sadka 
(2006).584 
                                                          
579 Cp. Amihud & Mendelson, 2015, p. 151; Foran & O'Sullivan, 2017, p. 261. 
580 Cp. Hasbrouck, 2009, p. 1446. 
581 Cp. Amihud, 2002, p. 31ff.; Amihud & Mendelson, 1986, p. 223ff.; Brennan et 
al., 1998, p. 345ff.; Brennan & Subrahmanyam, 1996, p. 441ff.; Eleswarapu & 
Reinganum, 1993, p. 373ff. 
582 Cp. Ben-Rephael et al., 2015, p. 198; Bradrania & Peat, 2014, p. 79. 
583 Cp. Acharya & Pedersen, 2005, p. 376. 
584 Cp. Acharya & Pedersen, 2005, p. 375ff.; Korajczyk & Sadka, 2008, p. 45ff.; 
Pástor & Stambaugh, 2003, p. 642ff.; Sadka, 2006, p. 309ff. 
 
127 Liquidity in an economic framework  
III.2.1. LIQUIDITY AS A STOCK CHARACTERISTIC 
The notion of liquidity as a priced characteristic dates back to the early work 
by Amihud and Mendelson (1986).585 The core metaphor of Amihud and 
Mendelson’s (1986) model is that the equilibrium value of an asset is associated 
with the investor’s expected cost of exiting from an investment.586 Subsequently, 
the basic model is discussed first, before significant extensions are considered.587  
In Amihud and Mendelson’s (1986) model, there are 𝑖 = 1,2… , 𝐼 different 
investor types trading 𝑁 + 1 securities indexed by j= 0,1,2… ,𝑁. Investors are risk 
neutral and randomly enter the market with wealth 𝑊𝑖 used to purchase capital 
assets from the market maker at the ask price. Short sales as well as liability 
holdings are not permitted. Furthermore, investors are subject to a random arrival 
of a need to liquidate their portfolio by selling it to the market maker at the bid 
price. The probability of a liquidation event 𝑝𝑙𝑖 varies across investors but is 
constant over time. Because market makers earn a spread 𝑆𝑗 for providing liquidity 
services to the market, investors incur a loss when liquidating their portfolios. 
Rational investors will a priori to investing in a security consider how much 
it will cost them to divest in the future and demand compensation for bearing the 
costs of holding illiquid securities.588 Consequently, in equilibrium, the price effects 
of illiquidity are first order and the asset return to an individual investor equals its 








 = equilibrium gross (market-observed) return, 
𝑟𝑗,𝑘
∗  = equilibrium net (market-unobserved) return, 
𝑝𝑙𝑖  = probability of liquidation event for stock i, and 
                                                          
585 Cp.Amihud & Mendelson, 1986, p. 223ff. 
586 Cp. Amihud & Mendelson, 1986, p. 228. 
587 The following derivation of the basic model is based on Amihud & 
Mendelson, 1986, p. 225, 2015, p. 151ff.; Sauerbier, 2006, p. 49f. 
588 Cp. Amihud et al., 2005, p. 279. 
589 Cp. Amihud & Mendelson, 1986, p. 227. 
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𝑅𝑆𝑗 = relative bid-ask spread. 
If investors differ in their expected holding periods, then the clientele effect 
posits that the positive relationship between expected asset returns and illiquidity 
costs is concave.590 The clientele effect is used by researchers to describe a situation 
where, in equilibrium, investors with long expected holding periods hold less 
liquid assets because they can effectively amortise their liquidity costs over a longer 
period.591 While all investors prefer assets with low transaction costs, they are 
especially beneficial to short term investors who frequently incur transaction costs. 
As long-term investors bear the costs of trading illiquid securities less frequently, 
they can earn a liquidity premium more than their expected trading costs. This 
additional value to long-term investors results from the fact that short term 
investors punish less liquid securities by heavily discounting them. 
Most variants of Amihud and Mendelson’s (1986) model refer to the motives 
why investors buy and sell securities.592 While Amihud and Mendelson (1986) 
create trading motives through the assumptions of different expected holding 
periods, other researchers model the time horizon as an endogenous variable. 
Constantinides (1986) formulates an intertemporal portfolio selection model 
showing that investors tend to equalise transaction costs by adjusting their trading 
frequency.593 The author defines the liquidity premium on the risky asset in the 
presence of proportional transaction costs “as the decrease in the risky asset’s mean 
return “which, combined with the elimination of transaction costs, leaves unchanged the 
investor's expected utility”.594 For risk-averse investors that face proportional 
transaction costs, Constantinides (1986) finds that a no-trade region characterises 
the optimal investment policy and that an investor’s demand for an asset being 
sensitive to the net effects of rebalancing.595 While rebalancing means transaction 
costs, it provides the investor with additional gains from holding an optimal 
portfolio.  
                                                          
590 Cp. Amihud & Mendelson, 2015, p. 152. 
591 Cp. Amihud et al., 2005, p. 282; Atkins & Dyl, 1997, p. 309f. 
592 Cp. Sauerbier, 2006, p. 51. 
593 Cp. Constantinides, 1986, p. 842ff. 
594 Constantinides, 1986, p. 854. 
595 Cp. Constantinides, 1986, p. 843f. 
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Other researchers create trading motives by introducing background risks 
such as labour income risk, investor life-cycle, and time-varying return volatility. 
Heaton and Lucas (1996) examine numerically the effect of idiosyncratic and 
uninsurable labour income risk on equilibrium expected returns while considering 
both transaction costs and no transaction costs on the riskless and equity assets.596 
The authors conclude that an asset can have a significantly lower return because of 
precautionary demand induced by higher consumption variability. Vayanos (1998) 
study the effects of transaction costs on asset prices in an overlapping generations 
economy.597 In Vayanos’ (1998) model, investors have a life cycle motive for trading 
and sell stocks as they get older because of increasing risk aversion in old age.598 
Lynch and Tan (2011) investigate the association between labour income and 
multiplicative wealth shocks on liquidity premia and numerically produce per-
annum liquidity premia that are the same order of magnitude as the transaction 
cost spread.599 Finally, Jang et al. (2007) arithmetically show that when the 
assumption of a constant investment opportunity set is released, transaction costs 
can have a first-order effect on liquidity premia.600 
Table 12 summarises the results of 18 empirical research studies that link 
liquidity to asset characteristics. Most of the selected studies direct at a significant 
liquidity premium in the order of 0.22% to 6.75%.601 The variability in the liquidity 
effect on excess returns might be attributed to both methodological issues as well 
as differences in sample selection. In terms of methodology, the selected studies 
employ various diversification measures, thereby potentially taping different 
aspects of liquidity construct. For instance, Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993) and 
Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) provide evidence of a seasonal phenomenon 
                                                          
596 Cp. Heaton & Lucas, 1996, p. 443ff. 
597 Cp. Vayanos, 1998, p. 1ff. 
598 Cp. Vayanos, 1998, p. 10. 
599 Cp. Lynch & Tan, 2011, p. 1330. 
600 Cp. Jang et al., 2007, p. 2333ff. 
601 Although Table 12 is - by no means – exhaustive, it mirrors the conventional 
wisdom that investors care about stock illiquidity to the extent that they will pay 
less for illiquid assets than for otherwise liquid assets. Cp. Amihud & Mendelson, 
2015, p. 160. 
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in the return-illiquidity relation and that the bid-ask spread might proxy for a risk 
variable associated with price level or firm size rather than the costs of transacting, 
respectively.602 Additionally, some of the measures (e. g. dollar volume) are in 
breach with the minimum requirements of liquidity measures as set out in section 
III.3.1. As far as sample selection is concerned, there is some evidence for NASDAQ 
firms to suffer from a reduced liquidity / higher illiquidity premium compared to 
firms traded at either NYSE or AMEX.  
 
Table 12: Empirical evidence on the pricing of illiquidity as a characteristic603 
The table summarises the results of 12 empirical research studies that link liquidity to asset 
characteristics. “Discount” means that investors command a higher premium for illiquid assets than 
for otherwise identical liquid assets, thereby reducing shareholder value. Definition of stock 
exchanges: NYSE means “The New York Stock Exchange”, AMEX means “American Stock 
Exchange”, NYAM means “New York or American stock exchange”, and NASDAQ means “National 













NYSE 1961-1980 619-900 
Relative bid-
ask spread 
Discount: 1% increase in the spread is 
associated with a 2.53%*** increase in 





NYSE 1960-1981 NR 
Relative bid-
ask spread 
Discount: 1% increase in the bid-ask 
spread is associated with an increase in 





NYSE 1961-1990 654-929 
Relative bid-
ask spread 
Insignificant: Both, the liquidity 
premium and the beta-risk premium 










Insignificant: The spread is a proxy for 
a risk variable associated with the 
reciprocal of the price variable. 
Eleswarapu 
(1997) 
NASDAQ 1976-1990 657-2,161 
Relative bid-
ask spread 
Discount: A 1% increase in the spread 
raises the expected yearly return by 
0.34% to 0.42%NR. 
Brennan et al. 
(1998) 
NYSE / 





Discount: A one standard deviation 
increase in log. dollar volume reduces 
excess returns of NYSE / AMEX and 
NASDAQ stocks by 1.32%p.a.*** and 
3.48%p.a.***, respectively. 
Datar et al. (1998) NYSE 1962-1991 880 
Share 
turnover 
Discount: Illiquid stocks earn an excess 
return over liquid assets of about 3.25% 
p.a. 
                                                          
602 Cp. Brennan & Subrahmanyam, 1996, p. 441ff.; Eleswarapu & Reinganum, 
1993, p. 373ff. 
603 Source: Own representation. 









Amihud (2002) NYSE 1963-1997 NR ILLIQ 
Discount: 1% increase in ILLIQ is 
associated with a 1.944%*** increase in 
expected yearly stock returns. 
Easley et al. 
(2002) 




Insignificant: Spreads do not affect 
asset returns, whereas the probability of 
informed trading (PIN) does. A 10%-
points increase in PIN is associated 
with a 2.5%*** increase in the per 
annum expected return of the stock. 




1971-2009 1,597-2,166 ILLIQ 
Discount: A one-standard deviation 
change in the log-transformed ILLIQ 
ratio raises expected yearly excess 
returns by 4.27%*** (6.75%***) for 
NYAM stocks (NASDAQ stocks).  
Amihud et al. 
(2015) 
World 1990-2011 39,764 ILLIQ 
Discount: Across countries, the risk-
adjusted illiquidity premium is, 
respectively, 0.82%, 0.45%, or 0.73% 
after controlling for six common global 
and regional risk factors and using 
return weighted, value weighted, and 












Insignificant: For NYSE stocks the 
characteristic premium declined from 
1.3% in 1964 – 1975 to insignificant 
levels in 2000 - 2011. There is also 
evidence of a size factor in 
characteristic liquidity. Similar trends 
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III.2.2. PRICING OF SYSTEMATIC LIQUIDITY RISK 
An alternative interpretation for the liquidity effect is based on the discovery 
of commonality in liquidity by, among others, Chordia et al. (2000), Hasbrouck and 
Seppi (2001), and Huberman and Halka (2001)604 and states that fluctuations in 
liquidity constitute a type of undiversifiable risk that augments the standard 
CAPM beta risk factor.605 Acharya and Pedersen (2005) derive a liquidity-adjusted 
CAPM, showing that in equilibrium liquidity fluctuations are priced to the extent 
that they are either correlated across assets or exacerbate fundamental covariance 
risk.606 The central result of their theoretical asset pricing model is that the CAPM 
in the imagined frictionless economy holds for net returns in an economy with 
liquidity costs.607 Rewriting the one-beta CAPM in net returns in terms of gross 
returns, Acharya and Pedersen (2005) introduce three liquidity betas 𝛽𝐿1, 𝛽𝐿2, and 
𝛽𝐿3 that complement the standard CAPM beta as shown below:608 
 E(𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑔


























                                                          
604 Cp. Chordia et al., 2000, p. 3ff.; Hasbrouck & Seppi, 2001, p. 383ff.; Huberman 
& Halka, 2001, p. 161ff. 
605 Cp. Amihud & Mendelson, 2015, p. 159; Bradrania & Peat, 2014, p. 79. 
606 Cp. Favero et al., 2010, pp. 109,111. 
607 Cp. Amihud & Mendelson, 2015, p. 159; Amihud et al., 2005, p. 288. 
608 Cp. Acharya & Pedersen, 2005, p. 381. 




) = expected gross stock return, 
𝑟𝑓𝑡 = return on the risk-free asset, 
λ = risk premium, 
𝛽𝑖𝑡 = 
sensitivity of returns on the ith asset against 




𝐿3 = liquidity betas estimated for firm i at time t, 
𝑐𝑀𝑡 = relative market illiquidity costs at time t, and 
𝑐𝑖𝑡 = relative illiquidity costs of stock i at time t. 
In this equation, the expected gross stock return E(𝑅𝑖𝑡) is a linear combination 
of the expected relative illiquidity costs E(𝑐𝑖𝑡) plus four covariances times the risk 
premium λ. As in the standard CAPM framework609, the expected return on an asset 
is linearly related to the market risk premium with a constant proportionality given 
by its sensitivity to the market portfolio as measured by 𝛽𝑖𝑡.  
Then, equation (23) yields three additional liquidity-related beta factors: The 
first liquidity beta 𝛽𝑖𝑡
𝐿1 reflects the sensitivity of the stock’s liquidity to market-wide 
liquidity shocks. For most securities, 𝛽𝑖𝑡
𝐿1 yields a positive sign due to commonality 
in liquidity meaning that investors want to be compensated for holding a security 
that becomes illiquid when the market becomes illiquid.610 The second liquidity 
beta 𝛽𝑖𝑡
𝐿2, which measures the sensitivity of the stock’s return to market-wide 
liquidity shocks, affects required returns negatively because investors are willing 
to accept a lower return on an asset with a high return in times of market 
illiquidity.611 Finally 𝛽𝑖𝑡
𝐿3 means the covariation between a security’s illiquidity and 
the market return. The negative effect stems from the willingness of investors to 
accept a discounted return on stocks with low illiquidity costs, provided that these 
securities remain tradeable in states of poor market return.  
To date, the evidence on liquidity as a priced risk factor is at best mixed: 
While studies by Acharya and Pedersen (2005), Chen (2005), Foran and O'Sullivan 
(2014), and Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) provide evidence of a premium for 
                                                          
609 For further reading on the CAPM, see section II.1.2.2. 
610 Cp. Amihud et al., 2005, p. 288. 
611 Cp. Acharya & Pedersen, 2005, p. 382. 
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systematic liquidity risk612, other studies by Chordia et al. (2000), Coughenour and 
Saad (2004), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), and Karolyi et al. (2012) do not support 
the notion of commonality in liquidity613. 
There are also some empirical studies that attempt to combine the views 
about the liquidity effect on asset pricing by simultaneously examining the 
relationship between liquidity as a characteristic and liquidity as an undiversifiable 
source of market risk. Again, the results of these studies are inconclusive: Bradrania 
and Peat (2014) use a triple-sort portfolio formation technique developed by Daniel 
and Titman (1997)614 to isolate the variation in liquidity-related co-variation from 
the changes in liquidity level for 3,035 NYSE stocks from January 1926 to December 
2008.615 Bradrania and Peat (2014) find that systematic liquidity risk is priced 
irrespective of illiquidity level.616 For a sample of NYSE-listed stocks over the 
period January 1983 through December 1992, Korajczyk and Sadka (2008) obtain a 
premium in the absolute level of liquidity characteristic after controlling for across-
measure systematic liquidity risks while using the Amihud (2002) ratio and stock 
turnover as liquidity measures.617 Liu (2010) reports that liquidity risk carries a 
significant premium, whereas there is little evidence for liquidity as a firm 
characteristic.618 Finally, Watanabe and Watanabe (2008) declare that “the illiquidity 
premium is delivered primarily in the form of beta risk premium with respect to the liquidity 
factor during periods of high preference uncertainty”.619 
                                                          
612 Cp. Acharya & Pedersen, 2005, p. 375ff.; Chen, 2005, p. 1ff.; Foran & 
O'Sullivan, 2014, p. 178ff.; Pástor & Stambaugh, 2003, p. 642ff. 
613 Cp. Chordia et al., 2000, p. 3ff.; Coughenour & Saad, 2004, p. 37ff.; Hasbrouck 
& Seppi, 2001, p. 383ff.; Karolyi et al., 2012, p. 82 ff. 
614 Cp. Daniel & Titman, 1997, p. 1ff. 
615 Cp. Bradrania & Peat, 2014, p. 78ff. 
616 Cp. Bradrania & Peat, 2014, p. 93. 
617 Cp. Korajczyk & Sadka, 2008, p. 47. 
618 Cp. Liu, 2010, p. 7ff. 
619 Cp. Watanabe & Watanabe, 2008, p. 2452. 
 
 
III.3. MEASURING LIQUIDITY IN STOCK MARKETS 
III.3.1. CLASSIFICATION 
Obtaining accurate measures of trading costs and assessing the reasons for 
their systematic behaviour is vital to individual investors, portfolio managers, and 
policymakers. While investors and portfolio managers need to base their decisions 
conditioned on the anticipated trading costs to avoid shortfalls in investment 
performance, policymakers are concerned with the impacts of regulatory reforms 
on trading mechanisms, thereby determining the attractiveness and profitability of 
a regulated market.620  
Previous market microstructure literature has adopted more than 60 different 
measures to proxy for market liquidity.621 To date, there is little agreement on the 
best measure to use and, as the different measures have a low correlation to each 
other622, researchers likely end up with conflicting results about the liquidity of a 
financial market when using different measures. As Amihud (2002) state: “These 
measures of liquidity […] can be regarded as empirical proxies that measure different 
aspects of illiquidity. It is doubtful that there is one single measure that captures all its 
aspects”.623 
Liquidity measures are commonly distinguished along (i) the number of 
dimensions they cover and (ii) the capital market data used to calculate them. 101F624 
One classification dates back to Wyss (2004) and Kindermann (2005) who separate 
liquidity measures into one-dimensional and two-dimensional ones.625 One-
dimensional liquidity measures only take into account one liquidity dimension at 
                                                          
620 Cp. Bessembinder, 2003, p. 233f.; Bessembinder & Venkataraman, 2010, p. 184; 
Chordia, Roll, et al., 2001, p. 501.  
621 Cp. Aitken & Comerton-Forde, 2003, p. 46 
622 Cp. Aitken & Comerton-Forde, 2003, p. 51. For a correlation analysis on U.S. 
treasury notes, see Fleming, 2003, p. 96f. 
623 Amihud, 2002, p. 35. 
624 Cp. Hachmeister, 2007, p. 24. 
625 Cp. Kindermann, 2005, p. 46; Wyss, 2004, p. 9. 
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a time and provide a direct measure of the spread, the volume traded, or the time 
between subsequent trades.626 Instead, two-dimensional measures explicitly model 
the relationship between the various liquidity dimensions. They combine 
properties of different one-dimensional liquidity measures as it is the case for 
“quote slope” that has the spread in the numerator (breadth dimension) and the 
volume in the denominator (depth dimension). 
Collins and Fabozzi (1991) introduce another classification of liquidity 
measures into pre-trade measures and post-trade measures.627 Pre-trade measures 
utilise information about quotes and trading interest that is already available before 
the execution of a trade.628 The central idea behind pre-trade measures is that the 
quote function of the open order book contains information on the willingness of 
market participants to trade, thereby determining the price at which they are 
prepared to buy or sell a stock.629 Consequently, pre-trade measures, such as quoted 
spreads or order-book depth, indicate the cost of completing a round trip (buy and 
sell at the same time).630 A major disadvantage of pre-trade measures is that, by 
construction, they do not capture the resilience dimension of liquidity. 108F631 Post-trade 
liquidity measures, such as the “Amivest Liquidity Ratio”, are calculated based on 
transaction prices632 and, therefore, indicate what people have traded in the past633. 
Their strengths lies in the consideration of the open interest of traders who are 
willing to trade but who do not want to appear in the order book prior to a trade.634 
Also, the history of past transaction prices reveals information about the resilience 
                                                          
626 Cp. Wyss, 2004, p. 9. 
627 Cp. Collins & Fabozzi, 1991, p. 31. Aitken and Comerton-Forde (2003) choose 
a similar approach and differentiate between trade-based measures and order-
based measures. In their classification, trade-based measures are expost rather than 
ex ante measures. Cp. Aitken & Comerton-Forde, 2003, p. 47f. 
628 Cp. Kindermann, 2005, p. 46f. 
629 Cp. Kempf, 1998, p. 300f. 
630 Cp. Aitken & Comerton-Forde, 2003, p. 47. 
631 Cp. Kindermann, 2005, p. 47. 
632 Cp. Hachmeister, 2007, p. 26; Kindermann, 2005, p. 62. 
633 Cp. Aitken & Comerton-Forde, 2003, p. 47. 
634 Cp. Kindermann, 2005, p. 26f. 
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dimension of a market.635 Other researchers, however, argue that post-trade 
measures fail to measure opportunity costs and, therefore, do not accurately reflect 
the implicit cost of not being able to implement the desired investment strategy, 
that is, the level of liquidity is systematically overestimated.636 The notion is based 
on the premise that investors care about the level of liquidity prevailing in the 
secondary market when making buying and selling decisions. Therefore, 
transactions could be omitted due to a lack of liquidity. 
Table 13 provides an overview on frequently used liquidity measures 
separated first into one-dimensional and two-dimensional ones, then into pre-trade 
and post-trade measures.637 To choose the most suitable liquidity measure for the 
investigation of the mediating effects of stock liquidity on the diversification’s 
effect, the author follows Kindermann (2005) and Kuhlmann (2018) in adopting 
three quality properties:638 
- Symmetry means that the liquidity metric should lead to the same conclusion 
about the liquidity of a market or financial asset irrespective of whether it is 
applied by a buyer or a seller. The central tenet underlying the symmetry 
property is that trading is a zero-sum game meaning that the sum of the market 
impact costs of all market participants (e.g. buyers, sellers, dealers) must be 
zero to prohibit free lunch configurations.639 Liquidity measures based on 
discrete returns such as quoted spreads often fail to meet the symmetry 
property when not transformed by the natural logarithm.640 
- Data availability ensures that the liquidity measure is available for a sufficiently 
long period of time.641 Due to their high data requirements (e.g. intraday trading 
data), some measures are more elaborate in their determination than others. 
                                                          
635 Cp. Kindermann, 2005, p. 71. 
636 Cp. Collins & Fabozzi, 1991, p. 32. 
637 For further reading on the various measures, instead of many, see Alexandros 
et al., 2011, p. 6ff. 
638 Cp. Kindermann, 2005, p. 39ff.; Kuhlmann, 2018, p. 98f. 
639 Cp. Berkowitz et al., 1988, p. 100. 
640 Cp. Kindermann, 2005, p. 40f. 
641 Cp. Fleming, 2003, p. 85. 
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- Comparability refers to the possibility to compare the liquidity situation of stocks 
with no regards to the price level of the stocks in question.642 
With particular attention paid to the aforementioned quality criteria, the 
following statements on liquidity measures are limited to four key figures, among 
them are relative spreads, turnover ratio, illiquidity ratio, and liquidity ratio 2. 
  
                                                          
642 Cp. Wyss, 2004, p. 13. 
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Table 13: Selective summary of liquidity measures643 
The table presents 23 liquidity metrics proposed in the early stages of the market microstructure 
literature and that measure different aspects of illiquidity. The last three columns indicate whether 




Symmetry Data availability Comparability 
One-dimensional liquidity measures: depth dimension  
Pre-trade / order-based      
 Quoted spread if log fulfilled not fulfilled 2 of 3 
 Relative spreads if log fulfilled fulfilled 3 of 3 
 Average spreads if log fulfilled not fulfilled 2 of 3 
 Round trip costs not fulfilled not fulfilled not fulfilled 0 of 3 
 Relative round trip costs not fulfilled not fulfilled fulfilled 1 of 3 
Post-trade / trade-based      
 Market impact not fulfilled not fulfilled not fulfilled 0 of 3 
 Price impact fulfilled not fulfilled fulfilled 2 of 3 
 Depth of price impact fulfilled not fulfilled fulfilled 2 of 3 
One-dimensional liquidity measures: breadth dimension  
Pre-trade / order-based      
 Quantity depth if log not fulfilled not fulfilled 1 of 3 
 Dollar depth Not fulfilled not fulfilled fulfilled 1 of 3 
Post-trade / trade-based      
 Trading volume fulfilled fulfilled not fulfilled 2 of 3 
 Turnover ratio fulfilled fulfilled fulfilled 3 of 3 
One-dimensional liquidity measures: time dimension  
Post-trade / trade-based      
 Number of transactions fulfilled not fulfilled not fulfilled 1 of 3 
 Trading latency fulfilled not fulfilled not fulfilled 1 of 3 
 Zeros fulfilled fulfilled not fulfilled 2 of 3 
Two-dimensional liquidity measures: price and volume  
Pre-trade / order-based      
 Quote slope if log not fulfilled not fulfilled 1 of 3 
 Composite liquidity not fulfilled not fulfilled not fulfilled 0 of 3 
 Order ratio not fulfilled not fulfilled not fulfilled 0 of 3 
Post-trade / trade-based      
 ILLIQ fulfilled fulfilled fulfilled 3 of 3 
 Liquidity ratio 1 if log fulfilled not fulfilled 2 of 3 
 Liquidity ratio 2 if log fulfilled fulfilled 3 of 3 
 Liquidity ratio 3 if log fulfilled not fulfilled 2 of 3 
Two-dimensional liquidity measures: price and time  
Post-trade / trade-based      
 Flow ratio fulfilled not fulfilled not fulfilled 1 of 3 
                                                          
643 Source: Own representation based on Hachmeister, 2007, p. 24ff.; 
Kindermann, 2005, p. 112; Kuhlmann, 2018, p. 100; Sarr & Lybek, 2002, p. 8ff.; Wyss, 
2004, p. 9ff. 
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III.3.2. ONE-DIMENSIONAL MEASURES 
The relative spread is among the most frequently used measures of market 
liquidity121F644 and gives an approximation of the cost that an investor must incur in 


















𝑀𝑡  = relative spread calculated with mid-prices, 
𝑝𝑡
𝐴 = best asked price at time t,  
𝑝𝑡
𝐵 = best bid price at time t, and 
𝑝𝑡
𝑀 = mid-price at time t. 
On the positive side, the relative spread can be calculated quickly with 
readily available data and does not require any trading activity. By calculating the 
cost of a round-trip as a percentage of the stock price, the relative spread can be 
used to compare the liquidity across stocks. To achieve better distributional 
properties, some researchers employ log prices to calculate the relative spread or 
even calculate log relative spread of log prices.647 On the negative side, relative 
spread measures are criticised for not considering differences in the order volume 
so that for large investors the true cost of trading might be underestimated.648 Also, 
many transactions take place within the quoted spread, thereby overstating the cost 
of trading.649 Quoted spreads should widen with the variability in price returns as 
                                                          
644 Cp. Amihud & Mendelson, 1986, p. 223f.; Fleming, 2003, p. 85. 
645 Cp. Aitken & Comerton-Forde, 2003, p. 47. 
646 Cp. Kadlec & McConnell, 1994, p. 628; Wyss, 2004, p. 14. 
647 Cp. Wyss, 2004, p. 15. 
648 Cp. Aitken & Comerton-Forde, 2003, p. 47.  
649 Cp. Stoll, 2000, p. 1486. 
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dealers demand compensation for inventory carrying costs which themselves are a 
positive function of the riskiness of the underlying.650 
The turnover ratio is a common post-trade measure of liquidity indicating the 
number of times the outstanding volume changes hands. In contrast to the relative 
spread introduced above, it can be best considered as a proxy for volume (or 
breadth) rather than market depth. The turnover ratio is defined as the dollar value 









𝑅𝑇𝑉𝑡 = relative transaction volume at time t, 
𝑛𝑇 = number of trades in a given time period T, 
𝑞𝑖 = number of shares of trade i,  
𝑛𝑖
𝑠 = issued shares of firm i, and 
𝑓𝑓𝑖 = free float fraction of firm i. 
The advantage of using the relative turnover rate of a stock as a proxy for its 
liquidity is two-fold. First, it is relatively easy to calculate, and data availability is 
less of an issue. Second, the turnover ratio has a strong theoretical and empirical 
appeal. By the clientele effect, investors with long expected holding periods hold 
less liquid assets, which in turn, implies that asset returns are a decreasing function 
of the turnover rate.652 Among others, Chordia, Subrahmanyam, et al. (2001) and 
Datar et al. (1998) find that cross-sectionally stock returns are a decreasing function 
of the turnover rates which confirms the idea of a negative relationship between 
expected returns and liquidity.653 
  
                                                          
650 For further reading, see section III.1.3. 
651 Cp. Ajinkya & Jain, 1989, p. 334; Amihud, 2002, p. 34f.; Datar et al., 1998, p. 
205. 
652 Cp. Amihud, 2002, p. 35; Datar et al., 1998, p. 206. 
653 Cp. Chordia, Subrahmanyam, et al., 2001, p. 4; Datar et al., 1998, p. 205. 
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III.3.3. TWO-DIMENSIONAL MEASURES 
The first two-dimensional approach, developed by Amihud (2002) and 
known as „ILLILQ“, reflects the „daily price response associated with one dollar of 
trading volume“.654 The illiquidity of a specific stock is defined as the daily ratio of 











𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡 = Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio at time t, 
𝑛𝑇 = number of trades in a given time period T, 
𝑝𝑖  = transaction price of trade i, 
𝑞𝑖 = number of shares of trade i,  
𝑆𝑇𝑡 = stock turnover at time t, and 
𝑟𝑡−1,𝑡 = return from period t - 1 to t. 
A high value for ILLIQ is taken to indicate that only a few shares were traded 
with high price movements and, hence, means lower liquidity of stocks. Using a 
sample of NYSE stocks during the years 1964 – 1997, Amihud (2002) empirically 
documents that ILLIQ has a positive and highly significant effect on expected 
returns.656 The main advantage of Amihud’s (2002) measure is that it relies on the 
full availability of data on stock returns and volume for its computation. Thus, the 
index allows for the investigation of long times series. A disadvantage of ILLIQ, 
however, is the assumption of a linear relationship between price changes and 
changes in turnover so that the influence of lagers-than-average trades remains 
uncovered.657 Additionally, ILLIQ fails to distinguish between transitory and 
permanent liquidity shortfalls.658 A market can display high price variability for 
various reasons without high volumes of trading; explanations include the arrival 
of new but ambiguous information or mispricing.  
                                                          
654 Amihud, 2002, p. 32. 
655 Cp. Wyss, 2004, p. 19. 
656 Cp. Amihud, 2002, p. 32. 
657 Cp. Grossman & Miller, 1988, p. 630. 
658 Cp. Kindermann, 2005, p. 71f. 
 
143 Liquidity in an economic framework  
The second two-dimensional liquidity measure has been proposed by 
Ranaldo (2000) as a slight modification of ILLIQ. In this version of the liquidity 











𝐿𝑅2𝑡 = Liquidity ratio 2 at time t, 
𝑛𝑇 = number of trades in a given time period T, 
𝑝𝑖  = transaction price of trade i, 
𝑞𝑖 = number of shares of trade i,  
𝑆𝑇𝑡 = stock turnover at time t,  
𝑟𝑡−1,𝑡 = return from period t - 1 to T, and 
𝑓𝑓𝑖 = free float fraction of firm i. 
As in most related research studies, this thesis employs a series of alternative 
liquidity measures to reduce estimation error. However, only the relative spread 
measure and the turnover ratio will be considered in the empirical analysis. The 
reasons are twofold: First, while relative spreads and turnover are relatively easy 
to calculate and to interpret, ILLIQ and LR2 are not. Second, ILLIQ and LR2 are not 
consistent with the liquidity concept introduced in section III.1.1, as they are 
exclusively aimed at the relationship between transaction volume and transaction 
price change. Third, as with every post-trade measure, ILLIQ and LR2 tend to 
overvalue liquidity systematically because they do not account for transactions not 
executed due to lack of liquidity.660 
The selection of relative spread is supported by the fact that they are not 
based on transaction data. In conjunction with the turnover ratio as a post-trade 
measure, estimation biases can be reduced while ensuring high comparability with 
previous studies. 
 
                                                          
659 Cp. Ranaldo, 2000, p. 80. 
660 Cp. Rojahn, 2008, p. 90. 
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IV. VALUE CONSEQUENCES OF STOCK ILLIQUIDITY ON MULTI-
BUSINESS FIRMS 
IV.1. DEVELOPMENT OF RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS 
Ever since Ansoff’s (1957) and Chandler’s (1962) observation that firms seek 
growth, there has been a long tradition of research on the relationship between 
product diversification and firm performance in the strategy and finance fields. 
From a conceptual point of view, increasing levels of diversification should provide 
additional shareholder value through operating synergies661 and financial 
synergies such as debt coinsurance effects662 and an increased allocation efficiency 
of capital in multi-business firms663. However, product diversification is not a 
costless process, and diversified firms might have to cope with growing agency 
problems causing inefficiencies in the internal capital allocation process.664  
Concerning shareholder value, much literature reports evidence that the 
costs of diversification outweigh its benefits, leading to substantial reductions in 
shareholder value and supporting an earlier notion by Myers (1984): “Investors who 
want to diversify do so on their own. Corporate diversification is redundant; the market will 
not pay extra for it.”665 On average, the sum of a diversified firm’s distinct business 
units is worth 2,8% to 60% of the value of a comparable portfolio single segment 
firms as indicated by Appendix 4. The literature review covers research studies 
                                                          
661 Cp. Beckmann, 2006, p. 40ff.; Purkayastha et al., 2012, p. 18ff.; Tanriverdi & 
Venkatraman, 2005, p. 99ff. 
662 Cp. Hann et al., 2013, p. 1961ff.; Higgins & Schall, 1975, p. 93ff.; Lewellen, 
1971, p. 521ff. 
663 Cp. Gertner et al., 1994, p. 1211ff.; Hubbard & Palia, 1999, p. 1131ff.; Rajan et 
al., 2000, p. 35ff.; Stein, 1997, p. 111ff. 
664 Cp. Amihud & Lev, 1981, p. 605ff.; Denis et al., 1997, p. 135ff.; Jensen, 1986, p. 
323ff.; Ozbas & Scharfstein, 2010, p. 581ff.; Rajan et al., 2000, p. 35ff.; Shin & Stulz, 
1998, p. 531ff.; Stulz, 1990, p. 3ff. 
665 Myers, 1984, p. 129. 
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using various methodologies, periods, and firm samples; thereby confirming that 
the diversification discount is a widespread phenomenon. 
Hence, it is a priori likely that diversified European firms trade with 
significant discounts, too. Therefore, the following two hypotheses seem to be a 
reasonable starting point for assessing the diversification effect across European 
firms:666  
H1.1: There are significant valuation differences between European non-financial 
focused firms and diversified firms. 
H1.2: On average, the valuation difference is negative meaning that diversified firms 
trade at a discount. 
Generally, the diversification literature computes the average valuation 
effects of corporate diversification under the implicit assumption that future 
returns are the same for diversified firms and focused firms.667 Equation (18) shows 
that even if cash flows are held constant, diversified firms and focused firms might 
have different Wall Street values due to variations in the appropriate discount rate 
for equity. Different securities might have different expected returns for many 
reasons; among such factors, this study focuses on stock market liquidity. 
The ability to buy or sell significant quantities of a security without moving 
the price against him or her (i.e. perfect liquidity) is an essential element of perfect 
capital markets without which Neoclassical asset pricing models such as the CAPM 
or APT would be without practical use. However, the assumption of perfect 
liquidity regularly does not hold under real market conditions and, because the 
lack of liquidity reflects a non-diversifiable risk, it should be considered a 
significant determinant in valuing illiquid securities. As liquidity, in contrast to 
stock prices, is inherently unobservable, it is common practice to specify the level 
of liquidity by transaction costs. 
In a nutshell, transaction costs are the dealers’ compensation for standing 
ready to trade with the incoming orders of those who demand immediate servicing 
of their orders. The endogenous costs of operating liquidity services include order-
                                                          
666 Please note that all research hypotheses are formulated in the style of an 
alternative hypothesis H1. For simplicity reasons, the null hypothesis is not listed 
separately. 
667 Cp. Lamont & Polk, 2001, p. 1694. 
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processing costs, inventory holding costs, and adverse selection costs. Dealers 
recover these costs by quoting different prices for purchases from the dealer and 
selling assets to the dealer. 
To date, little attention has been paid to the effect of stock illiquidity on the 
diversification-performance linkage668, albeit its theoretical implications are 
ambiguous: On the one hand, greater diversification can lead to higher illiquidity 
premiums and an undervaluation of the issuer’s shares through an information 
effect. Information asymmetries might be more severe in diversified firms, leading 
to considerable surcharges in the costs of trading the equity instrument of 
diversified firms.669 If diversified firms are less transparent relative to focused firms 
as outlined in section II.4.1.2.3, then from the viewpoint of a market maker, the risk 
of losses from trades with informed traders is higher for firms with more severe 
information asymmetries, leading to increased transaction costs (bid-ask spreads). 
As investors expect a certain level of liquidity and are only willing to buy less liquid 
securities if they are compensated for by a liquidity premium to indemnify for the 
additional risk taken, the equity premium is likely to be higher for diversified firms 
than for otherwise identical focused firms.  
On the other hand, corporate diversification might lessen the adverse-
selection problem facing equity issuers through an information diversification 
effect stating that the errors the market makes in forecasting the cash flows of the 
multiple segments in a diversified firm are imperfectly correlated. The cash flow 
forecast for a diversified firm can, thus, be more accurate than the forecast for a 
focused firm. Above and beyond, diversified firms might have lower illiquidity risk 
premiums through a size effect that makes large stocks relatively more attractive 
(“flight to liquidity”).  
Empirical evidence on the net effects of liquidity of traded equity on the 
diversification-performance linkage is scare and is mostly rooted in the real estate 
investment trust (REIT) industry. As these results must not generalise to other 
                                                          
668 For empirical evidence on the effect of stock liquidity on the diversification 
performance linkage, refer to section II.4.3. 
669 For an introduction to the operationalization of liquidity by transaction costs, 
see section III.1. 
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industries such as non-financial firms, in the fourth chapter the following two 
contradictory hypotheses will be tested: 
H2.1: The relationship between corporate diversification and firm value is mediated by 
stock liquidity, such that the more that diversification enhances liquidity, the 
higher the excess firm value. 
H2.2: The relationship between corporate diversification and firm value is mediated by 
stock liquidity, such that the more that diversification reduces liquidity, the lower 
the excess firm value. 
IV.2. SAMPLE AND DATA 
IV.2.1. SAMPLE DEFINITION 
The investigation of the impact of stock illiquidity on the diversification effect 
in Europe covers the years 2007 to 2016, with at least one year falling on the 
outbreak of the financial crisis.670 The initial sample consists of all firms that have 
been a member of the STOXX® EUROPE 600 index during the nine-year time 
window. To avoid survivorship and newness bias, firms will be added to the 
sample in the year they first enter the index and will remain a part of the relevant 
firm sample unless they cease their business activity during the investigation 
period. Reason for firms to leave the sample are plenty and include bankruptcy, 
mergers, or going private. The STOXX® EUROPE 600 index consists of the 600 
largest companies located across 18 countries in Europe; thereby representing firms 
with high importance for the European area. Firms are elected to be part of the 
index based on several criteria including free float and market capitalisation. 
The initial sample includes 7,686 firm-year observations across nine-years, 
with yearly observations ranging from 600 firms in 2007 to 941 firms in 2016. Thus, 
341 firms newly entered the STOXX® EUROPE 600 index since 2007. In the first 
step, 2,052 firm-year observations from the financial industry according to the 
industry classification benchmark (ICB) have been eliminated. These firms are 
subject to industry-specific regulations introducing spurious effects to the excess 
value measure and the independent variables. For instance, the study controls for 
                                                          
670 Cp. Acharya & Schnabl, 2010, p. 38. 
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the influence of the leverage ratios which is most likely to be distorted when 
financial firms are not excluded.671 In a second step, 2,963 firm-year observations 
are excluded due to the absence of information on one or more predictor variables 
such as total capital, firm sales, segment level sales or Altman’s Z score. After these 
deductions, a sample of 2,671 firm-year observations is left. In contrast to assets or 
earnings, sales are usually entirely allocated among business segments.  
To check for plausibility, the study requires that the sum of the segment sales 
falls within 1 per cent of the total sales of the firm, leading to a deduction of further 
253 firm-year observations.672 In a final step, 437 observations are qualified as 
extreme observations concerning excess firm value as the dependent variable, 
where extreme is defined as observations with an actual value being either more 
than four times of the imputed value or less than one-fourth of the imputed value.673  
Altogether, these modifications lead to a final sample of 1,981 firm 
observations across nine years corresponding to 343 firms (unbalanced panel). 
Table 14 summarises the sample generation process. 
 
Table 14: Sample selection process674 
  2007-2016 
% of basis 
population 
Basic population: firms included in the STOXX® EUROPE 600 index 
between the years 2007 to 2016 
7,686 100.00% 
 Financials or unknown sector -2,052 -26.70% 
 Lack of data -2,963 -38.55% 
 Sum of segment sales (1% rule) -253 -3.29% 
 Outlier excess firm value -437 -5.69% 
Sample population: firms included in the regression analysis 1,981 25.77% 
 Thereof diversified (business count, BDIV) 1,427 72.03% 
 Thereof diversified (market implied, MCOUNT) 1,525 76.98% 
 
The data items required for this research study are primarily sourced from 
one of the world’s largest data providers Thompson Reuters. All fundamental data 
                                                          
671 Cp. Rojahn & Zechser, 2017, p. 6. 
672 Cp. Berger & Ofek, 1995, p. 43; Graham et al., 2002, p. 699. 
673 Cp. Berger & Ofek, 1995, p. 61. 
674 Source: Own representation. 
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such as accounting numbers and industry classifications are taken from 
“Datastream/Worldscope”, which are considered as the most comprehensive 
databases for academic research related to corporate samples.675 Likewise, 
information about the world’s capital markets including the sample firms’ stock 
market performance is drawn from “Thomson Reuters Eikon”. 
IV.2.2. MEASURES OF CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION 
Prior research suggests multiple dimensions along which distinct businesses 
may be interlinked within a corporate portfolio.676 As in most related research 
studies, this thesis employs a set of alternative diversification measure to reduce 
estimation errors and to provide a high level of comparability with previous 
studies.677 The choice of the diversification measures is fundamentally based on 
recent studies by Ataullah et al. (2014), Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2016); Rojahn 
and Zechser (2017), and Zechser and Rojahn (2017)678 and includes three business 
count measures and three market-implied diversification measures, each of which 
has been discussed in greater detail throughout section II.3: First, the diversified 
firm dummy (BDIV) is a binary variable that equals unity if the number of different 
four-digit SIC codes for a firm’s segment revenues assigned by the Worldscope 
database exceeds one and zero otherwise.  
Second and third, the study considers two revenue-based Herfindahl indices 
that reflect the degree to which sales are concentrated among industry groups 
(H2DIV) and industry segments (H4DIV). Industry segments are identified 
according to two-digit SIC codes, while industry segments are based on four-digit 
SIC codes. These Herfindahl indices are calculated for each fiscal year, and sample 
                                                          
675 Cp. Klier, 2009, p. 116. 
676 Cp. Greune, 1997, p. 12f.; Schüle, 1992, p. 7f.; Srivasta et al., 1994, p. 146; Weiss, 
2009, p. 28. 
677 Cp. Bausch & Pils, 2009, p. 165ff.; Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 1989, p. 540.  
678 Cp. Ataullah et al., 2014, p. 228ff.; Kuppuswamy & Villalonga, 2016, p. 905ff.; 
Rojahn & Zechser, 2017, p. 1ff.; Zechser & Rojahn, 2017, p. 457ff. 
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firm is as the inverse of the sum of the squared output in the ith business unit as a 
percentage of the firm’s squared total output across all business units.679  
The estimation of the business count measures is subject to the following 
modifications: First, for reasons of data availability, the two Herfindahl indices are 
calculated using revenue figures only. The reason is that reliable information on 
both segment assets and segment income are not available to the author. Second, 
revenues reported for sic code “9999 Non-classifiable establishments” are neglected 
following prior research studies in this field.680 Third, if a firm does not report 
segment information, it will be treated as focused. However, due to our sample 
selection process, this conversion does not apply. 
Fourth, the multi-index dummy MCOUNT is a binary variable that takes a 
value of one if the number of different and significant regression coefficients 
obtained from estimating equation (13) exceeds one and is zero otherwise. 
Fifth, this thesis employs a beta-based Herfindahl index that reflects the 
degree to which the performance of a firm on the global capital markets is spread 
across broad market indices. MHDIV is an application of the Berry-Herfindahl 
index and is calculated as the inverse of the sum of the squares of each standardised 
regression coefficient obtained from equation (13) divided by the squared total 
regression coefficients. 
Finally, the market-implied diversification measure is the minimum of the 
proportion of explained variance and the inverse of a Herfindahl index based on 
standardised regression coefficients resulting from yearly forward stepwise 
regressions of equation (13). 
The Herfindahl indices H2DIV and H4DIV as well as the market-implied 
diversification measures MHDIV and MDIV converge towards one as the number 
of a firm’s SIC involvements increases. 
Table 15 presents descriptive data for the six diversification measures applied 
in this research study. The weighted business count measures vary from a 
minimum of zero (single-segment firm) to a maximum of 0.778 and 0.851 (high 
degree of diversification) for H2DIV and H4DIV, respectively, indicating a wide 
range of different diversification strategies among the sample firms. The results are 
                                                          
679 For further reading on Herfindahl indices, see section II.3.2.  
680 Cp. Klier, 2009, p. 125. 
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comparable to the market-implied indices of corporate diversification, which 
deviate from a minimum of zero to a maximum of 0.778 and 0.851 for MDIV and 
MHDIV, respectively. For all diversification metrics except the dummy variables, 
the null hypothesis of the Shapiro–Wilk normality test (SW test), “The data are 
normally distributed”, is rejected at the 0.01 level. By construction, the diversified 
firm dummies do not follow a normal distribution.  
 
Table 15: Sample descriptive statistics on diversification measures over the period 2007–2016681 
The table presents summary statistics across all diversification measures and over the whole sample 
period. “NR” indicates that the information is not reported. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Diversification  
measure 
Mean Max Min SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Shapiro-Wilk 
Test 
BDIV 0.720 1.000 0.000 0.449 ‐0.982 1.964 NR 
H2DIV 0.205 0.778 0.000 0.233 0.613 1.885 10.171*** 
H4DIV 0.329 0.851 0.000 0.263 ‐0.028 1.551 10.585*** 
MCOUNT 0.770 1.000 0.000 0.421 ‐1.282 2.643 NR 
MHDIV 0.409 0.851 0.000 0.256 ‐0.539 2.001 11.929*** 
MDIV 0.305 0.778 0.000 0.206 ‐0.222 1.946 9.782*** 
 
To mitigate the adverse effects of non-normally distributed variables, H2DIV 
is transformed using the square-root transformation method.682 As the square-root 
transformation is useful for more positively skewed data, the left tailed 
distributions of MHDIV and MDIV are first turned into a positively skewed 
distribution by subtracting each data point from the largest data point and adding 
one. After turning the negatively skewed distribution into positive, the standard 
square-root transformation can also be applied to MHDIV and MDIV. However, 
please note that the ranking has changed as indicated in the simplified example 
below (i.e. the smallest value becomes the largest and vice versa): 
  
                                                          
681 Source: Own representation. 
682 Cp. De Muth, 2014, p. 114f. 
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Table 16: Illustration of the transformation technique683 
Value before  
transformation 
transformation 
Value after  
transformation 
‐10 10‐(‐10)+1 21 
5 10‐5+1 6 
10 10‐10+1 1 
   
Skewness: ‐1.293  Skewness: 1.293 
 
From here on, the thesis refers to the transformed diversification measures as 
H2DIV0.5, MHDIV0.5, and MDIV0.5. H4DIV as well the binary variables BDIV and 
MCOUNT are not transformed. Table 17 summarises the predicted signs of the six 
diversification measures under the assumption that corporate diversification is a 
value-destroying strategy: 
 
Table 17: Predicted regression signs for diversification measures 
The table includes a brief description of the diversification measures used in the empirical analysis of 
this thesis. It also shows the expected signs of the coefficients of the diversification measures in the 
regression models contained in sections IV.3.2.2 and IV.3.2.3 assuming that corporate diversification 





Binary variable that takes a value of one if the number of 
different four‐digit SIC codes for a firm’s segment revenues a 
exceeds one and zero otherwise. 
‐ 
H2DIV0.5 
Square root of a revenue‐based Herfindahl index that reflects 
the degree to which revenues are concentrated among 
industry groups (i.e. two‐digit SIC codes). 
‐ 
H4DIV 
Transformed square root of a revenue‐based Herfindahl 
index that reflects the degree to which revenues are 




Binary variable that takes a value of one if the number of 
significant regression coefficients obtained from estimating 
equation (13) exceeds one and is zero otherwise. 
‐ 
MHDIV0.5 
Transformed square root of the inverse of the sum of the 
squares of each standardised regression coefficient obtained 




Transformed square root equal to the minimum of the 
proportion of explained variance and the inverse of a 
Herfindahl index based on standardised regression 
coefficients resulting from yearly forward stepwise 
regressions of equation (13). 
+ 
                                                          
683 Source: Own representation. 
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IV.2.3. ENDOGENOUS AND CONTROL VARIABLES 
Independent variables. As a proxy for the valuation effects of corporate 
diversification, this thesis employs the traditional Berger and Ofek (1995) excess 
value measure as defined in section II.4.2.1. The excess value measure compares 
the market value of a firm with an imputed value that reflects the value of its 
segments on a stand-alone basis.684 A firm’s imputed value corresponds to the 
reported accounting value (e.g. assets, sales, or earnings) multiplied by its industry 
median ratio of total capital to that accounting item. Negative (positive) excess 
values indicate a diversification discount (premium). More formally, excess firm 














𝐴𝑉𝑖𝑡 = market value of common equity𝑖𝑡





excess firm value of firm i at time t based on 
business count approach, 
AV𝑖𝑡 = total firm capital of firm i at time t, 
I(V)𝑖𝑡 = 
imputed value of the sum of a firm’s segments as 
stand-alone firms at time t, 
𝐴𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 
segment j’s value of sales used in the valuation 
multiple of firm i at time t, 
𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 
multiple of total capital to sales for the median single-
segment firm in segment j’s industry at time t, and 
𝑁𝑆𝐼𝐶,𝑡 = 
number of different SIC categories constituting the 
corporate portfolio at time t. 
Entity multipliers are selected as they account for differences in the capital 
structure of the sample firms and the resulting cost of equity. Following the entity 
                                                          
684 Cp. Berger & Ofek, 1995, p. 48; Glaser & Mueller, 2010, p. 2309. 
685 Cp. Beckmann, 2006, p. 96; Berger & Ofek, 1995, p. 60f. 
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approach, a firm’s total capital equals the market value of equity and the market 
value of debt. However, obtaining reliable estimates for the market value of a firm’s 
debt is associated with an unjustified effort. Thus, following most other studies in 
this field, the book value of debt is considered.686  
The use of entity multiples requires as a multiple of total capital a 
performance measure for which the claims of the lenders have not yet been settled 
(i.e. performance measures before interest payments). From the set of common 
multiples, this study relies on sales multipliers.687 The reason is twofold: First, firm 
sales are subject to less accounting distortions and strategic accounting problems 
compared to other reporting figures.688 Second, reliable information on both 
segment assets and segment operating income were just not available to the author. 
Thus, including multipliers based on these fundamental figures would have led to 
a large reduction in the sample population. The industry median ratios for the sales 
multiplier are based on the narrowest SIC grouping. However, the use of a sales 
multiple instead of other frequently used multiples such as EBIT or EBITDA 
multiples is not costless. The main disadvantages of sales multiples are that they 
do not allow any statement about the profitability of a company and that they do 
not explicitly account for growth or risk of a firm.689 
The computation of the excess firm values using the market implied 
approach is subject to the same principles as the determination of the excess value 
based on the business count approach. However, instead of using segment 
information, a firm’s imputed value in the market-implied approach corresponds 
to the relative importance of a sector index multiplied by the industry median ratio 
of total capital to sales. More formally, excess firm value based on the market-
implied approach for firm i and fiscal year t is defined as follows:690 
                                                          
686 Cp. Hoechle et al., 2012, p. 44. Prominent exceptions that explicetly model the 
market value of debt include Glaser & Mueller, 2010, p. 2307ff.; Mansi & Reeb, 2002, 
p. 2167ff.; Rojahn & Zechser, 2017, p. 1ff. 
687 For a review of common equity value and entity value multiples, instead of 
many, see Schreiner, 2007, p. 38ff. 
688 Cp. Beckmann, 2006, p. 93; Schreiner, 2007, p. 42. 
689 Cp. Geddes, 2003, p. 83. 
690 Cp. Beckmann, 2006, p. 96; Berger & Ofek, 1995, p. 60f. 
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excess firm value of firm i at time t based on the 
market-implied approach, 
AV𝑖𝑡 = total firm capital of firm i at time t, 
𝐼(𝑉)𝑖𝑡
𝑚 = 
imputed value of the sum of a firm’s segments as 
stand-alone firms based on market-implied approach 
at time t, 
𝛿𝑖𝑗𝑡
2 = jth squared regression coefficients of firm i at time t,  
𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑚  = 
multiple of total capital to sales for the median single-
segment firm in segment j’s industry based on 
market-implied approach at time t, and 
N𝛿𝑡 = number of significant regression coefficients at time t. 
 
Firm-specific control variables. The scope of this thesis is to assess whether the 
liquidity of traded equity mediates the diversification-performance relationship. 
Among other econometric techniques, this thesis relies on regression-based 
analysis. A fundamental problem associated with this kind of analysis is the 
specification problem.691 The specification problem describes a situation where 
omitted variables appear only in the error term and potentially cause spurious 
relationships between the explanatory variables and excess firm value.  
Put differently, the gain or loss in excess firm value must not merely be due 
to diversification. To reduce the specification bias, this thesis includes both non-
diversification specific variables and the determinants of the diversification 
discount. Following Billett and Mauer (2003), Campa and Kedia (2002) Glaser and 
                                                          
691 Cp. Hsiao, 2014, p. 313ff. 
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Mueller (2010), Hyland and Diltz (2002), and Rojahn and Zechser (2017), the control 
variables include:692 
 
1. ALTMAN’s Z: Used as an aggregated measure for the operational and financial 
difficulties within a firm. The Z-score is calculated from accounting information 
and the method proposed by Altman (1968).693 Because the financial 
performance of a firm increases with higher z-scores, a positive relationship is 
between Altman’s Z and excess firm value assumed. 
2. CAPEX: The ratio of capital expenditures to total assets is a proxy for the 
growth opportunities and, along with R&D, is used to test for the importance 
of the internal capital market hypothesis. A positive relation between EFV and 
CAPEX is anticipated because firms could be investing in their current 
operations to achieve future growth. 
3. CASH: The relationship between the cash ratio, defined as the sum of cash and 
marketable security to total assets, and the traditional Berger and Ofek (1995) 
excess value measure is ambiguous. On the positive side, cash holdings not 
only reduce the likelihood of financial distress but allow firms to pursue their 
optimal investment policy which should result in higher profitability. On the 
negative side, Jensen (1986) argues that firms use available cash to pursue 
increasingly far-flung opportunities that increase their power, compensation, 
and perquisites; thereby reducing the overall firm value. 
4. CFTA: The ratio of free cash flow to total assets is used to control for the 
operating performance of a firm. The higher the operating performance, the 
more valuable the firm. Building on the winner’s course hypothesis of internal 
capital markets and following prior research such as Servaes (1996)694, a positive 
relationship is expected. 
                                                          
692 Cp. Billett & Mauer, 2003, p. 1182; Campa & Kedia, 2002, p. 1746ff.; Glaser & 
Mueller, 2010, p. 2310; Hyland & Diltz, 2002, p. 65ff.; Rojahn & Zechser, 2017, p. 
10f. 
693 Cp. Altman, 1968, p. 589ff. 
694 Cp. Servaes, 1996, p. 1216ff. 
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5. DEBT: The debt ratio is defined as the sum of short – and long-term debt scaled 
by the sum of the financial debt and book equity. Following Williamson (1988), 
debt can serve as a monitoring device helping to discourage managers’ 
overinvestment of free cash flow695 and to diversify their operations696 which 
calls for a positive effect of debt on excess firm value. 
6. R&D: The measure of research and development intensity, computed as R&D 
scaled by net sales, is used to control for firm-specific knowledge. A positive 
relationship is expected as firm-specific know-how could be contributing to 
sources of cost or differentiation advantages over rival firms. 
7. RELS. Prior research reveals that investors are only willing to buy less liquid 
securities if they are compensated by a liquidity premium to indemnify for the 
additional risk taken (e. g. Amihud and Mendelson (1986)).697 To control for this 
liquidity premium, the relative bid-ask spread of the i-th sample firms’ traded 
common equity is employed. To derive an undistorted liquidity measure, the 
spread is averaged daily and over the last month before the financial year-end. 
Because liquidity increases with lower bid-ask spreads, a negative relationship 
is assumed. 
8. SIZE. A firm’s total assets are used as a proxy for both the size of a firm and its 
capital market access. A positive impact of SIZE on excess firm value is 
expected because large and diversified firms can compete more effectively in 
the markets than otherwise smaller firms and emphasises the potential benefits 
of diversification arising from market power.698 Likewise, the danger of default 
is reduced with increasing size, which should lead to decreasing risk premiums; 
thereby increasing shareholder value. 
9. STDRET. The residual volatility is applied to control for value-relevant 
information reserved for a firm’s management. When a company's managers 
and external investors are equally well informed about systematic factors 
affecting shareholder value, residual volatility reflects the amount of value-
                                                          
695 Cp. Williamson, 1988, p. 567ff. 
696 Cp. Hyland & Diltz, 2002, p. 65. 
697 Cp. Amihud & Mendelson, 1986, p. 223ff. 
698 Cp. Pils, 2009, p. 22; Purkayastha et al., 2012, p. 21; Ramanujam & 
Varadarajan, 1989, p. 535. 
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relevant information reserved for management. Because the investors’ 
perceived level of risk is higher for less transparent firms, a negative 
relationship between residual volatility and excess firm value is to be expected. 
10. TANG. The asset structure is defined as the ratio of fixed tangible assets divided 
by the total assets of the firm. A positive relationship is expected as the 
valuation of capital-intensive firms is easier than the valuation of firms with a 
high ratio of intangible assets for which there is usually no active market. 
Relatedly, tang can be considered a proxy for the presence of information 
asymmetries. 
11. TURNOVER. Along with RELS, TURNOVER is used as a proxy for the level of 
liquidity prevailing in the secondary market. TURNOVER equals the dollar 
value of shares traded scaled by the fraction of outstanding value traded. 
Because liquidity increases with turnover, a positive relationship is expected. 
 
Panel (B) of Table 18 provides descriptive statistics for the controlling 
variables in our sample. The table shows that the average firm has got an Altman’s 
(1986) Z-score of 9.801. As the financial performance is a positive function of z-
scores, focused firms (z-score: 4.388) seem to be healthier than their diversified 
counterparts (z-score: 3.950). The difference in z-scores in favour of focused firms 
is statistically significant at the 5% level.  
The ratio of capital expenditures to total assets varies strongly from a 
minimum of zero to 28.3%. On median, the sample firms spend 3.4% of their total 
assets for capital expenditure. Again, there is a statistically significant difference in 
CAPEX for diversified firms (3.5%) and focused firms (3.2%).  
Moreover, the table highlights that the average firm operates with an cash 
ratio of 8.8%. There is no statistically significant difference in cash holdings for 
diversified and focused firms. In terms of cash flows, the summary statistics 
support prior findings that diversified firms not necessarily have an competitive 
advantage in generating cash flows. While focused firms have a cash flow to asset 
ratio of approximately 5.3%, diversified firms only come to a value of 3.9%. 
The average firm run a debt ratio of approximately 37.3%. Diversified firms, 
on average, have a 2.20%-points higher debt ratio than focused firms; thereby 
confirming the idea of the risk reduction hypothesis of corporate diversification as 
 Florian Zechser, M.A. 160 
suggested by Lewellen (1971). Above and beyond, 2.36% of the yearly observations 
belong to predominately equity-financed firms (less than 2.5% of debt), of which 
45% follow a focused strategy.  
Firm size waffles between a minimum of EUR 0.183 bn. and EUR 376 bn., 
with the smallest (biggest) firms belonging to the technology sector (utility sector). 
On average, diversified firms are 1.64 times larger than focused firms. 
The ratio of tangible assets to total assets averages 20.2% and is more than 
2.5% points higher for diversified firms than for otherwise similar focused firms. In 
terms of liquidity, the difference in relative spreads of traded equity of diversified 
and focused firms is statistically significant on the 0.01 level. The absolute 
difference in median values, however, is rather small (diversified firms: 0.0013 vs 
focused firms: 0.0014). 
Finally, no statistically significant differences are estimated for the median 
R&D expenditures, and residual volatilities and share turnovers.  
As with the diversification metrics, the data on the controlling variables do 
not follow a normal distribution. Following the diversification metrics, controlling 
variables with a right-skewed (left tailed) distribution will be transformed using 
the square-root procedure. As the square root of a negative number is not defined 
within the range of real numbers, the distribution of CFTA is first shifted to positive 
values by subtracting the minimum value. This procedure does not apply to size 
which, by definition, is transformed by the natural logarithm. By the designation 
of the diversification measures, this thesis refers to square-root transformed 
variables as X0.5 and to size as ln X. 
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Table 18: Sample descriptive statistics on the firm-specific and liquidity-specific control variables699 
The table presents summary statistics on the firm-specific and liquidity specific control variables. Diversity is measured using a binary variable based 
on four-digit SIC codes. Differences in the median are assessed using a two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Variable Mean 
Median 
Max Min SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Shapiro 







Panel (A): dependent variable 
𝐸𝐹𝑉𝑖𝑡 ‐0.122 ‐0.036    1.384 ‐1.386 0.525 ‐0.057 2.873 6.423*** 
𝐸𝐹𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝑚 0.015 0.001    1.383 ‐1.383 0.575 ‐0.029 2.504 4.565*** 
Panel (B): firm-specific and liquidity-specific control variables 
𝐴𝐿𝑇𝑀𝐴𝑁′𝑠 𝑍it 9.801 4.045 3.950 4.388 2.201** 269.668 0.819 24.359 6.683 55.405 16.179*** 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋it 0.043 0.034 0.035 0.032 ‐2.599*** 0.283 0.000 0.031 2.109 10.216 12.811*** 
𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻it 0.114 0.088 0.089 0.087 0.394 0.890 0.002 0.091 2.008 9.283 12.874*** 
CFTAit 0.041 0.043 0.039 0.053 2.421** 1.835 ‐0.508 0.125 2.315 36.475 12.469*** 
DEBTit 0.377 0.373 0.380 0.358 ‐2.028** 1.261 0.007 0.192 0.510 4.013 7.796*** 
R&Dit 0.038 0.019 0.021 0.016 ‐0.669 1.078 0.000 0.064 6.273 75.285 15.21*** 
RELSit 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 2.822*** 0.033 0.000 0.003 4.850 34.775 15.224*** 
SIZEit (bn. €) 20.400 6.011 7.371 4.498 ‐8.059*** 376.000 0.183 38.600 4.267 26.461 15.339*** 
STDRETit 0.252 0.215 0.215 0.215 0.029 1.881 0.006 0.158 2.279 13.835 12.655*** 
Tangit 0.235 0.202 0.207 0.178 ‐2.979*** 0.880 0.009 0.155 1.006 3.753 10.778*** 
TURNOVERit 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.738 0.101 0.000 0.005 7.411 95.129 15.237*** 
 
                                                          
699 Source: Own representation. 
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IV.3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
IV.3.1. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MARKET-IMPLIED AND SIC-
BASED DIVERSIFICATION MEASURES 
Before investigating the diversification-performance linkage, this section 
examines the construct validity of the market-implied approach to the 
measurement of the diversification strategy. The validity of a construct refers to the 
extent to which it accurately reflects a specific domain of content without being 
confounded from other systematically varying constructs.700 A construct describes 
the initial concept or hypothesis and often cannot be directly observed. The 
construct needs to be inferred indirectly through observable measures, also called 
indicators. In the words of Carmines and Zeller (1979): “An indicator of some abstract 
concept is valid to the extent that it measures what it purports to measure.”.701 It is worth 
mentioning that it is rather the “interpretation of data arising from a specified procedure” 
that is validated than a property of a test.702 Put differently, validity gives the 
“truthfulness” of a construct about the purposes for which it is being used.703  
In validating the market implied diversification measures, this thesis 
concentrates on three dimensions of validity: content, construct, and criterion 
validity. 
IV.3.1.1. Content validity 
Content validity – also called face validity of an indicator – deals with the 
appropriate degree to which empirical measurement reflects the full range of the 
underlying concept regarding contextual aspects.704 Content validity is a qualitative 
type of validity which must be addressed primarily through theory rather than 
                                                          
700 Cp. Hoskisson et al., 1993, p. 217; Venkatraman & Grant, 1986, p. 78. 
701 Carmines & Zeller, 1979, p. 12. 
702 Cp. Cronbach, 1971, p. 447. 
703 Cp. Döring & Bortz, 2016, p. 446; Hartig et al., 2012, p. 144. 
704 Cp. Carmines & Zeller, 1979, p. 78; Hartig et al., 2012, p. 149; Maruyama & 
Ryan, 2014, p. 212. 
 
163 Value consequences of stock illiquidity on multi-business firms  
empirical tests.705 As there is no standard methodology for evaluating face validity, 
this thesis follows an earlier study in this field by focusing on two traditional 
domains of interest and the correspondence between these domains and the 
various diversification measures.706 The two domains are (i) the level of 
diversification and (ii) the type of diversification.  
As far as the face validity of business count measures is concerned, one would 
expect that the more SIC categories associated with a particular firm, the higher the 
level of diversification.707 However, business count measures have considerable 
limitations.708 Objections to the business count approach aim primarily at the SIC 
system that underlies most business count measures and their dependence on 
segment data.709 Three issues arise in the use of SIC codes:710  
The first relates to the inherent hierarchy of the SIC system and its limitations 
as an information source for identifying competitive interrelationships. The SIC 
system has been developed to facilitate the collection of data on the activity of the 
U.S. economy by the U.S. Bureau of the Census.711 The SIC system shall provide a 
precise representation of the economy and, therefore, rests on production data such 
as similarities in product-market attributes or patterns in the raw material usage.712 
These industry level differences, however, may provide an incomplete picture of 
the nature and the extent of strategic interrelationships inherent in a firm’s 
corporate portfolio.713 It is criticised that the classification procedure is not 
uniformly and consistently applied to all industries inducing a considerable 
amount of subjectivity and arbitrariness.714  
                                                          
705 Cp. Bollen, 1989, p. 185. 
706 Cp. Hoskisson et al., 1993, p. 217. 
707 Cp. Hoskisson et al., 1993, p. 217. 
708 Cp. Jansen, 2006, p. 103ff.; Wulf, 2007, p. 15. 
709 Cp. John & Harrison, 1999, p. 134f.; Nayyar, 1992, p. 223; Robins & Wiersema, 
1995, p. 280f.; Zechser & Rojahn, 2017, p. 458. 
710 Cp. Nocker et al., 2016, p. 200. 
711 Cp. Hall & John, 1994, p. 154; Pitts & Hopkins, 1982, p. 621. 
712 Cp. Montgomery, 1982, p. 299f.; Nocker et al., 2016, p. 200. 
713 Cp. Davis & Duhaime, 1992, p. 521; Davis & Thomas, 1990, p. 17; Markides & 
Williamson, 1994, p. 149. 
714 Cp. Montgomery, 1982, p. 300; Robins & Wiersema, 1995, p. 281. 
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The second issue concerns the internal consistency of the SIC system. In 
constructing the measure of relatedness, the taxonomy treats two-, three-, or four-
digit SIC levels as an underlying scale of relatedness with equal distances between 
adjacent SIC levels.715 This procedure requires two problematic assumptions which, 
in the case of non-compliance, cast doubt as to the validity of the business count 
measures:716 i) industries are considered homogenous within their respective 
categories and ii) the arithmetic values assigned to the distances between the SIC 
levels accurately reflect distinctions between these industry categories.717 Martin 
and Sayrak (2003) argue that the assumption about equal dissimilarity does not 
correctly reflect strategic interrelationships by using SIC industry levels 2600 
(Paper and Allied Products industry), 2700 (Printing and Publishing), and 2800 
(Chemicals and Allied Products).718 Although they are treated as if they were 
equidistant from one another, SIC codes 2600 and 2700 on the surface seem closely 
related, whereas SIC 2800 seems unrelated to the other industries. Likewise, the 
system might not accurately discriminate between different types of diversification 
(e.g. horizontal diversification versus vertical diversification).719  
The third issue associated with the use of business count measures refers to 
the failure of industrial classifications to adapt to new or emerging industries 
proactively.720 They are unable to determine the degree of diversification of 
companies that concurrently penetrate into new markets with new products since 
these activities have not been observed in the economy before.721 Consequently, 
SIC-based diversification measures fall short of capturing an essential element of 
diversification (i.e. penetration into new product-markets). 
Aside from the criticism which aims directly at the use of industrial 
taxonomies, business count measures are further criticised for their reliance on 
                                                          
715 Cp. Hall & John, 1994, p. 154; Nayyar, 1992, p. 223. 
716 Cp. Robins & Wiersema, 1995, p. 280. 
717 Cp. Knecht, 2014, p. 198; Rumelt, 1982, p. 360. 
718 Cp. Martin & Sayrak, 2003, p. 50. 
719 Cp. Fan & Lang, 2000, p. 630. 
720 Cp. Nocker et al., 2016, p. 200. 
721 Cp. Fey, 2000, p. 183f. 
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business line reporting.722 Building on segment data, they are likely to be exposed 
to the risk of strategic accounting.723 A firm may group multiple former 
independent business segments to avoid detailed information disclosures on 
separate business units in the presence of competitors so that they appear to 
perform more poorly than single segment firms in the same industry. Changes in 
segment reporting which represent non-substantive reporting changes rather than 
diversification events are an indication of this.724  
The market-based approach goes beyond the limitations of physical 
measures of diversification including, but not limited, to business count measures:  
First, the market-implied diversification measures employ secondary data 
and are based on a highly reliable approach which is free from human judgements. 
The objective process can be systematically reproduced such that researchers 
studying the same data sample will most likely end up with the same 
classifications. 
Second, market-implied measures incorporate interaction effects between 
different lines of operations caused by the existence of common production factors, 
some of which might be unobservable by nature (e.g. management skills). Notably, 
they do not require a somewhat arbitrary decision about how and where to 
separate activities (i.e., two-digit vs four-digit SIC codes).  
Third, data on traditional diversification measures is hard to obtain and 
might be distorted by strategic accounting causing spurious relations between the 
level and type of diversification. To avoid detailed information disclosures on 
separate segments in the presence of competitors, a firm may group multiple 
former independent business segments so that they appear to perform more poorly 
than single segment firms in the same industry. Alternatively, large reporting units 
may be created after an acquisition to reduce the danger of future goodwill write-
offs. Such effects are implicitly controlled when decomposing the Wall Street return 
to broad sector indices.  
Forth, market-implied measures determine the level and type of the 
diversification strategy already at the corporate level, whereas traditional measures 
                                                          
722 Cp. Erdorf et al., 2013, p. 199f.; Martin & Sayrak, 2003, p. 51f. 
723 Cp. Villalonga, 2004a, p. 482. 
724 Cp. Denis et al., 1997, p. 151f.; Hyland & Diltz, 2002, p. 58. 
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need to be aggregated to form an appropriate measure of corporate diversification. 
This requires two problematic assumptions – an algorithm to aggregate business 
level data and the certainty that top-level managers reveal their firm's lines of 
business in the annual report in the same way as they perceive and manage the 
business lines.  
IV.3.1.2. Construct validity 
Construct validity refers to the extent to which a measure connects with other 
measures that are deemed suitable for assessing the construct.725 It involves 
determining whether the measure has convergent validity and discriminant 
validity.726 To check whether a measure exhibits sufficient convergent and 
discriminant validity, this thesis investigates correlation coefficients and applies 
general structural equation models as in Hoskisson et al. (1993), Lubatkin et al. 
(1993), and Sambharya (2000).727 The data underlying these tests are based on the 
sample derived in section IV.2.1 
Table 19 reports summary statistics and Spearman rank correlation 
coefficients among the three business count measures (BDIV, H2DIV, H4DIV) and 
the three market-implied diversification measures (MCOUNT, MHDIV, MDIV). If 
the various diversification variables are measures of the same dimension, they 
should be strongly correlated with each other.728 
Following other studies in this field, the correlations within the measures of 
the same approach are strong and have a high level of statistical significance. By 
contrast, the correlation coefficients across the two approaches are around zero, 
and for most correlation coefficients p-values are not low enough to reject the null 
hypothesis of zero correlation; thereby suggesting a rather low level of convergent 
validity. 
                                                          
725 Cp. Hartig et al., 2012, p. 153; Wegener & Fabrigar, 2004, p. 161. 
726 Cp. Cohen et al., 2011, p. 187. 
727 Cp. Hoskisson et al., 1993, p. 215ff.; Lubatkin et al., 1993, p. 433ff.; Sambharya, 
2000, p. 163ff. 
728 Cp. Keats, 1988, p. 154. 
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Table 19: Convergent validity – Spearman rank correlations729 
Variable P50 max min sd BDIV H2DIV H4DIV MCOUNT MHDIV MDIV 
BDIV 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.449 1.000      
H2DIV 0.081 0.778 0.000 0.233 0.608*** 1.000     
H4DIV 0.383 0.851 0.000 0.263 0.777*** 0.704*** 1.000    
MCOUNT 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.421 0.033 0.033 0.038* 1.000   
MHDIV 0.478 0.851 0.000 0.256 0.037 ‐0.012 0.011 0.734*** 1.000  
MDIV 0.339 0.778 0.000 0.206 0.081*** 0.086*** 0.095*** 0.733*** 0.741*** 1.000 
 
                                                          
729 Source: Own representation. 
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To underpin the results from the Spearman rank correlation coefficients, 
factor analysis is performed on all continuous measures of diversification to test for 
unidimensionality.730 Table 20 presents the results from a factor analysis indicating 
a two-factor solution from a Promax rotation which accounts for 76.7% of the 
variance. The number of relevant factors is extracted using the Very Simple 
Structure Criterion (VSS). The VSS terminology is used to refer to the idea of 
reproducing the original correlation matrix by a simplified pattern matrix, in which 
only the highest loading for each item is retained, all other loadings are suppressed 
to zero.731 The Tucker-Lewis fit index is 0.992 and the RMSEA =0.047 indicating a 
good fit of the model.  
The first factor includes the market-implied diversification measures. Among 
them, MDIV has the lowest commonality which might indicate that MDIV 
comprises information that is not included in MCOUNT and MHDIV such as 
information about the degree to which equity risks are diversifiable in the capital 
market (r-squared). The second factor is formed by the business count measures 
BDIV, H2DIV, and H4DIV. Amongst them, H2DIV has got the lowest commonality 
which might be because the other two measures rely on four-digit SIC levels, 
whereas H2DIV refers to the two-digit SIC level. Again, there is no evidence for 
unidimensionality. 
  
                                                          
730 Cp. Venkatraman & Grant, 1986, p. 79. 
731 Cp. Revelle & Rocklin, 1979, p. 403ff. 
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Table 20: Results of factor analysis for three SIC-based continuous measures and three market-
implied measures732 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness 
BDIV  0.831 0.308 
H2DIV  0.742 0.451 
H4DIV  0.936 0.124 
MCOUNT ‐0.910  0.174 
MHDIV 0.945  0.110 
MDIV 0.873  0.232 
SS loadings 2.481 2.121  
Proportion Var 0.414 0.353  
Cumulative Var 0.414 0.767  
RMSEA 0.047   
Tucker‐Lewis 0.992   
Likelihood Chi‐Square 21.33***   
IV.3.1.3. Criterion validity 
Criterion validity concerns the relationship between the results being 
determined by the measure in question and some form of external criterion that is 
deemed to be another measure of the same variable.733 By the temporal availability 
of the external criteria, researchers distinguish between two subtypes of criterion 
validity. Concurrent validity concerns the measure’s ability to predict criteria 
obtained at the same point in time, whereas predictive validity is the measure’s 
ability to predict the future performance of the construct.734 As shareholder value 
or equivalently financial performance is the dominant criterion, using multiple 
measures of a performance construct might be a sufficient way to address the 
criterion validity of diversification measures.735 
Following prior research in this field (Hall and John (1994), Hoskisson et al. 
(1993), Keats (1990)), accounting-based performance is measured using three 
                                                          
732 Source: Own representation. 
733 Cp. Carmines & Zeller, 1979, p. 17f.; Schnell et al., 2013, p. 145 
734 Cp. Hoskisson et al., 1993, p. 220; Thyer, 2010, p. 56. 
735 Cp. Lubatkin et al., 1993, p. 436; Sambharya, 2000, p. 171. 
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different indicators: return on assets, on equity, and on sales.736 In addition to the 
accounting-based figures, three market-based performance measures are 
considered: the Sharpe and Treynor measures and Jensen’s alpha.737 As negative 
values for both the Sharpe ratio and the Treynor ratio cannot be interpreted 
meaningful, the ratios are floored at zero. All necessary fundamental firm data and 
required market data such as stock market returns and interest rates (necessary to 
calculate the Sharpe and Treynor measures) are collected from Thomson Reuters 
Eikon, Datastream and the Worldscope database. 
Table 21 shows the results of Spearman rank correlations between the 
diversification indices and firm performance measured both in terms of 
accounting-based performance and market-based performance. Prior research such 
as Hoskisson and Hitt (1990)738 suggests that diversification strategies harm 
financial performance. However, Table 21 finds only weak support for the 
predictive validity of all performance measures. Only three business count 
measures have a negative and significant relationship with one of the six 
performance measures. All other measures have mostly non-significant 
relationships, and their signs are often inverted.  
Table 22 presents the panel regression results for all diversification measures. 
As far as the traditional business count measures are concerned, a significant 
relationship is found only for the combination of H2DIV and ROS as well as H4DIV 
and Jensen’s alpha, in both cases indicating lower returns for diversified firms. The 
findings for the series of market-implied diversification measures are ambiguous 
and includes positive relationships as between MDIV and ROS, BDIV and Treynor 
index as well as Jensen index and negative relationships as between MHDIV and 
MDIV and the Treynor and Jensen indices. To summarise, there is only weak 
support for the predictive validity of the diversification measures.739  
                                                          
736 Cp. Hall & John, 1994, p. 155; Hoskisson et al., 1993, p. 223f.; Keats, 1990, p. 
65. 
737 For further reading on performance indicators, please see section II.4.2.1. 
738 Cp. Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990, p. 461ff. 
739 The low predictive validity is not a specific feature of this work but has 
already been established for other investigation periods and markets. See among 
others, Sambharya, 2000, p. 171. 
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Table 21: Predictive validity – Spearman rank correlations740 
The table presents the results of the correlations between the diversification measures and performance. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
     Spearman 
Variable P50 max min sd BDIV H2DIV H4DIV MCOUNT MHDIV MDIV 
ROA 0.000 0.603 ‐0.355 0.068 ‐0.010 0.013 0.012 0.017 0.014 0.030 
ROE ‐0.015 13.097 ‐2.244 0.509 0.011 0.028 0.021 0.041* 0.031 0.064*** 
ROS 0.002 15.876 ‐0.821 1.920 ‐0.068*** ‐0.045* ‐0.0560** 0.012 ‐0.001 0.012 
Sharpe 2.390 53.332 0.000 9.892 0.012 0.028 0.010 ‐0.032 ‐0.011 ‐0.043* 
Treynor 0.094 29.548 0.000 1.641 0.003 0.015 0.004 ‐0.030 ‐0.005 ‐0.058** 
Jensen 0.047 1.412 ‐3.305 0.331 0.006 0.008 0.003 ‐0.011 0.008 ‐0.024 
 
                                                          
740 Source: Own representation. 
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Table 22: Predictive validity – Fixed effects regression741 
The table summarises the results of two-way fixed effects regressions regressing the performance 
measures, each over one for the diversification measures as well as the debt ratio and firm size as 
control variables. The panel regression models have been fitted by “within estimation”. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses (Huber–White sandwich estimators).*, **, *** denote significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 














Return on asset (ROA) 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.004 -0.013 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.003) (0.013) (0.017) 
Hausman Test       
F-Stat. 5.812*** 5.789*** 5.819*** 5.783*** 5.795*** 5.814*** 
within R² 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.077 0.0771 0.077 
Return on asset (ROE) -0.063 -0.088 -0.162 0.008 -0.023 -0.141 
 (0.068) (0.075) (0.153) (0.013) (0.051) (0.087) 
Hausman Test       
F-Stat. 2.018** 1.941** 1.960** 1.965** 1.956** 2.173*** 
within R² 0.017 0.018 0.019 0.015 0.015 0.016 
Return on asset (ROS) 0.064 -0.344** -0.017 -0.113 0.329 1.018* 
 (0.139) (0.170) (0.230) (0.116) (0.493) (0.558) 
Hausman Test       
F-Stat. 2.974*** 2.975*** 2.969*** 2.970*** 2.960*** 2.972*** 
within R² 0.151 0.152 0.150 0.151 0.151 0.152 
Sharpe index 0.595 1.459 -0.603 0.201 -2.212 -1.688 
 (0.866) (1.267) (1.619) (0.518) (2.275) (2.869) 
Hausman Test       
F-Stat. 51.480*** 50.340*** 50.980*** 50.870*** 50.510*** 50.510*** 
within R² 0.229 0.230 0.229 0.229 0.229567 0.229 
Treynor index -0.050 -0.050 -0.069 0.032* -0.205** -0.213** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.053) (0.018) (0.083) (0.106) 
Hausman Test       
F-Stat. 23.790*** 23.470*** 23.380*** 23.520*** 23.480*** 24.000*** 
within R² 0.228 0.227 0.227 0.228006 0.230137 0.229 
Jensen index -0.135 -0.079 -0.408* 0.154* -0.688* -0.384 
 (0.109) (0.162) (0.215) (0.091) (0.359) (0.404) 
Hausman Test       
F-Stat. 16.520*** 16.440*** 16.570*** 16.680*** 16.480*** 16.780*** 
within R² 0.228 0.091 0.092 0.092 0.092 0.091 
                                                          
741 Source: Own representation. 
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IV.3.2. RE-ASSESSING THE DIVERSIFICATION-PERFORMANCE LINKAGE 
IV.3.2.1. Univariate results 
If corporate diversification affects a firm’s market valuation, significant 
differences in the traditional Berger and Ofek (1995) excess value measure for 
diversified and focused firms are to be expected. It should be noted that an excess 
value can be calculated for focused firms, too. The approach to estimating an excess 
firm value for focused firms is like the procedure applied to diversified firms except 
that that focused firms do only have one segment. In order to make a general 
statement about the impact of diversification on the Wall Street value, the 
differences in the mean excess value of diversified and focused firms are assessed 
using a Wilcoxon rank-sum test. For all diversification proxies but the multi-
segment dummies, the groups will be split by median. 
To back up hypothesis H1.1 and H1.2 with data, the excess value for 
diversified firms must be significantly lower than the excess value for focused 
firms. Table 23 presents the median values for the excess value of diversified and 
focused firms. Besides, it contains the number of observations of each group and 
the results of a Wilcoxon rank-sum test. The focus is on the median instead of 
arithmetic means because the median is more reliable when the negative average 
values are capped at -100%. For all business count measures 𝐻0, “the two 
subsamples are drawn from the same population”, is rejected at least at the 0.1 
level. On average, a multi-business firm is worth 13.7% to 19.1% less than a 
portfolio of comparable single segment firms. 
By contrast, MHDIV and MDIV imply a small but marginally significant 
diversification premium in favour of diversified firms. This can be an early 
indication that estimates based on the business count approach are downward 
biased.742 The coefficient of MCOUNT is not significant. 
 
                                                          
742 For further reading on the validity of the business count approach to 
diversification measurement, see section IV.3.1. 
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Table 23: Descriptive statistics on excess firm values for focused and diversified firms743 
The table presents the median values for the excess firm values of diversified and focused firms. 
Excess value is based on sales multiplier. The differences in the median are assessed using a two-
sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test. For all proxies except the diversified firm dummies BDIV and 
MCOUNT, the groups have been split by the median. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. 
Excess firm 
 value 
N Median Max Min SD Skewness Kurtosis Ho: diff = 0 
Panel (A): diversified firms 
BDIV 1,427 ‐0.152 1.384 ‐1.386 0.578 0.105 2.458 4.937*** 
H2DIV 990 ‐0.137 1.384 ‐1.386 0.590 0.096 2.402 1.809* 
H4DIV 990 ‐0.191 1.384 ‐1.386 0.563 0.184 2.552 5.961*** 
MCOUNT 1,525 0.022 1.383 ‐1.383 0.590 ‐0.050 2.378 0.034 
MHDIV 990 0.054 1.383 ‐1.383 0.606 ‐0.045 2.284 ‐1.839* 
MDIV 990 0.004 1.363 ‐1.383 0.585 ‐0.028 2.351 1.842* 
Panel (B): focused firms 
BDIV 554 0.000 1.138 ‐1.285 0.341 ‐0.819 5.914  
H2DIV 991 ‐0.002 1.285 ‐1.366 0.450 ‐0.324 3.593  
H4DIV 991 0.000 1.362 ‐1.347 0.477 ‐0.306 3.571  
MCOUNT 456 0.000 1.342 ‐1.299 0.525 0.081 3.034  
MHDIV 991 0.000 1.363 ‐1.299 0.542 ‐0.041 2.769  
MDIV 991 0.000 1.383 ‐1.361 0.564 ‐0.021 2.667  
 
Table 24 shows the yearly allocation of the sales-based excess firm value 
across the six diversification proxies. Notwithstanding a lack of significance of the 
yearly differences in median, the business count measure mostly direct at a 
valuation discount raging between 32.33% (H4DIV, 2008) and 4.28% (H2DIV, 2010). 
Over the observation period, the discount decreases from 18.52% to 6.43%. The 
standard deviation is similar to prior studies on the diversification discount.744 By 
contrast, the diversification premia and discounts using the market-implied 
diversification measures report are in balance. While the diversification discounts 
fall mostly in the first half of the observation period, the premia are detected from 
2013 onwards. Although not explicitly reported, the quota of diversified firms 
trading at a discount is relatively stable over time. 
                                                          
743 Source: Own representation 
744 For instance, Beckmann (2006) reports an average standard deviation of 68% 
for a German firm sample over the period 1998 to 2002. Cp. Beckmann, 2006, p. 99. 
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Table 24: Yearly allocation of diversification discount745 
The table presents summary statistics across all diversification measures and broken down by years. Excess value is based on sales multiplier. *, **, *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
EFV [%]  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Average 
BDIV             
 Median -19.86** -29.79*** -27.12** -7.33 -10.09 -15.07 -10.00 -13.54 -12.18* -6.43 -15.14 
 Min -134.31 -132.71 -136.58 -138.56 -127.22 -122.29 -126.75 -134.55 -126.03 -133.63 -131.26 
 Max 128.53 106.88 101.17 136.23 98.63 116.04 126.90 126.15 123.31 138.36 120.22 
 SD 54.59 55.32 57.74 57.70 58.95 56.42 56.25 58.69 56.58 62.48 57.47 
H2DIV             
 Median -19.29 -26.63** -27.12 -4.28 -12.42 -6.40 -9.27 -13.94 -12.21 -6.43 -13.80 
 Min -134.31 -132.71 -134.66 -138.56 -127.22 -122.29 -126.68 -134.55 -125.51 -133.63 -131.01 
 Max 117.03 106.88 101.17 136.23 98.63 116.04 125.43 126.15 123.31 138.36 118.92 
 SD 55.30 58.96 57.76 58.28 61.43 60.18 55.74 58.70 58.21 63.32 58.79 
H4DIV             
 Median -16.42 -32.33*** -29.96** -25.84*** -23.64*** -15.21 -10.00 -14.99 -15.55*** -6.43 -19.04 
 Min -134.31 -130.49 -136.58 -138.56 -127.22 -122.29 -126.75 -130.14 -126.03 -132.39 -130.48 
 Max 105.58 106.88 101.17 87.63 88.21 102.08 125.43 126.15 123.31 138.36 110.48 
 SD 53.64 54.02 56.16 56.12 58.36 54.16 53.55 58.65 54.86 61.18 56.07 
MCOUNT             
 Median 9.97 -0.91 -10.80 -0.42 -0.19 -8.31 4.73 16.26 -4.05 19.48 2.58 
 Min -134.83 -121.39 -128.68 -131.44 -138.32 -129.16 -136.08 -116.94 -130.63 -133.77 -130.12 
 Max 138.06 134.58 133.06 131.73 127.69 138.28 136.31 135.09 129.67 130.34 133.48 
                                                          
745 Source: Own representation. 
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EFV [%]  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Average 
 SD 61.57 60.10 57.06 55.47 56.91 62.25 57.37 54.69 59.18 59.55 58.41 
MHDIV             
 Median 12.78 7.40 -4.16 1.21 -0.19 -4.13 6.55 25.91** -1.33 19.90 6.39 
 Min -134.83 -111.07 -128.68 -131.44 -138.32 -123.96 -136.08 -88.10 -130.63 -133.77 -125.69 
 Max 138.06 134.58 133.06 131.73 110.32 138.28 116.23 135.09 129.67 130.34 129.74 
 SD 68.66 61.86 57.03 56.05 56.77 63.99 59.29 54.74 63.13 57.99 59.95 
MDIV             
 Median 7.83 -7.59 -9.19 -11.93 1.60 -10.12 4.81 19.26 -8.52 19.48 0.56 
 Min -134.83 -121.39 -128.68 -131.44 -138.32 -129.16 -97.57 -56.64 -112.88 -133.77 -118.47 
 Max 132.58 134.58 133.06 122.12 127.69 123.28 136.31 128.25 129.67 130.34 129.79 




IV.3.2.2. Multivariate results 
So far, the effect of diversification has been investigated in isolation without 
considering alternative explanatory approaches. When included, omitted variables 
can dramatically change the findings from research hypothesis H1.1 and H1.2 in 
different ways: The omitted variable could a) modify the direction or intensity of 
the relationship between diversification and excess value, or b) make an additional 
contribution to the diversification effect, or c) be the true explanatory variable itself. 
To further separate the impact of corporate diversification on the Wall Street value, 
several panel regression models are estimated. The next three steps guide through 
the analysis of the performance effects of corporate diversification using panel 
regression techniques. 
Panel regression analysis is performed to test hypothesis H1.1 and H1.2 while 
controlling for the influence of firm-specific variables. More specifically, EFV𝑖𝑡 is 
modeled as a linear function of L different firm-specific variables (𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡) other than 







 𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑛 +∑𝛽𝑗 ∗ 𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝐿
𝑗=1
+ 𝛽10 ∗ √𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡 + 𝑛𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 , 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝐻2𝐷𝐼𝑉,𝑀𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑉,𝑀𝐷𝐼𝑉
𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑛 +∑𝛽𝑗 ∗ 𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝐿
𝑗=1





Excess firm value of firm i at time t based on either 
the business count approach or market-implied 
approach, 
𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑛 = constant regression coefficients, 
𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡 = firm-specific control variables of firm i at time t,  
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 = proxy for corporate diversification of firm i at time t, 
𝑑𝑡 = unobservable time effects, 
𝑛𝑖 = unobservable individual effects, and 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 = stochastic disturbance term of firm i at time t. 
As the analysis can include observations for one and the same firm for 
different years, the error term is likely driven by unobservable time and individual 
effects, which are denoted by 𝑑𝑡 and 𝑛𝑖, respectively. 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the remainder stochastic 
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disturbance term, which may include both unobserved time and individual effects. 
It is set to have a mean of zero and a constant volatility (𝑢𝑖𝑡~𝐼𝐼𝐷(0, 𝜎
2)).746  
The selection of the appropriate diversification measures follows the 
guidelines and discussions in section II.3 and includes BDIV, H2DIV, and H4DIV 
as representatives of the business count approach and MCOUNT, MHDIV, and 
MDIV as measures of the market-implied approach. The regressions include all 
firm-specific variables discussed in section IV.2.3 and summarised in Table 25. The 
final sample consists of 1,981 yearly-observations on European non-financial firms 
between the years 2007 to 2016. The sample selection procedure is outlined in 
section IV.2.1. All calculations are performed in STATA 13. 
For the panel regression models to derive at the best linear unbiased 
estimators (BLUE) for the individual regression coefficients, the Gauss-Markov 
assumptions must be met.747 For this reason, the explanatory variables should not 
be highly correlated with each other, the error terms should have a constant 
variance, and the error terms should be both serially independent and cross-
sectionally independent. The testing procedures are briefly explained below. 
- Multicollinearity. Multicollinearity refers to a non-negligible, but not perfect, 
relationship between two or more explanatory variables.748 Although this 
does not negatively affect the reliability and predictive power of the 
regression model (no violation of the Gauss-Markov assumptions), 
multicollinearity likely increases the standard error of the estimates of the 
individual regression coefficient.749 In such a situation, predictors may be 
declared as insignificant, though they have a high impact on the criterion 
variable or vice versa. Testing for multicollinearity involves looking at 
                                                          
746 For further reading on panel data models, instead of many, see Hsiao, 2014, 
p. 1ff. 
747 Cp. Poddig et al., 2003, p. 245ff.; Wooldridge, 2016, p. 89ff. 
748 Cp. Brooks, 2008, p. 170f. 
749 Cp. Poddig et al., 2003, p. 377ff. 
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correlation coefficients or the estimation of variance inflation factors (VIF).750 
Multicollinearity is most likely to occur if the VIF exceeds ten.751 
- Heteroscedasticity. The panel regression model given by equation (40) assumes 
that the disturbances are homoscedastic with the same variance across time 
and individuals, in which case 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑥1𝑖𝑡, … , 𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡) = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 ∀ 𝑖, 𝑡.752 A lack of 
constancy in variance, also called heteroscedasticity, does not affect the 
consistency of the estimators753 but can lead to grossly deflated standard 
errors and inflated t-statistics.754 Various tests have been proposed to 
determine the presence of heteroskedasticity in the data, among the most 
popular methods is the Lagrange multiplier test by Breusch and Pagan 
(1979).755 The Breusch-Pagan test builds on an auxiliary regression where the 
squared residuals of the original model are regressed on the explanatory 
variables and a constant. The central idea behind the auxiliary regression is 
that if the regression coefficients of the control variables are equal, then the 
error term must have a constant variance. Under the null hypothesis, the 
Breusch-Pagan test asymptotically follows a chi-squared distribution with J 
degrees of freedom.756 In order to overcome the problem of 
heteroskedasticity, robust standard errors such as Huber-White or Driscoll-
Kraay (1998) standard errors, can be employed.757 
  
                                                          
750 Cp. Backhaus et al., 2018, p. 52f.; Verbeek, 2008, p. 43. 
751 Cp. Albers, 2009, p. 225. 
752 Cp. Auer & Rottmann, 2010, p. 516ff.; Baltagi, 2005, p. 79. 
753 Cp. Auer & Rottmann, 2010, p. 519; Wooldridge, 2013, p. 268f. 
754 Cp. Poddig et al., 2003, p. 323ff.; Verbeek, 2008, p. 86f. 
755 Cp. Breusch & Pagan, 1979, p. 1287ff.  
756 Cp. Auer & Rottmann, 2010, p. 523ff.; Verbeek, 2008, p. 99. 
757 Cp. Driscoll & Kraay, 1998, p. 549ff.; Huber, 1967, p. 221ff.; White, 1980, p. 
817ff. 
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Table 25: Definition of variables and predicted signs758 
Unless otherwise stated, the variables are calculated for each firm and year and allow for 






Traditional Berger and Ofek (1995) value measure for sample 




Traditional Berger and Ofek (1995) value measure for sample 
firm i based on the market‐implied approach. 
 
√ALTMAN′s Zit Square root of Altman’s (1968) Z‐score. + 
√CAPEXit Square root of a firm's capital expenditures over total assets. + 
√CASHit 
Square root of cash plus marketable securities scaled by total 
assets. 
+/‐ 
√CFTAit Square root of the flow to equity scaled by total assets. + 
√DEBTit 
Square root of the sum of the short‐ and long‐term financial 
debt scaled by the sum of the financial debt and book equity. 
+ 
√R&Dit 








Square root of the residual volatility which remains left when 
predicting a company’s stock returns by a well‐diversified 
market portfolio. The calculation is based on 125 trading 
days. 
‐ 
√TANG Square root of the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. + 
 
- Serial correlation. The regression model further assumes that the regression 
error terms are serially uncorrelated with one another over time, formally: 
𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟 (𝑢𝑡|𝑢𝑠) = 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑡 ≠ 𝑠.759 If consecutive residuals terms in a linear 
regression model are correlated, a phenomenon called autocorrelation, then 
standard errors can be underestimated which inflates significance tests and 
                                                          
758 Source: own representation. 
759 Cp. Wooldridge, 2013, p. 353 
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confidence intervals.760 To detect serial correlation, this study employs the 
Breusch-Godfrey / Wooldridge, which is an Lagrange multiplier test of the 
null hypothesis of no autocorrelation versus the alternative that 𝑢𝑡 follows an 
AR(p) or MA(p) process.761 As for heteroskedasticity, robust standard errors 
can be used to control for the negative influence of serially correlated 
disturbances including Huber-White or Driscoll-Kraay (1998) standard 
errors.762 
- Cross-sectional correlation. Aside from the unobserved firm effect (serial 
correlation), the disturbances of a given year may be correlated across 
different firms (time effect).763 Though many panel studies exhibit complex 
patterns of mutual dependence between the cross-sectional units, the 
problem of cross-sectional correlation is often neglected.764 In the presence of 
a time effect, standard ordinary least squares estimations do no longer 
produce unbiased standard errors and correctly sized confidence intervals. 
Driscoll and Kraay (1998) are among a few researchers who propose a 
method to obtain standard errors that are robust to both violations of the 
assumption of homoskedasticity and various forms of spatial and temporal 
dependence.765  
Table 26 presents summary statistics about the model assumptions and 
reveals that heteroscedasticity, serial correlation of errors, and cross-sectional 
correlation of errors are present in the data but no multicollinearity biases. To 
account for these violations of the BLUE properties, the significance tests of the 
regression coefficients rely on Driscoll and Kraay robust standard errors.766 Aside 
from the tests of model assumptions, a joint F-test of the year dummies shows that 
time fixed effects are not required when applying business count measures.  
                                                          
760 Cp. Auer & Rottmann, 2010, p. 540f. 
761 Cp. Breusch, 1978, p. 334ff.; Godfrey, 1978, p. 1293ff.; Wooldridge, 2013, p. 
422. 
762 Cp. Knecht, 2014, p. 251. 
763 Cp. Petersen, 2009, p. 435. 
764 Cp. Hoechle, 2007, p. 281f. 
765 Cp. Driscoll & Kraay, 1998, p. 549ff. 
766 Cp. Driscoll & Kraay, 1998, p. 549ff.; Hoechle, 2007, p. 281ff. 
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Table 26: Test of the model assumptions of the panel regressions767 
The table presents the results of the various tests of the model assumptions. 
 Method of testing Result 
 
▪ Test using variance 
inflation factors (VIF). 
▪ The variance inflation factors do not indicate critical 
multicollinearity which would most likely occur at 
values of 𝑉𝐼𝐹𝑚𝑎𝑥 ≫ 10. 
 
▪ Maximum VIFs for the business count approach and 
market-implied approach are 2.439 and 2.433, 
respectively. 
 
▪ Breusch-Pagan test 
 
▪ Null hypothesis (H0): 
Homoskedasticity 
▪ The null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is rejected 
on a high level of significance for all diversification 
measures  
 
▪ Breusch-Pagan test:  
- BDIV: BP = 123.45, df = 10, p<0.0001; 
H2DIV: BP = 64.497, df = 10, p<0.0001; 
H4DIV: BP = 61.401, df = 10, p<0.0001 
- MCOUNT: BP = 41.709, df = 10, p<0.0001; 
MHDIV: BP = 43.955, df = 10, p<0.0001; 
MDIV: BP = 39.824, df = 10, p<0.0001) 
 
▪ Breusch-Godfrey / 
Wooldridge test for 
serial correlation in 
panel models 
 
▪ Null hypothesis (H0): 
No serial correlation 
▪ Null hypothesis of no serial correlation in 
idiosyncratic errors is rejected on a high level of 
significance. 
 
▪ Breusch-Godfrey / Wooldridge test: 
- BDIV: chisq = 117.400, df = 1, p<0.0001; 
H2DIV: chisq = 117.480, df = 1, p<0.0001; 
H4DIV: chisq = 116.950, df = 1, p<0.0001 
- MCOUNT: chisq = 3.210, df = 1, p <= 
0.0732; MHDIV: chisq = 3.050, df = 1, p-
value <= 0.0808; MDIV: chisq = 2.902, df = 
1, p <= 0.0885 
 









▪ Null hypothesis is not rejected for both samples. 
Thus, cross-sectional dependence is not present. 
 
▪ Pesaran’s test: 
- BDIV: CD = 2.0861, p <= 0.0370; H2DIV: 
CD = 2.0962, p <= 0.0361; H4DIV: CD = 
2.029, p <= 0.0425 
- MCOUNT: CD = -2.2132, p = 0.02689; 
MHDIV: CD = -2.3237, p <= 0.0201; 
MDIV: CD = -2.323, p <= 0.0202 
 
▪ F-test for time 
individual effects. 
▪ Null hypothesis of no time fixed effects is rejected on 
a high level only for the market implied 
diversification measures  
- MCOUNT: F(9,342) = 9.319, p<0.0001; 
MHDIV: F(9,342) = 9.400, p<0.0001; 
MDIV: F(9,342) = 9.051, p<0.0001 
 
▪ No time fixed effects are needed when applying 
business count measures  
- BDIV: F(9,342) = 1.046, p>0.3744; H2DIV: 
F(9,342) = 1.083, p>0.4027; H4DIV: 
F(9,342) = 1.074, p>0.3815 
  
                                                          








Time fixed effects 
183 Value consequences of stock illiquidity on multi-business firms  
The results of the panel regression models are summarised in Table 27. The 
first column presents the base model (M0) which includes only the control variables 
and EFVit
B. The remaining columns (M1 to M6) correspond to the six models of 
regressing the standard Berger and Ofek (1995) excess firm value measure, each 
over one for the diversification measures and the control variables.  
The Hausman specification tests are rejected on a high level for all regression 
models suggesting a significant relationship between the individual effects and the 
remainder error term. The panel regression models are, thus, consistently 
estimated using the “within” transformation. They are overall highly significant 
with F-values raging between F = 6.663, p < 0.001 to F = 8.378, p<0.001. The 
regressions M0 to M3 explain approximately half of the variance in the excess firm 
value measures (adjusted R2 between 0.540 and 0.541), while models M4 to M6 
accounts for more than two-half of the variation in excess firm value (adjusted R2 
between 0.670 and 0.671). 
After controlling for influences other than diversification, a marginally 
significant relationship remains for all diversification measures but MDIV0.5 (model 
M6). However, their signs are inconclusive: According to the business count 
approach, corporate diversification may be considered a value increasing strategy, 
whereas an inverse relationship applies for MCOUNT and MHDIV0.5.768 
Notwithstanding the lack of significance, the sign of MDIV directs at a 
diversification discount, too. As the regression results are considered more robust, 
there are strong reasons to suggest that, at best, corporate diversification does not 
lead to substantial reductions in excess firm value (three positive signs vs two 
negative signs); thereby rejecting hypotheses H1.1 and H1.2. 
In view of the control variables, the signs of the regression coefficients for the 
firm-specific variables mostly meet the theoretical implications. Table 27, for 
instance, shows that an increase in the square-root of Altman’s Z, CAPEX, and 
CASH, as well as the natural logarithm of SIZE is associated with higher excess 
firm values (p < 0.1, two-tailed), which is consistent with theory. Furthermore, the 
square root of STDRET is negatively related to the excess firm value which, again, 
is consistent with the predictions derived in section IV.2.3.   
                                                          
768 For an overview on the predicted signs on the diversification variables when 
corporate diversification is an value-decreasing strategy, see Table 17. 
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Table 27: Determinants of excess value – fixed effects regressions769 
The table presents the results of the panel regression models. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses (Driscoll and Kraay robust standard errors). *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 














DIVit  0.032* 0.093** 0.083** -0.043* 0.147* 0.121 
  (0.016) (0.034) (0.035) (0.021) (0.078) (0.101) 
√ALTMAN′s Zit 0.037* 0.037* 0.036* 0.036* 0.035** 0.035** 0.035** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
√CAPEXit 0.568*** 0.553*** 0.539*** 0.553*** 0.123 0.120 0.113 
 (0.147) (0.143) (0.151) (0.145) (0.236) (0.238) (0.238) 
√CASHit 0.257** 0.252** 0.247** 0.255** 0.427*** 0.429*** 0.426*** 
 (0.093) (0.094) (0.093) (0.090) (0.111) (0.109) (0.110) 
√CFTAit -0.060 -0.058 -0.061 -0.059 -0.251** -0.251** -0.253** 
 (0.062) (0.063) (0.063) (0.064) (0.105) (0.106) (0.106) 
√DEBTit 0.024 0.017 0.013 0.017 0.186 0.185 0.184 
 (0.170) (0.172) (0.172) (0.174) (0.228) (0.229) (0.228) 
√R&Dit 0.393 0.352 0.343 0.347 0.611 0.600 0.595 
 (0.322) (0.337) (0.325) (0.331) (0.415) (0.406) (0.410) 
ln SIZEit 0.113** 0.110** 0.101* 0.105* 0.184*** 0.182*** 0.182*** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.048) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) 
√STDRET -0.393*** -0.391*** -0.384*** -0.392*** -0.393** -0.393** -0.387** 
 (0.050) (0.051) (0.050) (0.051) (0.135) (0.135) (0.134) 
√TANG -0.767** -0.770** -0.767** -0.781** -0.479** -0.485** -0.487** 
 (0.308) (0.308) (0.318) (0.313) (0.167) (0.167) (0.165) 
CONSTANT -1.684* -1.651* -1.500 -1.569 -2.607*** -2.786*** -2.754*** 
 (0.840) (0.850) (0.861) (0.885) (0.771) (0.773) (0.803) 
FIRM FIXED 
EFFECTS 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YEAR FIXED 
EFFECTS 
NO NO NO YES YES YES YES 
OBSERVATIONS 1,981 1,981 1,981 1,981 1,981 1,981 1,981 
NUMBER OF ID 343 343 343 343 343 343 343 
R-SQUARED 0.621 0.621 0.622 0.622 0.731 0.731 0.730 
ADJ. R-SQUARED 0.540 0.540 0.541 0.540 0.671 0.671 0.670 
F-TEST 7.385*** 6.663*** 6.897*** 6.718*** 8.378*** 8.298*** 8.193*** 
HAUSMAN 46.733*** 52.773*** 53.111*** 58.238*** 76.631*** 78.613*** 74.958*** 
  
                                                          
769 Source: Own representation. 
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IV.3.2.3. Robustness checks 
To further reinforce the results of the univariate and multivariate regression 
models, robustness checks concerning the time-varying impacts of diversification 
on excess value, linearity assumptions, and endogeneity biases are conducted. 
Among others, Dimitrov and Tice (2006), Kuppuswamy and Villalonga 
(2016), Yan (2006), and Yan et al. (2010) acknowledge that the state of the economy 
in the business cycle significantly influences the intrinsic value of corporate 
diversification.770 There are strong reasons to believe that diversified firms benefit 
from their relatively lower cash flow volatility during times of economic crisis 
(‘more-money’ effect), which enables them to maintain their desired level of 
external financing.771 As the sample period covers the recent financial crisis, 
controlling for the economic environment can provide additional insights into the 
diversification-performance linkage. To assess whether excess firm values respond 
asymmetrically to changes in the economic environment, equation (40) is modified 












𝛽0 +∑𝛽𝑗 ∗ 𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝐿
𝑗=1
+ 𝛽10 ∗ √𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑔𝑡 + 𝛽11 ∗ √𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝑔𝑡) + 𝑑𝑡 + 𝑛𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡
 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝐻2𝐷𝐼𝑉,𝑀𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑉,𝑀𝐷𝐼𝑉
𝛽0 +∑𝛽𝑗 ∗ 𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝐿
𝑗=1
+ 𝛽10 ∗ 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11 ∗ 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 ∗ (1 − 𝑔𝑡) + 𝑑𝑡 + 𝑛𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵𝐷𝐼𝑉,𝑀𝐶𝑂𝑈𝑁𝑇,𝐻4𝐷𝐼𝑉
 (41) 
  
                                                          
770 Cp. Dimitrov & Tice, 2006, p. 1465ff.; Kuppuswamy & Villalonga, 2016, p. 
905ff.; Yan, 2006, p. 5ff.; Yan et al., 2010, p. 103ff. 
771 Rojahn & Zechser, 2017, p. 17. 
 Florian Zechser, M.A. 186 
where: 
EFV𝑖𝑡 = 
Excess firm value of firm i at time t based on either the 
business count approach or market-implied approach, 
𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑛 = constant regression coefficients, 
𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡 = firm-specific control variables of firm i at time t,  
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 = proxy for corporate diversification of firm i at time t, 
𝑔𝑡 = 
Economic indicator variable with a value of one if the 
performance of the EURO STOXX 50 Total Return index is 
positive and zero otherwise. 
𝑑𝑡 = unobservable time effects, 
𝑛𝑖 = unobservable individual effects, and 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 = stochastic disturbance term of firm i at time t. 
The results of the adjusted panel regression model as shown in Table 28 
mostly confirm previous findings by, among others Dimitrov and Tice (2006) and 
Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2016), who argue that corporate diversification is 
(most) effective when the market conditions worsen as it gives firms both financing 
and investment advantages.772 The level of the regression coefficient on H2DIV0.5 is 
higher when market conditions are negative in terms of market returns than when 
they are positive. Likewise, the levels of the regression coefficients for MHDIV0.5 
and MDIV0.5 are lower in falling markets than in rising markets. Although the 
results for H4DIV point in principle to an increase in value through diversification, 
the estimates are reliable only in a positive market environment. By contrast, 
MCOUNT directs at a significant and negative association of diversification on 
performance in falling markets.  
In terms of the diversification-performance linkage, the findings do not allow 
for a more differentiated view on the net effects of corporate diversification on 
excess firm value compared to the panel regression models discussed in the 
previous chapter.773 Again, the regression coefficients of the business count 
approach suggest an overall positive relationship, whereas the opposite is true for 
the market-implied diversification measures.  
                                                          
772 Cp. Dimitrov & Tice, 2006, p. 1465ff.; Kuppuswamy & Villalonga, 2016, p. 
905ff. 
773 For an overview about the findings of the panel regression models on the 
diversification-performance linkage, see Table 27. 
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Table 28: Interaction effects – corporate diversification and macroeconomic conditions774 
The panel regression models have been fitted by “within estimation”. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses (Driscoll and Kraay robust standard errors). *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively.  














DIVit ∗ 𝑔 0.028 0.081* 0.084** -0.034 0.157** 0.188*** 
 (0.016) (0.038) (0.033) (0.022) (0.060) (0.058) 
DIVit ∗ (1 − 𝑔) 0.044 0.133** 0.077 -0.063** 0.133** 0.167** 
 (0.037) (0.059) (0.073) (0.028) (0.053) (0.060) 
√ALTMAN′s Zit 0.037* 0.037* 0.036* 0.031** 0.031** 0.031** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
√CAPEXit 0.550*** 0.538*** 0.554*** 0.547*** 0.543** 0.536** 
 (0.140) (0.152) (0.142) (0.168) (0.168) (0.171) 
√CASHit 0.251** 0.243** 0.255** 0.249** 0.258** 0.255** 
 (0.093) (0.094) (0.092) (0.084) (0.084) (0.086) 
√CFTAit -0.055 -0.058 -0.060 -0.286* -0.290* -0.291* 
 (0.060) (0.063) (0.062) (0.135) (0.136) (0.134) 
√DEBTit 0.023 0.023 0.016 0.197 0.192 0.191 
 (0.163) (0.162) (0.168) (0.237) (0.237) (0.237) 
√R&Dit 0.370 0.369 0.343 0.601 0.574 0.576 
 (0.338) (0.328) (0.331) (0.344) (0.358) (0.363) 
ln SIZEit 0.112** 0.102** 0.105* 0.097*** 0.096*** 0.098*** 
 (0.042) (0.043) (0.047) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) 
√STDRET -0.410*** -0.410*** -0.388*** -0.187*** -0.183** -0.179** 
 (0.075) (0.065) (0.073) (0.057) (0.057) (0.059) 
√TANG -0.764** -0.763** -0.782** -0.824*** -0.824*** -0.825*** 
 (0.296) (0.307) (0.307) (0.156) (0.154) (0.154) 
CONSTANT -1.688* -1.530* -1.564 -1.275* -1.472** -1.540** 
 (0.760) (0.793) (0.855) (0.601) (0.592) (0.579) 
FIRM FIXED EFFECTS YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YEAR FIXED EFFECTS NO NO NO NO NO NO 
OBSERVATIONS 1,981 1,981 1,981 1,981 1,981 1,981 
NUMBER OF ID 342 342 342 342 342 342 
R-SQUARED 0.622 0.623 0.622 0.716 0.716 0.716 
ADJ. R-SQUARED 0.539 0.541 0.540 0.654 0.654 0.654 
F-TEST 6.113*** 6.380*** 6.111*** 5.237*** 5.301*** 5.276*** 
  
                                                          
774 Source: Own representation. 
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As a second robustness check, the influence of a non-linear relationship 
between corporate diversification and excess firm value is investigated. Therefore, 
the thesis allows the slopes of the regression model to change at three different 
points:  
𝐷𝐼𝑉10𝑖𝑡 = {
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡, 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 < 0.10




0.10 ≤ 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 < 0.25
0,
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 − 0.10, 
0.15, 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 > 0.25
 (43) 
𝐷𝐼𝑉25𝑖𝑡 = {
0, 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 < 0.25
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 − 0.25, 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 ≥ 0.25
(44) 
For instance, when the level of corporate diversification as determined by 
H2DIV equals 0.27, then one would have H2DIV10 = 0.10, H2DIV1025=0.15, and 
H2DIV25 = 0.02. The theoretical justification for these cutoff points is rather weak 
and is inspired by the international financial reporting standard (IFRS) 8 that 
requires an entity to report separate information about an operating segment when 
the segment has 10% or more of the combined assets of all operating segments. 
Analogous to the other variables in this study, the slope variables are 
transformed using the square-root procedure. As H2DIV10, H4DIV10, H4DIV1025, 
MHDIV10, MHDIV1025, MDIV10, MDIV1025 are negatively skewed, their 
distribution is turned to positive skew before applying the square root 
transformation. Due to the displacement of the distribution function, the expected 
signs are reversed as for MHDIV0.5 and MDIV0.5. The binary variables are excluded 
from the regression analysis as they, by construction, do not allow to distinguish 
between different levels of diversification. 
The estimated coefficients for the various diversification levels and their 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are shown in Table 29. For reasons of 
simplicity, only the coefficients for the diversification measures are printed. Again, 
they do not support the hypothesis of a negative influence of corporate 
diversification on firm value because they all lack significance except for H2DIV10 
and MDIV25, both indicating significant gains to diversification up to a level of 
least 10% and above 25%, respectively.  
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Overall, the coefficient of determination R2 increases only marginally due to 
the building of three diversification classes which underpins the notion that, at best, 
corporate diversification does not influence the market value of a firm. 
 
Table 29: Determinants of excess value – non-linear relationship775 
The table presents the results of the panel regression models with different slope points of the 
diversification measures. Robust standard errors are in parentheses (Driscoll and Kraay robust 
standard errors). *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 










DIVit10 -3.178*** -1.435 0.053 0.546 
 (0.771) (1.511) (2.062) (0.787) 
DIVit1025 -0.096 -0.572 0.358 0.525 
 (0.157) (1.230) (1.278) (0.601) 
DIVit25 -0.131 -0.098 -0.031 0.066* 
 (0.104) (0.071) (0.056) (0.034) 
CONTROL VARIABLES YES YES YES YES 
FIRM FIXED EFFECTS YES YES YES YES 
YEAR FIXED EFFECTS NO NO YES YES 
OBSERVATIONS 1,981 1,981 1,981 1,981 
NUMBER OF ID 343 343 343 343 
R-SQUARED 0.624 0.623 0.731 0.731 
ADJ. R-SQUARED 0.542 0.540 0.671 0.671 
F-TEST 6.30*** 5.78*** 7.60*** 7.600*** 
 
To investigate further, this thesis refers to the observation in Campa and 
Kedia (2002) and Villalonga (2004b) that the same characteristics that cause a firm 
to choose to diversify may also cause it to be discounted – a phenomenon often 
called “endogeneity bias” in the literature.776 Given that the remainder disturbance 
term and the diversification dummy are not independent of each other 
(endogeneity bias: cov(x,u_it)≠0), commonly used panel estimators, such as a 
within-transformation are no longer suitable. Any failure to control for the 
                                                          
775 Source: Own representation. 
776 Cp. Campa & Kedia, 2002, p. 1746ff.; Villalonga, 2004b, p. 6ff. 
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endogeneity of the diversification decision can lead to incorrect inferences about 
the effect of corporate diversification on excess firm value.777  
To control for potential endogeneity bias, regression model (40) is re-
estimated using a two-stage least squares instrumental variable regression that 
removes the unobserved variable from the error term by introducing instruments 
to the regression problem.778 The selection of an appropriate set of instrument 
variables is not an easy task as the natural instruments for the diversification 
proxies in terms of observed firm characteristics are already included in the excess 
firm value equation, causing the system to be unidentified. Following Campa and 
Kedia (2002) favourable instrument variables are not correlated with the remainder 
error term 𝑢𝑖𝑡 but have a significant relationship with the diversification proxy.779 
If the instruments exhibit only a poor correlation with the endogenous 
diversification regressor, the instrumental variable estimator can be very poor in 
the sense that standard errors are misleading and hypothesis tests are unreliable.780 
Aside from any firm characteristic that might affect a firm’s decision to diversify, 
the natural logarithms of both the annual volume of completed mergers and 
acquisitions as well as the number of completed transactions are used as 
instrument variables.781 These variables are deemed to capture the overall 
attractiveness of a given industry to diversification. 
The results of the two-stage least squares instrumental variable regression are 
summarised in Table 30 showing that the panel regression results presented in 
Table 27 are not subject to an endogeneity bias. At first glance, the set of instrument 
variables appears to be valid because they are appropriately uncorrelated with the 
disturbance process as indicated by Hansen J statistic (orthogonality condition). 
However, a more general approach for testing the relevance of the instrument 
variables suggested by Kleibergen and Paap (2006) implies that the matrix is rank 
deficient meaning that the equation is underidentified.782 In this study, a slightly 
                                                          
777 Cp. Martin & Sayrak, 2003, p. 45; Verbeek, 2008, p. 140. 
778 Cp. Verbeek, 2008, p. 154f. 
779 Cp. Campa & Kedia, 2002, p. 1747. 
780 Cp.Verbeek, 2008, p. 156. 
781 Cp. Rojahn & Zechser, 2017, p. 18. 
782 Cp. Kleibergen & Paap, 2006, p. 97ff. 
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modified version of Kleibergen-Paap (2006) test procedure is used to account for 
non-independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) errors (hereafter Kleibergen-Paap 
statistic). The null hypothesis of the Kleibergen-Paap statistic is that the equation is 
underidentified and cannot be rejected at convenient significance levels (10%, 5%, 
and 1%) for all but two of the instrument variable regressions. Notwithstanding the 
limited power of the instrument variables, the endogeneity test reveals that the 
diversification variables can be treated as exogenous in order to derive consistent 
estimates. 
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Table 30: Two-stage least squares instrumental variable regression – determinants of corporate 
diversification783 
The table presents the results of the two-stage least squares instrumental variable regression. Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses (Huber–White sandwich estimators). *, **, *** denote significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  














DIVit -0.767 -1.512 -1.475 -0.296 1.532 1.316 
 (0.599) (1.337) (1.170) (0.911) (3.817) (3.997) 
√ALTMAN′s Zit 0.034*** 0.044*** 0.041*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 0.034*** 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
√CAPEXit 0.920* 1.030* 0.826* 0.228 0.265 0.189 
 (0.480) (0.597) (0.457) (0.499) (0.521) (0.409) 
√CASHit 0.355* 0.416 0.289 0.424** 0.447** 0.414** 
 (0.196) (0.259) (0.188) (0.166) (0.176) (0.169) 
√CFTAit -0.109 -0.042 -0.071 -0.228 -0.215 -0.233* 
 (0.136) (0.159) (0.136) (0.141) (0.154) (0.131) 
√DEBTit 0.204 0.208 0.148 0.187 0.175 0.165 
 (0.219) (0.260) (0.196) (0.146) (0.154) (0.163) 
√R&Dit 1.364 1.196 1.211 0.759 0.737 0.689 
 (0.881) (0.937) (0.809) (0.657) (0.574) (0.502) 
ln SIZEit 0.178** 0.312* 0.251** 0.207** 0.204** 0.206** 
 (0.074) (0.184) (0.121) (0.098) (0.080) (0.093) 
√STDRET -0.442*** -0.544*** -0.423*** -0.461* -0.499 -0.444** 
 (0.100) (0.172) (0.095) (0.256) (0.305) (0.205) 
√TANG -0.706* -0.766* -0.530 -0.463 -0.516 -0.538 
 (0.386) (0.431) (0.414) (0.364) (0.384) (0.403) 
FIRM FIXED EFFECTS YES YES YES YES YES YES 
YEAR FIXED EFFECTS NO NO NO YES YES YES 
OBSERVATIONS 1,934 1,934 1,934 1,934 1,934 1,934 
NUMBER OF ID 296 296 296 296 296 296 
AIC 1774.097 2285.284 1803.566 1069.286 1183.479 1020.196 
BIC 1829.771 2340.958 1859.239 1175.066 1289.259 1125.976 
KLEIBERGEN-PAAP LM 
STATISTIC 
6.670** 3.155 6.303** 1.170 1.098 1.706 
HANSEN J STATISTIC 0.284 0.181 0.314 0.069 0.004 0.072 
MOD. DURBIN WATSON 
STATISTIC 
2.271 2.420 2.282 0.104 0.169 0.116 
  
                                                          
783 Source: Own representation. 
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IV.3.3. DOES LIQUIDITY INFLATE THE DIVERSIFICATION-
PERFORMANCE RELATIONSHIP? 
So far, the relationship between corporate diversification and excess firm 
value has been modeled using a one-stage regression approach between a set of 
independent firm-specific and liquidity-specific variables (X) on the one hand and 
excess firm value (Y) on the other hand, including conditions under which X can 
be considered a possible cause of Y.784 The standard mediation approach in social 
science represents the addition of a mediator variable M in the causal sequence 
between X and Y, whereby X causes M which in turn causes Y.785 Mediators can 
provide substantive interpretations of the nature of the relationship between X and 
Y even if X and Y are not associated.786  
Figure 9 shows a standard three-variable non-recursive causal model, where 
rectangles represent the variables X, M, and Y and the arrows characterise the 
relationship between them. In the language of path analysis, c’ quantifies the direct 
effect of X on Y adjusted for M, whereas a and b refer to the relation of X on M and 
M on Y adjusted for X, respectively. The total effect of X on Y is the sum of the direct 
effect c’ and the indirect effect a*b. The indirect effect means “the amount by which 
two cases who differ by one unit on X are expected to differ on Y through X’s effect on M, 






Figure 9: Simple mediation model.788 
                                                          
784 Cp. equation (40). 
785 Cp. MacKinnon et al., 2007, p. 595. 
786 Cp. Hayes, 2009, p. 413; Zhao et al., 2010, p. 199f. For a dinstinction between 
indirect and mediating relationships, see Mathieu & Taylor, 2006, p. 1037ff. 
787 Hayes, 2009, p. 409. 
788 Source: own representation based on Fritz & MacKinnon, 2007, p. 234; 
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The most widely-used method to testing intervening variable effects is the 
causal steps approach outlined in the classical work “The moderator-mediator variable 
distinction in social psychological research: conceptual, strategic, and statistical 
considerations” by Baron and Kenny (1986).789 Their causal steps approach is based 
on the sequential estimation of a series of relationships among the independent 
variable, the mediator, and the dependent variable:790 
𝑀 = 𝑖3 + 𝑎𝑋 + 3 (45) 
𝑌 = 𝑖1 + 𝑐𝑋 + 1 (46) 
𝑌 = 𝑖2 + 𝑐
′𝑋 + 𝑏𝑀 + 2 (47) 
where: 
𝑖1… 𝑖3 = intercepts, 
𝑐 = 
coefficient relating the independent and dependent 
variable, 
𝑐′ = 
coefficient relating the independent and dependent 
variable adjusted for the effect of M, 
𝑏 = 
coefficient relating the mediator and dependent 
variable adjusted for the effect of X, 
𝑎 = 
coefficient relating the independent and mediator 
variable, 
𝑋 = independent variable, 
𝑌 = dependent variable, and 
𝑀 = mediator. 
 
To establish that an independent variable affects a distal dependent variable 
through a mediator, it must now hold that (i) the independent variable X 
significantly affects the hypothesized mediator M in the first equation, (ii) the 
independent variable X significantly relates to the dependent variable Y in the 
second equation, and (iii) the mediator has a significant effect on the dependent 
                                                          
789 Cp. Baron & Kenny, 1986, p. 1173ff. 
790 Cp. MacKinnon et al., 2007, p. 598. 
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variable in the third equation while the effect of the independent variable on the 
dependent variable must be substantially less than in the second effect.791  
Regardless of its widespread use in social science and psychological 
research,792 the causal steps approach is criticised heavily on multiple grounds.793 
Objections aim primarily at the low statistical power of the causal steps approach 
(or equivalently the requirement for large data samples)794 and the use of the Sobel 
(1982, 1986) z-test to infer the existence of an indirect effect795. The major drawback 
of Sobel’s (1982, 1986) z-test is that for an accurate estimation of the standard error 
of the mediated effect, the distribution of the indirect effect needs to be normal.796 
However, the sampling distribution tends to be positively skewed with a shorter, 
fatter tail to the left.797 
This study deviates from the causal steps approach in three aspects: First, it 
explicitly acknowledges that for stock liquidity to mediate the effect of 
diversification on firm value, all that matters is that the indirect effect is significant. 
Second, to avoid making assumptions about the shape of the sampling distribution 
of the indirect effect, this study follows the advice by, among others, Hayes (2009) 
and Zhao et al. (2010) and implements a bootstrap test instead of using the Sobel z-
test to make statistical inferences about the indirect effect.798 The number of 
bootstrap resamples is set to 5,000. Third, the assumption that equations (45) to (47) 
are independent is rejected in favour of a structural equation approach (SEM) fitted 
by ‘maximum likelihood’ using the gsem command in STATA 13.799  
                                                          
791 Cp. Baron & Kenny, 1986, p. 1176f. 
792 As of December 2018, the Baron and Kenny’s (1986) article has been cited 
more than 35,000 times according to the Web of Science Core Collection index. 
793 Cp. Hayes, 2009, p. 410f.; Zhao et al., 2010, p. 198ff. 
794 Cp. Fritz & MacKinnon, 2007, p. 237; MacKinnon et al., 2002, p. 94ff. 
795 Cp. Zhao et al., 2010, p. 202. 
796 Cp. Zhao et al., 2010, p. 202. 
797 Cp. Bollen & Stine, 1990, p. 129ff.; Stone & Sobel, 1990, p. 343ff. 
798 Cp. Hayes, 2009, p. 411f.; Zhao et al., 2010, p. 204. 
799 For further reading on structural equation models to test for mediating 
patterns, instead of many, see Iacobucci, 2008, p. 17ff. 
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To answer liquidity hypothesis H.2 “The relationship between corporate 
diversification and firm value is mediated by stock liquidity”, twelve multilevel 
mediation models (‘1-1-1’ multilevel mediation model), one for each diversification 
measure and liquidity measure (bid-ask spread: M1 to M6, turnover: M7 to M12) 
are estimated. By contrast to the standard panel models, STDRET is deliberately 
omitted. Based on the explanations in the third chapter, it is expected that the 
effects of information availability will be expressed implicitly through the liquidity 
of traded equity. The primary results and conclusions, however, are robust to this 
modification as indicated in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2.  
The results of the basic multilevel mediation models are summarised in Table 
31 and Table 32. In the first step, the results of models M1 to M6 are discussed. 
Because increasing bid-ask spreads approximate decreasing liquidity, negative 
coefficients for path a and path b indicate a higher liquidity level and a higher firm 
valuation, respectively. Please note that due to variable transformation, an inverse 
relationship holds for models M5 and M6. 
After controlling for the mediating effects of liquidity, the mean indirect 
effect from bootstrapping is significant and positive for all models.800 As 
hypothesised by the information-diversification hypothesis, information 
asymmetries between outside investors and the management of the firm are less 
severe in diversified firms, as indicated by the highly significant regression 
coefficients for the path a (EFVit ← lnRELSit), which in turn provide for an increase 
in firm value through a liquidity effect (path b: ln RELSit ← DIVit).  
For models M1 (BDIV) and M3 (H4DIV), the direct effects are also highly 
significant at the 1 percent level. Their negative coefficients suggest that adjusted 
for the effects of liquidity, diversified firms have a lower market valuation than 
their focused counterparts. The remaining and significant direct effects can be an 
indicator for omitted mediators in the direct path, some of which are discussed in 
section II.4 (e.g. corporate level cash flows). Notwithstanding a lack of significance, 
the coefficients for the market-implied diversification measures suggest a 
diversification premium after adjusting for stock liquidity.   
                                                          
800 A negative sign for models M5 and M6 means a positive effect due to 
transformation. 
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Table 31: Mediating effects of bid-ask spreads on the diversifications effect with asymmetry801 
The multilevel mediation models (1-1-1) have been fitted by ‘maximum likelihood’ using the gsem 
command in STATA 13. Robust standard errors are in parentheses (Huber–White sandwich 
estimators). Bootstrap results for indirect effects based on 5000 simulations. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  














Direct effect (c’) -0.066*** -0.036 -0.178*** 0.011 -0.172 -0.100 
 (0.022) (0.036) (0.04) (0.028) (0.114) (0.15) 
Indirect effect (a*b) 0.007* 0.015*** 0.012* 0.029*** -0.106*** -0.220*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.026) (0.039) 
Total effect (c’+a*b) -0.059*** -0.020 -0.166*** 0.040 -0.278** -0.320** 
 (0.022) (0.036) (0.041) (0.029) (0.115) (0.153) 
Path a: 𝐥𝐧𝐑𝐄𝐋𝐒𝐢𝐭 ← 𝐃𝐈𝐕𝐢𝐭 
 -0.002* -0.004*** -0.003* -0.006*** 0.021*** 0.044*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) 
Path b: 𝐄𝐅𝐕𝐢𝐭 ← 𝐥𝐧𝐑𝐄𝐋𝐒𝐢𝐭 
 -3.546*** -3.552*** -3.559*** -5.040*** -4.975*** -5.019*** 
 (0.567) (0.568) (0.565) (0.620) (0.620) (0.621) 
Control variables: 𝐥𝐧𝐄𝐅𝐕𝐢𝐭 ← 𝐗𝐢𝐭 
√ALTMAN′s Zit 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.060*** 0.090*** 0.090*** 0.090*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
√CAPEXit -0.605** -0.615** -0.650*** -0.304 -0.313 -0.307 
 (0.242) (0.243) (0.242) (0.263) (0.263) (0.263) 
√CASHit -0.314*** -0.313*** -0.327*** -0.262** -0.259** -0.262** 
 (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) 
√CFTAit 0.355*** 0.364*** 0.355*** 0.586*** 0.582*** 0.589*** 
 (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) 
√DEBTit 0.143 0.147 0.133 -0.051 -0.054 -0.051 
 (0.138) (0.138) (0.137) (0.147) (0.146) (0.147) 
√R&Dit 0.225** 0.227** 0.206* 0.709*** 0.715*** 0.713*** 
 (0.109) (0.109) (0.109) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) 
ln SIZEit -0.051*** -0.054*** -0.049*** -0.062*** -0.062*** -0.063*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
√TANG 0.201* 0.197* 0.201* -0.038 -0.045 -0.039 
 (0.108) (0.108) (0.107) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) 
  
                                                          
801 Source: Own representation. 
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In view of total effects, for models M1 and M3, the benefits arising from lower 
liquidity costs are not strong enough to overcompensate the negative direct effects 
(path c’) of corporate diversification on firm value, causing the total effects to be 
statistically significant and negative. By contrast, for models M5 and M6 significant 
and positive total effects are obtained, again showing that corporate diversification 
should not per se be considered a value-reducing strategy. This proposition should 
especially hold when the positive liquidity effects are properly managed by the 
firm (e.g. through an optimisation of the shareholder structure802). The remaining 
models M2 and M4 do not show significant total effects. 
With a view to the control variables, the results of the multilevel mediation 
model are in a qualified sense comparable to the results of the fixed effects 
regressions contained in Table 27. While the influence of some control variable has 
been strengthened (e. g. Altman’s Z, R&D), other receive an opposite sign in the 
mediating models (e. g. CAPEX; CASH, TANG). The differences could be based on 
the deviating estimation procedures (1-1-1 sem model vs “within estimator”). 
Table 32 shows the results of the mediation models M7 to M12, which differ 
from models M1 to M6 only in terms of the liquidity estimator. Instead of the bid-
ask spread, the models M7 to M12 use the relative turnover ratio as introduced in 
section III.3. As the level of liquidity is a positive function of turnover, positive 
coefficients on the indirect path (a*b) suggest positive liquidity effects from 
diversification and vice versa. Again, due to variable transformation, an inverse 
relationship applies to models M11 and M12.803 
 
  
                                                          
802 Common methods of optimizing the shareholder structure include, among 
other instruments, share buybacks, dividend distributions, dual listings, and 
investor relations. For an analysis of the various recommendations, see Rojahn, 
2008, p. 191 ff. 
803 For a description of the transformation procedure, see section IV.2.3. 
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Table 32: Mediating effects of stock-turnover on the diversifications effect804 
The multilevel mediation models (1-1-1) have been fitted by ‘maximum likelihood’ using the gsem 
command in STATA 13. Robust standard errors are in parentheses (Huber–White sandwich 
estimators). Bootstrap results for indirect effects based on 5000 simulations. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  














Direct effect (c’) -0.065*** -0.027 -0.176*** 0.031 -0.257** -0.221 
 (0.022) (0.036) (0.041) (0.029) (0.115) (0.153) 
Indirect effect (a*b) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.008) 
Total effect (c’+a*b) -0.065*** -0.027 -0.176*** 0.032 -0.263** -0.227 
 (0.022) (0.036) (0.041) (0.029) (0.115) (0.153) 
Path a: √𝐓𝐔𝐑𝐍𝐎𝐕𝐄𝐑𝐢𝐭 ← 𝐃𝐈𝐕𝐢𝐭 
 -0.002 -0.001 -0.006** 0.004*** -0.017** -0.017** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.009) 
Path b: 𝐄𝐅𝐕𝐢𝐭 ← √𝐓𝐔𝐑𝐍𝐎𝐕𝐄𝐑𝐢𝐭 
 -0.044 -0.023 -0.080 0.394 0.368 0.375 
 (0.370) (0.371) (0.370) (0.397) (0.397) (0.397) 
Control variables: 𝐥𝐧𝐄𝐅𝐕𝐢𝐭 ← 𝐗𝐢𝐭 
√ALTMAN′s Zit 0.062*** 0.063*** 0.061*** 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.093*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
√CAPEXit -0.629** -0.642** -0.672*** -0.302 -0.313 -0.306 
 (0.250) (0.250) (0.249) (0.266) (0.266) (0.266) 
√CASHit -0.330*** -0.330*** -0.343*** -0.303*** -0.298*** -0.302*** 
 (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) 
√CFTAit 0.338*** 0.348*** 0.337*** 0.565*** 0.559*** 0.572*** 
 (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.107) (0.107) (0.107) 
√DEBTit 0.187 0.192 0.177 0.009 0.003 0.008 
 (0.139) (0.139) (0.139) (0.149) (0.149) (0.149) 
√R&Dit 0.250** 0.254** 0.230** 0.753*** 0.760*** 0.761*** 
 (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.118) (0.118) (0.118) 
ln SIZEit -0.035*** -0.038*** -0.034*** -0.039*** -0.039*** -0.041*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
√TANG 0.172 0.169 0.171 -0.096 -0.105 -0.097 
 (0.110) (0.110) (0.109) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) 
 
  
                                                          
804 Source: Own representation. 
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The results presented in Table 32 are far less clear and only partially support 
the hypothesis of liquidity as a mediator in the diversification-performance linkage: 
As far as the indirect effects of the turnover ratio are concerned, none of the tested 
models shows a statistically significant regression coefficient. Apart from the lack 
of statistical significance, the market-implied diversification measures show a small 
positive effect while the regression coefficients of the indirect paths for models M7 
to M9 are near to zero.805 
Related to the direction and height of the direct effects, there is only one major 
change between models M1 to M6 and M7 to M12. Again, the regression 
coefficients for BDIV (M7) and H4DIV (M9) show that after controlling for the 
mediating effects of liquidity, destroys shareholder value. By contrast to model M5 
(MHDIV0.5), the regression coefficient for the direct effect of model M11 (MHDIV0.5) 
turns out to be significantly negative, revealing that corporate diversification, in 
fact, can generate additional value adjusted for liquidity effects. 
Regarding total effects as well as the control variables, the results of both 
mediation models are comparable among themselves, so that a separate analysis is 
not required here. 
 
                                                          
805 Please note that the pure regression coefficient must not be a good indicator 
for the effect size of the indirect effect (e.g. because of divergent variabe scales). For 
further reading, see Preacher & Kelley, 2011, p. 93ff. 
 
 
V. SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
V.1. SUMMARY 
Although corporate diversification has a rich tradition as a topic of research 
in the fields of strategic management and finance for almost 50 years, meta-
analytical reviews of the diversification literature by Benito‐Osorio et al. (2012), 
Erdorf et al. (2013), and Martin and Sayrak (2003) point to considerable confusion 
about the net impacts of diversification on shareholder value.806  
Drawing on the insights from the dividend growth model as populated by 
Gordon (1959), there are two channels through which corporate diversification can 
affect shareholder value: by influencing either corporate level cash flows or 
capitalisation rates.807 With a view to corporate level cash flows, a large fraction of 
the literature explains the findings of the valuation discount by focusing on the 
ability of a diversified firm vis-à-vis a focused firm to generate cash flows: While 
the benefits of diversification are driven by the efficiency of internal capital markets 
or debt coinsurance effects, the most prominent argument put forth against 
diversification is that it amplifies existing agency problems which cause 
inefficiencies in the capital allocation process. Other studies, however, doubt the 
existence of a diversification discount and argue that the loss in shareholder value 
is the result of factors other than diversification strategies including an endogeneity 
bias, sample selection bias, or construct validation bias.808 
Besides the effect of divergent corporate-level cash flows, differences in the 
capitalisation rates of diversified firms and focused firms might contribute to the 
finding of a valuation difference between diversified firms and focused firms. If, all 
                                                          
806 Cp. Benito‐Osorio et al., 2012, p. 328f.; Erdorf et al., 2013, p. 192ff.; Martin & 
Sayrak, 2003, p. 42ff. 
807 Section II.4.1.1 describes the economic framework surrounding the 
diversification-performance linkage in greater detail. 
808 For an introduction on the influence of corporate level cash flows on the 
diversification-performance linkage, see section II.4.1.2. 
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else equal, the required rate of return shareholders expect to receive is higher for 
diversified firms than for a portfolio of otherwise similar but focused firms, then 
they might be less valued.809 Different securities can have different returns for 
various reasons; Among such factors, this research study stresses the mediating 
role of liquidity of equity.810  
Analysing the impact of corporate diversification on the shareholder value 
adjusted for stock market liquidity, the theoretical implications are equivocal:811 On 
the one hand, diversified firms might benefit from a “flight to liquidity’’. It is often 
argued that diversified firms are less affecting by expected and unexpected market-
wide liquidity shocks compared to focused firms due to a size effect which might 
call for corporate diversification from an equity investors’ point of view. Above and 
beyond, looking at diversified firms as a collection of focused firms, they may be 
less subject to information asymmetries. Informed investors often possess private 
information about the value of a particular business segment but do not have 
superior knowledge about all business segments that form the corporate umbrella. 
In effect, any informational advantage with respect to a distinct business segment 
is likely to be offset by changes in the value of the diversified firm’s other business 
segments that the informed trader knows less about. As adverse selection costs are 
an integral part of the liquidity premium, less severe information asymmetries 
reduce liquidity costs, and ceteris paribus lead to substantial increases in 
shareholder value.812 
On the other hand, increasing agency costs may prevent investors from 
assessing the value of corporate diversification correctly, amplifying their potential 
unwillingness to trade the equity of diversified firms. The aggregate nature of the 
diversified firm’s accounting numbers, as well as the quality of the figures reported 
for each business segment, might be distorted by the managers’ incentive to avoid 
                                                          
809 For an introduction to corporate valuation, see section II.1.3. 
810 For a discussion of the valuation effects of stock market liquidity, see section 
III.2. 
811 For a detailed discussion of the theoretical and empirical implications of stock 
liquidity on the diversification effect, see sections II.4.1.3 and II.4.3, respectively. 
812 For further reading on the components of transaction costs, see section III.1. 
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disclosing information on poorly performing segments.813 Therefore, research 
analysts might prefer focused firms to reduce their economic costs of generating 
information.814 Following a diversified firm can increase the analyst’s career 
penalties associated with the production of inaccurate forecasts (e.g. lower 
reputation, risk of job loss).815 To the extent that the potential for an informational 
advantage of insiders over outside investors increases with the degree of 
diversification, greater diversification can lead to higher liquidity premiums 
because dealers price protect against potential losses from trading with better-
informed investors by demanding higher bid-ask spreads.816 The difference 
between the prices for purchases from the dealer (dealer’s ask price) and selling 
assets to the dealer (dealer’s bid price) is referred to as the bid-ask spread. It is a 
well-accepted liquidity measure. 
In this study, various panel regression techniques and multilevel mediation 
models are applied to reach conclusions about the relationship between corporate 
diversification, stock market liquidity, and the traditional Berger and Ofek (1995) 
excess firm value measure. The final firm sample consists of 1,981 firm observations 
across the years 2007 to 2016 corresponding to 343 European non-financial firms. 
The present study thus not only extends the country focus from the U.S. to Europe 
but also includes different economic cycles ranging from the foothills of the 
financial market crisis to pronounced bullish markets. 
The operationalisation of diversification takes a vital role when analysing its 
effects on shareholder value. Due to the multi-dimensional character, the 
diversification construct does not lend itself to easy conceptualisation. In effect, 
researchers using different measurement concepts might end up with very 
different results even if they build on the same sample. Thus, as in other 
diversification studies, this research employs a series of diversification measures 
including a binary variable based on four-digit SIC codes and two revenue-based 
Herfindahl indices, one relying on two-digit SIC codes and the other on four-digit 
SIC codes. To mitigate the problems of traditional diversification measures based 
                                                          
813 Cp. Bens et al., 2011, p. 420; Berger & Hann, 2007, p. 873f. 
814 Cp. Brennan & Tamarowski, 2000, p. 27; Cai & Zeng, 2011, p. 76. 
815 Cp. Duru & Reeb, 2002, p. 417f.; Zuckerman, 2000, p. 595. 
816 Cp. Damodaran, 2005, p. 5; Welker, 1995, p. 802.  
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on accounting information, analyses are also conducted using a newly developed 
market-implied measurement approach that exclusively utilises stock market data. 
More specifically, the market-implied diversification measures are estimated by 
forward stepwise regressions within which a firm’s stock market return series is 
regressed against a set of ten STOXX® EUROPE 600 sector indices. Because of their 
novelty, the market-implied diversification measures are subjected to detailed 
validity tests. 
Using the different proxies for corporate diversification and controlling for 
commonly accepted firm-specific and diversification-specific factors, the results of 
the empirical analysis suggest that corporate diversification, at best, does not 
influence excess firm values. The results of the various panel regression models are 
inconclusive: While the business count measures suggest a positive relationship 
between diversification and excess value, an inverse relationship applies for the 
market-implied diversification measures. Consequently, hypotheses H1.1 and H1.2 
that, on average, diversified firms trade at a significant discount, are not fully 
supported.  
To further reinforce the results of the univariate and multivariate regression 
models, robustness checks with respect to the time-varying impacts of 
diversification on excess value, linearity assumptions, and endogeneity biases are 
conducted. The tests also refuse that diversification negatively affects shareholder 
value and, thus, support the findings from the panel regression models. 
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Table 33: Summary statistics of diversification’s effect on firm value817 
The table summarises the findings on research hypothesis H1.1 and H1.2. 
Research question  
Results support 
hypothesis 
H1.1: “There are significant valuation differences between European non-financial 
focused firms and diversified firms.” 
 
 Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
Yes (for 5 out of 6 
measures, section 
IV.3.2.1) 
 Fixed effects regressions 
Yes (for 5 out of 6 
measures, section 
IV.3.2.2) 
 Interaction effects 
Yes (for 8 out of 12 
measures, section 
IV.3.2.3) 
 Non-linear diversification measures 
No (for 10 out of 12, 
section IV.3.2.3) 
 
Endogeneity (two-stage least squares instrumental variable 
regression) 
No 
(for 6 out of 6 
measures, section 
IV.3.2.3) 
H1.2: “On average, the valuation difference is negative meaning that diversified 
firms trade at a discount.” 
 
 Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
Yes (for 3 out of 6 
measures, section 
IV.3.2.1) 
 Fixed effects regressions 
No (for 4 out of 6 
measures, section 
IV.3.2.2) 
 Interaction effects 
No (for 3 out of 6 
models, section 
IV.3.2.3) 
 Non-linear diversification measures 




Endogeneity (two-stage least squares instrumental variable 
regression) 
No 




Above and beyond, multilevel mediation analysis is applied to show (i) 
whether focus affects the liquidity of traded equity of non-financial firms and (ii) if 
stock liquidity mediates the relationship between corporate diversification and 
shareholder value. In the mediation analyses, liquidity is measured using bid-ask 
                                                          
817 Source: Own representation. 
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spreads and turnover ratios as representatives for the class of pre-trade and post-
trade liquidity measures, respectively. The multi-level mediation models follow a 
structural equation approach (SEM) and are fitted by ‘maximum likelihood’ 
procedure using the gsem command in STATA 13. Sobel’s (1982, 1986) z-test which 
allows for statistical inferences about the direct, indirect, and total effect of stock 
liquidity, is rejected in favour of a bootstrap test. 
Table 34 summarises the main findings of the mediating models: In terms of 
indirect effects, the results imply that diversified firms have higher liquidity scores 
compared to portfolios of otherwise similar focused firms, which, in turn, leads to 
increasing firm values. However, these findings hold only for bid-ask spreads, 
whereas there is no significant indirect effect of diversification on excess firm value 
via stock turnover. As far as the direct effect of stock liquidity is concerned, a 
significant and negative association remains for the binary variable (BDIV) and the 
four-digit Herfindahl measure (H4DIV) across both liquidity measures, whereas 
MHDIV directs at significant gains from diversification when liquidity is 
operationalised through turnover ratios. The results on the other diversification 
measures lack statistical significance. Finally, with a view on total effects, only the 
path coefficients for models M1, M3, M5, M6, M7, M9, and M11 are significant. 
However, their signs are inconclusive. While the traditional measures (M1, M3, M7, 
and M9) support the notion of the value-destroying character of corporate 
diversification, whereas the market-implied diversification measures find a 
significant positive effect revealing that the gains of corporate diversification in 
terms of a higher liquidity dominate. 
All in all, this work shows that empirical diversification research in Europe 
is only just beginning and that much more research is needed to decipher the 
mystery of the impacts of corporate diversification on firm value. 
  
207 Summary and implications  
Table 34: Summary statistics of mediating effects818 
The table summarises the main findings of the 12 mediation models. “Neg” and “pos” indicate a 
negative or positive relationship between the independent variable and excess firm value corrected 
for inverted relationships in case of MHDIV0.5 and MDIV0.5, respectively. *, **, *** denote significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 








Type of  
mediation 
H2.1: “The relationship between corporate diversification and firm value is mediated by stock liquidity, 
such that the more that diversification enhances liquidity, the higher the excess firm value.” 
Panel (A): bid-ask spread 
M1: BDIV neg*** pos* neg*** yes complementary 
M2: H2DIV0.5 neg pos*** neg yes indirect only 
M3: H4DIV neg*** pos* neg*** yes complementary 
M4: MCOUNT pos pos*** pos yes indirect only 
M5: MHDIV0.5 pos pos*** pos** yes indirect only 
M6: MDIV0.5 pos pos*** pos** yes indirect only 
Panel (B): stock turnover 
M7: BDIV neg*** pos neg*** no direct only 
M8: H2DIV0.5 neg pos neg no no effect 
M9: H4DIV neg*** pos neg*** no direct only 
M10: MCOUNT pos pos pos no no effect 
M11: MHDIV0.5 pos** pos pos** no direct only 
M12: MDIV0.5 pos pos pos no no effect 
 
  
                                                          
818 Source: Own representation. 
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V.2. LIMITATIONS 
As with most empirical research, this study has considerable limitations. 
Objections aim primarily at the sample selection process, the appropriateness of the 
dependent and independent variables, and the models employed. 
First and foremost, the sample firms are not randomly selected but are chosen 
because they have been a member of the STOXX® EUROPE 600 index between 2007 
and 2016. Therefore, the study places a high weight on developed countries and 
large firms. Additionally, certain types of corporations have been left out (e.g. 
financial institutions). Thus, the empirical results can be influenced by the 
institutional environment of the firm’s home country such as the information 
efficiency on national capital markets, corporate governance systems, law system, 
or economic indicators such as interest rates or GDP growth rates. Future research 
might gain additional insights into the contribution of liquidity to the 
diversification effect by including small and mid-sized companies and firms from 
emerging market countries. 
Second, the financial performance of firms does not lend itself to easy 
conceptualisation and measurement. This thesis solely builds on the traditional 
Berger and Ofek (1995) excess firm value measure to operationalise the valuation 
effects of corporate diversification. Among other downsides, the excess firm value 
measure requires semi-strong-form efficiency, neglects the positive effect of 
corporate diversification on bondholder value as suggested by Glaser and Mueller 
(2010) and Mansi and Reeb (2002)819, and must not necessarily reflect the efficacy of 
diversification efforts from the viewpoint of a firm’s senior management who are 
used to making decisions based on financial statements rather than value-
orientated indicators. Since to date, there is no silver bullet on how to best measure 
the performance effects of corporate diversification as stressed by Klier (2009), 
Perry (1998), and Schüle (1992)820, using other performance indicators such as pure 
accounting-based or market-based ratios might lend further support to the findings 
of this thesis. 
Third, the gain or loss in excess firm value must not merely be due to 
diversification. To reduce the specification bias, this thesis includes both non-
                                                          
819 Cp. Glaser & Mueller, 2010, p. 2307ff.; Mansi & Reeb, 2002, p. 2167ff. 
820 Cp. Klier, 2009, p. 35ff.; Perry, 1998, p. 77ff.; Schüle, 1992, p. 102ff. 
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diversification specific variables and variables that are ought to capture the 
likelihood of diversification. However, some control variables have been missed 
out simply because they could not be obtained in the primary databases used for 
this investigation. A prominent example of an omitted variable is “ownership 
structure”.821 For instance, managers with higher equity ownership face higher 
idiosyncratic risk and therefore might diversify their firms more to lower their 
employment risk. The weak instrument issue in the two-stage least squares 
regression might be an artefact of missing independent variables (instrument 
variables). 
Fourth, since there is no single measure that captures all aspects of stock 
liquidity, different results might be obtained when using other indicators of 
liquidity. The measures used in this research study notably fail to distinguish 
between transitory and permanent price movements and, therefore, are vulnerable 
against persistent price movements that result from information flow.  
Finally, as with any new invention or measurement concept, a great deal 
remains to be done in applying the new measurement concept to empirical 
research. Besides further validity studies, it would be interesting to rerun prior 
empirical diversification research using the market-implied diversification 
measures. Also, linking the measure to distinctive characteristics such as related vs 
unrelated diversification might provide a better understanding of the 
diversification phenomenon. 
V.3. IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 
The focus of this research is on the relationship between the type and scope 
of corporate diversification as well as stock market liquidity on the one hand and 
shareholder value on the other. At the theoretical level, central explanatory 
approaches for the success of diversification and its impact on stock liquidity are 
discussed throughout sections II and 0. For future research work, several starting 
points both in terms of content and methodology can be highlighted. 
                                                          
821 Cp. Aggarwal & Samwick, 2003, p. 71ff.; Denis et al., 1997, p. 135ff.; Hyland 
& Diltz, 2002, p. 51ff. 
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The first link to future diversification research concerns the 
operationalisation of corporate diversification without which (i) researchers cannot 
investigate the diversification-performance linkage and (ii) managers cannot 
decide about diversification. The review of the diversification literature has shown 
that, to date, there is no generally accepted measurement concept. In this respect, 
the study contributes to the growing body of literature by developing and applying 
a new estimator to assess the level of corporate diversification. The theoretical 
arguments for the newly developed diversification measures as well as the validity 
tests suggest that the market-implied approach offers a valuable alternative to the 
well-founded business-count measures. However, the results also demonstrate that 
there is a need for further investigations. For instance, the causes for the low 
correlation coefficients between traditional business count measures and market-
implied diversification measures yet remains a puzzle. 
The second implication for future diversification research concerns the 
influence of ownership identity on the diversification-performance linkage. In 
particular, it could be interesting to enhance the agency view on corporate 
diversification with a finer grained and institutionally conditioned view of 
ownership. The various ownership types (e.g. family ownership, state ownership, 
financial institution ownership) are characterized by different motivations (e.g. 
firm survival, economic policy, effectiveness of business strategy) and capabilities 
(e.g. strong local networks, institutional networks, expertise in mergers and 
acquisitions); thereby likely not only affecting the value of diversification but also 
the level of stock market liquidity.822 Above and beyond the pure ownership 
identity, the investors’ country can be considered a further determinant of the 
propensity to diversify and the gains and losses associated with a greater / lower 
level of diversification.  
Finally, diversification research might benefit from the application of more 
advanced machine learning techniques including classification trees, random 
forests, and support vector machines. While parametric methods such as linear 
regression techniques are often easy to fit and their coefficients have simple 
interpretations, they make strong assumptions about the functional form f(x) (e.g. 
linear relationship). In contrast, non-parametric methods do not prejudice any 
                                                          
822 Cp. Rojahn, 2017, p. 349ff. 
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nature about the association of the independent and dependent variables; thereby 
providing a more flexible and more accurate approach for assessing relationships. 
In addition to the implications for diversification research, the results of this 
study provide recommendations for corporate practice. The study chiefly reveals 
implications for the design of a company's business portfolio. First and foremost, it 
shows that corporate diversification is not per se a value-reducing strategy. The 
results of the market-implied diversification measures point to positive 
diversification premiums up to 5%. Moreover, the mean total effect from 
bootstrapping in the mediation models is positive, although not always statistically 
significant, for the market-implied diversification measures. Thus, diversification 
should not be categorically excluded when deciding about the long-term objectives 
planned to ensure the future of the firm.  
Second, the valuation difference between a diversified firm and an industry-
matched portfolio of focused firms cannot be attributed exclusively to a difference 
between the fundamental value and the market value of diversified firms as often 
claimed by senior managers.823 Instead, the results of the mediation analysis call for 
a shift from a pure cash flow-oriented view of diversification to an integrated view 
considering both future cash flows and liquidity premiums as part of future 
returns. To unleash the full potential of corporate diversification in the sense of 
value-oriented management, senior managers should (i) reduce its downsides on 
future cash flows (e. g. cross-subsidisation, fringe benefits) and (ii) continue to 
support the positive liquidity effect. There are countless ways that companies can 
take to increase the liquidity of their traded equity instruments including stock 
splits, dividend payments, and seasoned equity offerings.824 
 
 
                                                          
823 Cp. Young & Sutcliffe, 1990, p. 20. 
824 For a detailed overview, see Rojahn, 2008, p. 191ff. 
 
 






Appendix 1: Mediating effects of bid-ask spreads on the diversifications effect with STDRET825 
The multilevel mediation models (1-1-1) have been fitted by ‘maximum likelihood’ using the gsem 
command in STATA 13. Robust standard errors are in parentheses (Huber–White sandwich 
estimators). Bootstrap results for indirect effects based on 5000 simulations. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  














Direct effect (c’) -0.066*** -0.031 -0.177*** 0.007 -0.130 -0.138 
 (0.022) (0.035) (0.040) (0.028) (0.130) (0.148) 
Indirect effect (a*b) 0.006* 0.013*** 0.010* 0.024*** -0.090*** -0.183*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.023) (0.035) 
Total effect (c’+a*b) -0.060*** -0.018 -0.167*** 0.031 -0.220* -0.322** 
 (0.022) (0.036) (0.040) (0.028) (0.113) (0.150) 
Path a: 𝐥𝐧𝐑𝐄𝐋𝐒𝐢𝐭 ← 𝐃𝐈𝐕𝐢𝐭 
 -0.002** -0.004*** -0.003* -0.006*** 0.021*** 0.044*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) 
Path b: 𝐄𝐅𝐕𝐢𝐭 ← 𝐥𝐧𝐑𝐄𝐋𝐒𝐢𝐭 
 -2.998*** -3.004*** -3.013*** -4.233*** -4.184*** -4.181*** 
 (0.581) (0.583) (0.580) (0.624) (0.623) (0.625) 
Control variables: 𝐥𝐧𝐄𝐅𝐕𝐢𝐭 ← 𝐗𝐢𝐭 
√ALTMAN′s Zit 0.053*** 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.076*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
√CAPEXit -0.534** -0.545** -0.579** -0.262 -0.269 -0.265 
 (0.242) (0.242) (0.242) (0.260) (0.260) (0.260) 
√CASHit -0.293*** -0.293*** -0.307*** -0.192* -0.190* -0.191* 
 (0.104) (0.104) (0.103) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) 
√CFTAit 0.305*** 0.315*** 0.305*** 0.485*** 0.482*** 0.489*** 
 (0.100) (0.100) (0.099) (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) 
√DEBTit 0.083 0.088 0.074 -0.173 -0.175 -0.174 
 (0.138) (0.138) (0.138) (0.145) (0.145) (0.145) 
√R&Dit 0.222** 0.226** 0.204* 0.698*** 0.703*** 0.705*** 
 (0.109) (0.109) (0.108) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) 
                                                          
825 Source: Own representation. 
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ln SIZEit -0.056*** -0.058*** -0.054*** -0.073*** -0.073*** -0.075*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
√STDRET -0.336*** -0.333*** -0.334*** -0.730*** -0.726*** -0.733*** 
 (0.086) (0.086) (0.085) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) 
√TANG 0.202* 0.198* 0.201* 0.002 -0.004 -0.000 
 (0.107) (0.108) (0.107) (0.115) (0.115) (0.114) 
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Appendix 2: Mediating effects of stock-turnover on the diversifications effect with STDRET826 
The multilevel mediation models (1-1-1) have been fitted by ‘maximum likelihood’ using the gsem 
command in STATA 13. Robust standard errors are in parentheses (Huber–White sandwich 
estimators). Bootstrap results for indirect effects based on 5000 simulations. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  














Direct effect (c’) -0.064*** -0.021 -0.172*** 0.018 -0.175 -0.220 
 (0.01) (0.036) (0.040) (0.028) (0.115) (0.151) 
Indirect effect (a*b) -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 0.005* -0.017* -0.017 
 (0.022) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.010) (0.011) 
Total effect (c’+a*b) -0.065*** -0.021 -0.174*** 0.023 -0.192* -0.237 
 (0.022) (0.036) (0.040) (0.279) (0.115) (0.151) 
Path a: √𝐓𝐔𝐑𝐍𝐎𝐕𝐄𝐑𝐢𝐭 ← 𝐃𝐈𝐕𝐢𝐭 
 -0.002 -0.001 -0.006** 0.004*** -0.017** -0.017** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.009) 
Path b: 𝐄𝐅𝐕𝐢𝐭 ← √𝐓𝐔𝐑𝐍𝐎𝐕𝐄𝐑𝐢𝐭 
 0.342 0.365 0.302 1.037*** 1.010** 1.009** 
 (0.367) (0.368) (0.367) (0.397) (0.397) (0.397) 
Control variables: 𝐥𝐧𝐄𝐅𝐕𝐢𝐭 ← 𝐗𝐢𝐭 
√ALTMAN′s Zit 0.054*** 0.055*** 0.053*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
√CAPEXit -0.548** -0.558** -0.592** -0.203 -0.212 -0.208 
 (0.244) (0.244) (0.243) (0.262) (0.262) (0.262) 
√CASHit -0.305*** -0.305*** -0.318*** -0.236** -0.233** -0.234** 
 (0.104) (0.105) (0.104) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) 
√CFTAit 0.280*** 0.290*** 0.280*** 0.457*** 0.454*** 0.464*** 
 (0.100) (0.100) (0.100) (0.106) (0.106) (0.106) 
√DEBTit 0.100 0.106 0.091 -0.152 -0.155 -0.154 
 (0.139) (0.139) (0.139) (0.147) (0.147) (0.147) 
√R&Dit 0.248** 0.253** 0.229** 0.745*** 0.750*** 0.754*** 
 (0.109) (0.110) (0.109) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) 
ln SIZEit -0.043*** -0.046*** -0.042*** -0.053*** -0.054*** -0.057*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
√STDRET -0.459*** -0.458*** -0.456*** -0.878*** -0.870*** -0.881*** 
 (0.086) (0.086) (0.085) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) 
√TANG 0.184* 0.182* 0.184* -0.051 -0.057 -0.053 
 (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.115) (0.115) (0.115) 
                                                          
826 Source: Own representation. 
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Appendix 3: Empirical studies on diversification measures827 
The table summarizes the results of six research studies that assess the construct validity of various 
diversification measures. Definition of performance measures: ROA, ROCF, ROE, ROS mean return 
on assets, on cash flows, on equity, on sales, respectively. SDROS and SDROCF stand for standard 
deviation of return on sales and on cash flows, respectively. SDDS identifies the standard deviation 
of daily stock price changes. Definition of performance measures: NSD, BSD, and MNSD mean 
narrow spectrum diversification, broad spectrum diversification, and mean narrow spectrum 















(2-, 3-, 4-digit level), 
Rumelt’s (1974) 
classification 
High degree of correspondence 
between business count measures 
and categorical measures. 
Amit and Livnat 
(1988a) 










High degree of correspondence 
between Rumelt’s (1974) 
classification and various business 
count measures. Conglomerate 
diversification reduces the 
variability of profits at the expense 
of lower profitability. 
Hoskisson et al. 
(1993) 
160 U.S. firms: 
1988-1989 






The construct validity of the 
diversification measures seems to 
be strong. Both measures show 
strong and negative relationships 
with accounting performance. 
Lubatkin et al. 
(1993) 
286 U.S. firms; 
1980-1987 
ROE, cash flow 
growth, SDDS 
NSD, BSD, MNSD, 
Rumelt’s (1974) 
classification 
A high degree of correspondence 
between the two unweighted 
product-count measures (NSD, 
BSD) and Rumelt's categorical 
measure in terms of convergent 
and predictive validity. The results 
are not as supportive for MNSD. 
Hall and John 
(1994) 
205 U.S. firms; 
1987-1989 
ROA, ROE, ROS 
Berry-Herfindahl index 




Business count measures do not 
predict the same performance 
relationships as categories 
developed using Rumelt's (1974) 
classification rules. 
Sambharya (2000) 
54 U.S. firms; 
1985 
ROA, ROE, ROS 
Berry-Herfindahl index 
(4-digit level), Entropy 
index, Rumelt’s (1974) 
classification 
Low degree of correspondence 
between diversification measures 
along all dimensions: convergence, 




                                                          
827 Source: Own representation. 
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Appendix 4: Evidence on the diversification-performance linkage from selected cross-sectional 
studies828 
The table summarizes the results of 44 cross-sectional studies that assess the effect of corporate 
diversification on the financial performance of exchange-listed firms. Definition of diversification 
measures: 4D means four-digit SIC code and so forth. Definition of performance measures: ROA, 
ROE, ROI, ROS mean return on assets, equity, investment, and sales, respectively, EPS means 
earnings per share, GOS means growth on sales, and SDROS is the standard deviation of ROS. “NR” 












Anderson et al. 
(2000) 






Low stock ownership 
of CEOs does not 
explain the discount. 
Beckmann 
(2006) 





Discount: 17% to 
23%*** 
Berger and Ofek 
(1995) 





Discount: 13% to 
15%*** 







explains half of the 
discount. 




specific entry barriers 
are the main driver 


















Discount: 6% to 
11.4%n.r. 
Internal capital 
markets do not cause 
the discount. 
Borah et al. 
(2018) 





Discount: 7.46%*** to 
26.59%*** for low and 
high tech firms. 
Braakmann and 
Wagner (2011) 





points reduction in 












when controlling for 
the endogeneity of 
                                                          
828 Source: Own representation. 


















Discount: 13%*** due 
to simultaneity bias, 
no discount with 
2SLS. 






advantages in the 
order of 5.9% to 7.3%. 
Denis et al. 
(2002) 




























returns than related 
diversifiers. 
Fauver et al. 
(2003) 






to 8.41%** contingent 
on financial / legal / 
regulatory conditions. 
Ferris and Sarin 
(2000) 





Discount: Decrease in 
analyst following by 
0.62*** for each new 
segment. One 
additional analyst 










for the book value 
bias reduces the 
discount from 
14.7%*** to 5.1%**. 
Gopalan and 
Xie (2011) 





but is reduced by 
approx. 65% in years 
of financial distress. 





Discount: 9% to 
12.6%*** 
Grinyer et al. 
(1980) 
U.K. 1969-1973 48 Wrigley (1970) NP, ROI Inconclusive. 
Hann et al. 
(2013) 
U.S. 1988-2006 30,554 
Number of 
segments (4D) 
Cost of capital 
Premium: Value gain 
of approximately 
5%** when moving 
from the highest to 
the lowest cash flow 
correlations quintile. 
Hoechle et al. 
(2012) 













Inconclusive: -9% to 
+ 20%** (quadratic 



















Inconclusive: -20% to 










Discount: 10.3% to 
24.7%*** but discount 



















Discount: 30% to -
5%n.r.. Slightly half of 
the cross-sectional 
variance of excess 
values can be 
explained by the 
differences in future 
returns and by 
covariance of returns 
with cash flow. 
Lamont and 
Polk (2002) 






explains more than 
40% of the discount. 
Lang and Stulz 
(1994) 



















Discount: 8.3% to 
15.5%*** for JP and 
UK firms. No 









Discount: 5.9% to 







U.S. 1940-1970 144 Rumelt (1974) Jensen index 
Related 
diversification is 
superior. Firms using 
constrained strategies 
have risk-adjusted 
returns that are 35 
percent higher over a 
60-month period than 
those of other firms in 
the market. 
Mansi and Reeb 
(2002) 






After adjusting for 
the book-value bias, 
excess value is 
insignificantly related 
to diversification. 














U.S. 1986-1988 132 Own measure ROS 
Related 
diversification is 
superior. If based on 
















Miller (2006) U.S. 1990 531 
Multi-segment 
dummy (3D) 
Log of market 
value 
Discount: 11.3% to 
13.6%* 
Rumelt (1974) U.S. 1949-1969 246 Rumelt (1974) EPS, ROE, ROI 
Related 
diversification is 
superior. Firms using 
constrained strategies 
(DC, RC) are higher 
performers than firms 
using other strategies. 
Santalo and 
Becerra (2008) 






Net effects depend on 
industry 




Disocunt: 10% to 
60%** 
Thomas and Fee 
(2000) 












U.S. 1980-1984 216 
Broad and mean 
narrow spectrum 
diversity 




superior. On average, 
related diversifiers 




extremely low levels 
and extremely high 
levels of diversity. 
Villalonga 
(2004a) 
U.S. 1989-1996 12,708 
Multi-segment 
dummy (SIC code 
& BITS code) 
Tobin’s Q 
Inconclusive: -18%* 
for segment data to 
+28%* for BITS data 





Discount: 5.7%n.r. but 
when capital market 
conditions become 




relative to their 
focused counterparts. 





exposure to negative 
changes in the capital 
market conditions  
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Appendix 5: Evidence on the diversification-performance linkage from selected short- and long-
term event studies829 
The table summarizes the results of 18 event studies that are concerned with the effect of corporate 
diversification on the financial market-based return of firms. Definition of diversification measures: 
4D means four-digit SIC code and so forth. Definition of event window: d, m, and y mean days, 
month, and years, respectively. “NR” indicates that the information is not reported. *, **, *** denote 





Specifications Findings Country Period Sample 
size 
Bühner (1990) DE 1973-1985 90 NR 
Abnormal return; 
-24m to +24m 
Discount: 9.38%n.r 
Morck et al. 
(1990) 




-2d to +1d 
Discount: 1.89%* 
Agrawal et al. 
(1992) 






















-1d to 0d 
Discount: 4.3%*** 
Berger and Ofek 
(1999) 




-1d to +1d 
Discount: 4.4%*** 
Desai and Jain 
(1999) 













-5d to +5d 
Premium: 0.21%*** 
Hyland and Diltz 
(2002) 




-1y to 0y 
Discount: 17%*** 
Graham et al. 
(2002) 




-1y to +1y 
Discount: 12.10%*** 
Burch and Nanda 
(2003) 
US 1979-1996 106 Own measure 
EFV 
-1y to +1y 
Discount: 6.1%n.r. 




-1d to +1d 
Discount: 5.4%*** 













-1d to +1d 
Discount: 2.62%*** 
Dos Santos et al. 
(2008) 





















-1d to +1d 
Premium: 0.89%*** 




-1d to +1d 
Discount: 4.86%*** 
                                                          
829 Source: Own representation based on Akbulut & Matsusaka, 2010, p. 247f.; 
Beckmann, 2006, p. 30; Vollmar, 2014, p. 144f. 
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